State v. Craig
| Decision Date | 14 October 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 57706,57706 |
| Citation | 340 So.2d 191 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Charlie J. CRAIG. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Nesib Nader, Samuel V. Prunty, Jr., Sheveport, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., John A. Richardson, Dist. Atty., Albert S. Lutz, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
The defendant, Charlie J. Craig, was charged by grand jury indictment with the crime of aggravated rape in violation of R.S. 14:42. After a sanity commission reported that Craig could not assist counsel in his defense, he was committed to the East Louisiana State Hospital for treatment. After two and one-half months of treatment another sanity commission found that Craig was capable of assisting counsel in the defense of his case and that he understood the nature of the proceedings against him. He pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. After a jury trial he was found guilty and sentenced to death. We affirm the conviction but remand for resentencing.
The defendant contends that the trial judge erred in denying a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was contrary to the law and evidence. This court has consistently held that such an allegation presents nothing for review. State v. Woods, 327 So.2d 405 (La.1976).
Assignment of Error No. 1 is without merit.
The defendant contends that the verdict was contrary to the medical evidence in the case. Two psychiatrists testified that, in their opinion, the defendant was insane at the time the crime was committed.
When a defendant pleads 'not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity' the court is prohibited from determining the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense: this question is reserved for the jury. State v. Link, 301 So.2d 339 (La.1974); State v. Eisenhardt, 185 La. 308, 169 So. 417 (1936), cert. den., 299 U.S. 512, 57 S.Ct. 49, 81 L.Ed. 378. The defendant has the burden of establishing the defense of insanity. C.Cr.P. 652.
In the instant case the jury considered all of the evidence and found the defendant guilty. While the defendant's contention that the verdict is contrary to the medical evidence presents nothing for our review (State v. Woods, supra), we nonetheless note that there was other evidence tending to show that the defendant was in control of his faculties on the night of the crime. For example, the guard at the building where the rape occurred spoke with the defendant that night and testified that he appeared normal and spoke rationally. The police officer who gave defendant his Miranda warnings testified that defendant spoke and acted normally.
Assignment of Error No. 2 is without merit.
While we affirm Craig's conviction, we must remand for resentencing. In Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976), the United States Supreme Court declared Louisiana's mandatory death penalty for first degree murder unconstitutional, because the jury is given no chance to consider aggravating or mitigating circumstances:
428 U.S. 325, at page 333, 96 S.Ct. 3001, at page 3006.
Louisiana's mandatory death penalty for aggravated rape suffers the same constitutional infirmities. The jury is given no opportunity to consider mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Therefore, the death penalty for aggravated rape is unconstitutional under Roberts v. Louisiana, supra.
The defendant has thus been convicted of a crime whose penalty has been declared unconstitutional. This problem is not a new one, however. After the United States Supreme Court decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), which declared the death penalty as then applied unconstitutional, this court remanded murder and rape cases where death had been imposed for resentencing to life imprisonment. See e.g. State v. Franklin, 263 La. 344, 268 So.2d 249 (1972), a murder case; State v. Singleton, 263 La. 267, 268 So.2d 220 (1972), an aggravated rape case. The precedent for such action had been established in State v. Shaffer, 260 La. 605, 257 So.2d 121 (1971), where the problems were discussed, and State v. Duplessis, 260 La. 644, 257 So.2d 135 (1971), following the reversal by the United States Supreme Court of our judgment 'insofar as it imposes the death sentence' for a 'Witherspoon' violation. Duplessis v. Louisiana, 403 U.S. 946, 91 S.Ct. 2282, 29 L.Ed.2d 856 (1971).
However, a different situation exists now than at the time of Franklin and Singleton, supra. At the time those cases were decided, C.Cr.P. 814 provided for a responsive verdict of 'guilty without capital punishment' for murder and aggravated rape. C.Cr.P. 817, at that time, also authorized the 'qualified' verdict of 'guilty without capital punishment,' in which case the sentence would be life imprisonment. Thus, reasoning that the responsive verdict of guilty without capital punishment was the next authorized verdict for the crime, we remanded for resentencing as if that verdict has been returned, and, under C.Cr.P. 817, life imprisonment was called for.
The situation has changed. In an attempt to overcome Furman's objections to the death penalty, the legislature amended the murder statute to provide for first and second degree murder, making death mandatory for first degree murder. Likewise, the death penalty for aggravated rape was mandatory. To accomplish this, the legislature amended C.Cr.P. 814 to do away with the responsive verdict of 'guilty without capital punishment' for first degree murder and aggravated rape. Thus, at the time this crime was committed, November 26, 1974, the only responsive verdicts to a charge of aggravated rape were guilty; guilty of attempted aggravated rape; guilty of simple rape; not guilty. Additionally, C.Cr.P. 817 was amended to delete the provision authorizing the qualifying verdict 'guilty without capital punishment.' Thus there is no longer any authority for us to remand an aggravated rape case for resentencing to life.
At the time (November 26, 1974) this crime was committed, attempted aggravated rape was punishable by imprisonment for not more than twenty years. R.S. 14:27...
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