State v. Craig

• Decision Date: 18 April 2017
• Docket Number: No. COA16-1027,COA16-1027
• Citation: 798 S.E.2d 438 (Table)
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina, Plaintiff, v. Shantez Rickey CRAIG, Defendant.

798 S.E.2d 438 (Table)

STATE of North Carolina, Plaintiff,

v.Shantez Rickey CRAIG, Defendant.

No. COA16-1027

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: April 18, 2017

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Joseph L. Hyde, for the State.

Yoder Law PLLC, by Jason Christopher Yoder, for defendant-appellant.

ZACHARY, Judge.

Shantez Rickey Craig (defendant) appeals from judgments revoking probation and activating sentences that were imposed in separate cases upon his convictions for discharging a firearm into an occupied building and possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver. Defendant has not challenged the activation of his sentence for possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation and activate the sentence for discharge of a firearm into an occupied building. Defendant contends that an order extending his probation in this case was invalid and that, as a result, his probation expired prior to the date on which his probation officer filed a violation report. After careful review of the record and consideration of the law in this area, we agree.

I. Background

Although this appeal arises from only two criminal charges, the record is complicated by the fact that proceedings related to these charges were conducted in Anson, Stanly, and Union Counties, with each county assigning a different file number to a given charge. In order to avoid confusion, we will outline the relevant history of each charge separately.

A. Defendant's Conviction for Discharge of a Firearm

On 18 July 2011, the Grand Jury for Anson County indicted defendant in Anson County File No. 11 CRS 50738 for discharge of a firearm into an occupied building. On 21 August 2012, defendant entered a plea of guilty to this charge. Judge Tanya T. Wallace sentenced defendant to 25 to 39 months' imprisonment. The sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on supervised probation for 24 months, effective 21 August 2012 and expiring on 21 August 2014.

A Union County probation officer filed a probation violation report on 13 December 2012, alleging that defendant had violated the terms of his probation in various respects. Union County assigned the File No. 12 CRS 3106 to defendant's violation of the probation imposed in Anson County in 11 CRS 50738. Another probation violation report was filed in Union County on 16 September 2013, alleging that defendant had violated his probation by, inter alia , being convicted in Stanly County on 8 April 2013 of possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver. On 10 January 2014, Judge Ebern T. Watson, III, found that defendant had violated his probation, and ordered that defendant be imprisoned for 90 days, with this time to be served in a drug rehabilitation program.

On 6 August 2014, Judge Kevin M. Bridges signed an order extending defendant's probation until 21 August 2015. The validity of this order, which is discussed in detail below, is the primary issue in defendant's appeal.

A Stanly County probation officer filed violation reports on 20 April 2015, alleging that defendant had violated the terms of his probation. On 15 March 2016, Judge Bridges conducted a hearing on defendant's alleged violation of probation, to which Stanly County had assigned File No. 15 CRS 524. Judge Bridges found that defendant had violated the terms of his probation and activated his sentence of 25 to 39 months' imprisonment. The court ordered that this sentence be served at the expiration of the sentence imposed upon defendant's conviction of possession with intent to sell or deliver marijuana. Defendant was given credit for 87 days of confinement prior to the activation of his sentence. Defendant has appealed the revocation of probation in this case, which we will refer to as 15 CRS 524, which is the file number under which the revocation was ordered.

B. Defendant's Conviction for Marijuana Possession

On 3 December 2012, defendant was indicted by the Grand Jury of Stanly County for possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver. On 8 April 2013, defendant pleaded guilty to this charge before Judge Julia Lynn Gullett, who sentenced defendant to five to fifteen months' imprisonment. The sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on supervised probation for 30 months. Stanly County assigned File No. 12 CRS 52496 to this case.

On 16 September 2013, a Union County probation officer filed a probation violation report, which was assigned Union County File No. 13 CRS 1808. On 21 February 2014, Judge Watson found that defendant had violated his probation, and ordered that defendant be imprisoned for 90 days, to be served in the DART Cherry drug rehabilitation program.

A Stanly County probation officer filed two more probation violation reports on 30 March 2015 and 20 April 2015. Thereafter, a hearing was conducted before Judge Bridges. On 15 March 2016, Judge Bridges signed an order in which the court found that defendant had violated the terms of his probation, revoked defendant's probation, and activated the sentence of five to fifteen months' imprisonment. Defendant was given credit for 371 days' confinement prior to revocation of probation. Defendant has not appealed the trial court's decision to activate this sentence.

II. Defendant's Petitions and Appellate Motion

On 20 October 2016, defendant filed a petition seeking issuance of a writ of certiorari in order to obtain review of the substantive merits of his appellate arguments. In our discretion we have granted defendant's petition. Defendant filed a second petition for certiorari on 14 November 2016, seeking review of the trial court's order extending defendant's probation. We have reviewed the validity of this order as part of our determination of the merits of defendant's appellate arguments, and therefore have denied defendant's petition. On 23 November 2016, defendant filed a motion asking us to take judicial notice of the Master Calendar of Superior Courts for the fall of 2014. We have granted defendant's motion and take judicial notice of the Master Calendar for fall of 2014, which is available on the North Carolina Court System web page.

III. Standard of Review

On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court's revocation in Stanly County case No. 15 CRS 524 of the term of probation imposed upon his conviction for discharge of a firearm into an occupied building. Defendant's original term of probation was scheduled to expire on 21 August 2014. Defendant argues that the order extending his probation until 21 August 2015 was invalid and that, as a result, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to revoke his probation on 15 March 2016, nineteen months after his probation had expired.

It is well-established that "[a] trial court lacks the authority to decide a particular case in the absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter of that action. ‘Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred upon the courts by either the North Carolina Constitution or by statute.’ " State v. McCulloch , ––– N.C. App. ––––, ––––, 756 S.E.2d 361, 364 (2014) (citing State v. Reinhardt , 183 N.C. App. 291, 292, 644 S.E.2d 26, 27 (2007), and quoting Harris v. Pembaur , 84 N.C. App. 666, 667, 353 S.E.2d 673, 675 (1987) ). "The extent to which ‘a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, reviewed de novo on appeal.’ ‘[A]n appellate court necessarily conducts a statutory analysis when analyzing whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction in a probation revocation hearing, and thus conducts a de novo review.’ " McCullough , ––– N.C. App. at ––––, 756 S.E.2d at 365 (quoting McKoy v. McKoy , 202 N.C. App. 509, 511, 689 S.E.2d 590, 592 (2010), and State v. Satanek , 190 N.C. App. 653, 656, 660 S.E.2d 623, 625 (2008) ).

IV. Analysis

A. Legal Principles

The law governing a defendant's challenge to a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction over the revocation of his probation is well-settled:

"[T]he issue of a court's jurisdiction over a matter may be raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal or by a court sua sponte ." "It is well settled that a court's jurisdiction to review a probationer's compliance with the terms of his probation is limited by statute." "Where jurisdiction is statutory and the Legislature requires the Court to exercise its jurisdiction in a certain manner, to follow a certain procedure, or otherwise subjects the Court to certain limitations, an act of the Court beyond these limits is in excess of its jurisdiction[, and] ... its judgment ... is void and of no effect."

State v. Gorman , 221 N.C. App. 330, 333, 727 S.E.2d 731, 733 (2012) (quoting State v. Webber , 190 N.C. App. 649, 650, 660 S.E.2d 621, 622 (2008), Reinhardt , 183 N.C. App. at 292, 644 S.E.2d at 27, and Allred v. Tucci , 85 N.C. App. 138, 143, 354 S.E.2d 291, 295 (1987) ).

Chapter 15A of the North Carolina General Statutes includes two statutory bases upon which a court may extend a defendant's term of probation. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(d) (2015) provides in pertinent part that:

(d) At any time prior to the expiration or termination of the probation period or in accordance with subsection (f) of this section, the court may after notice and hearing and for good cause shown extend the period of probation up to the maximum allowed under G.S. 15A-1342(a) and may modify the conditions of probation.... If a probationer violates a condition of probation at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the period of probation, the court, in accordance with the provisions of G.S. 15A-1345, may continue the defendant on probation, with or without modifying the conditions ... [or] may revoke the probation and activate the suspended sentence imposed at the time of initial sentencing[.] ...

This Court has previously stated that although the trial court may have "the authority to modify [the] defendant's conditions of probation, ......