State v. Cramer
| Decision Date | 29 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. SCWC–11–0000085.,SCWC–11–0000085. |
| Citation | 299 P.3d 756,129 Hawai'i 296 |
| Parties | STATE of Hawai‘i, Respondent/Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Stephen CRAMER, Jr., Petitioner/Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
Hayden Aluli, for petitioner.
Artemio C. Baxa, for respondent.
Stephen Cramer, Jr. was found guilty of several drug-related offenses following his termination from the Drug Court program. At his sentencing hearing approximately two months later, Cramer was represented by a court-appointed deputy public defender. Privately retained counsel also appeared on behalf of Cramer, and sought to substitute for the deputy public defender "provided that [he was] given the opportunity to properly prepare." Cramer's privately retained counsel requested a three week continuance to prepare.
The Circuit Court for the Second Circuit denied Cramer's motion for substitution of counsel and a continuance as untimely.1 The deputy public defender represented Cramer for the duration of the hearing. The circuit court eventually continued the sentencing hearing for five days, apparently to obtain additional information with regard to whether Cramer was eligible for a sentence of probation under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 706–622.5, quoted infra.
At the continued sentencing hearing, Cramer was again represented by the deputy public defender. The circuit court determined that Cramer was not entitled to sentencing pursuant to HRS § 706–622.5. The circuit court then sentenced Cramer to a ten-year indeterminate term of incarceration for Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the Second Degree, a five-year term for Prohibited Acts Related to Drug Paraphernalia, and a thirty-day term for Promoting a Detrimental Drug in the Third Degree, all terms to run concurrently.
Cramer's privately retained counsel was subsequently permitted to substitute for the deputy public defender. Cramer appealed the circuit court's judgment of conviction and sentence, arguing, inter alia, that the circuit court violated his constitutional right to counsel of his choice when it denied his motion for substitution of counsel and a continuance of the sentencing hearing. The ICA determined that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cramer's motion, and accordingly affirmed the circuit court's judgment. State v. Cramer, No. CAAP–11–0000085, 127 Hawai‘i 241, 2012 WL 1560671, at *2 (Summary Disposition Order).
In his application to this court, Cramer again argues that the circuit court violated his constitutional right to counsel of his choice when it denied his motion. We agree that Cramer was denied his right to privately retained counsel of his choice under article I, section 14 of the Hawai‘i constitution. We also hold that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the motion for substitution of counsel and continuance of the hearing. Specifically, the circuit court relied only on the timeliness of the request, and the record does not reflect that the circuit court properly balanced Cramer's right to counsel of his choice against countervailing government interests. Accordingly, we vacate the ICA's June 1, 2012 judgment and the circuit court's January 11, 2011 judgment, and remand to the circuit court for resentencing.
The following factual background is taken from the record on appeal.
On November 9, 2007, Cramer was charged with Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the Second Degree, in violation of HRS § 712–1242(1)(b)(i)2 (Count One), Prohibited Acts Related to Drug Paraphernalia, in violation of HRS § 329–43.5(a)3 (Count Two), and Promoting a Detrimental Drug in the Third Degree, in violation of HRS § 712–1249(1)4 (Count Three), in relation to an incident on September 19, 2007, when officers executed a search warrant on Cramer's vehicle and discovered crystal methamphetamine and other drug paraphernalia.
On February 25, 2009, Cramer filed a Petition for Admission to Drug Court and Waiver of Rights; Admission Agreement (Petition), in which he admitted to the charged offenses. He acknowledged that the State would prosecute him if he did not successfully complete the Drug Court Program, and that he would be tried without a jury. At a February 25, 2009 hearing, the circuit court granted Cramer's Petition and admitted him into the Drug Court program.5
On July 21, 2010, the State filed a motion to terminate Cramer's participation in the Maui Drug Court Program because Cramer failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the program, specifically conditions A and B of the Drug Court Program Admission Agreement.6
A hearing was held on the State's motion, with Cramer represented by Deputy Public Defender (DPD) Danielle Sears, and on September 3, 2010, the circuit court filed an order granting the State's motion to terminate Cramer's participation in Drug Court. On November 4, 2010, the circuit court held a stipulated facts trial. The circuit court admitted Cramer's Petition into evidence, found Cramer guilty as charged on all three counts, and set sentencing for January 6, 2011. In the interim, Cramer was free on $100,000 bail.
At the start of the scheduled January 6, 2011 sentencing hearing, the following exchange occurred:
DPD Sears then informed the circuit court that she had received a presentence investigation report and a Substance Abuse Assessment of Cramer, and wanted to know whether the court had also received the Substance Abuse Assessment. The circuit court stated it did not receive the Substance Abuse Assessment, but wanted to review it to assess whether Cramer qualified for sentencing under "Act 44."7 The circuit court also noted that Cramer had a protective order entered against him in 2008 and convictions for violations of temporary restraining orders, and stated that it needed more information about those incidents before it made a determination as to whether Cramer was nonviolent and therefore qualified for sentencing under Act 44.
The deputy prosecuting attorney then stated, "Can we ask for a continuance." The circuit court responded, "I would like to continue this, but not more than a week." The circuit court also reiterated that it did not receive the Substance Abuse Assessment, which was a "critical determination in this case." The circuit court continued the sentencing until January 11, 2011.
DPD Sears appeared on behalf of Cramer at the January 11, 2011 sentencing hearing. The circuit court denied probation under Act 44, and sentenced Cramer to incarceration for ten years on count one, five years on count two, and thirty days on count three, all terms to run concurrently. The circuit court filed its Judgment of Conviction and Sentence on January 11, 2011.
On February 3, 2011, the circuit court approved the withdrawal of DPD Sears and the substitution of Aluli as Cramer's counsel. Cramer, through Aluli, filed a notice of appeal.
On March 21, 2011, Cramer, through Aluli, filed in the circuit court a Motion to Reduce Sentence pursuant to Hawai‘i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 35(b).8 On April 7, 2011, at a hearing on Cramer's motion to reduce sentence, the circuit court concluded that Cramer "needs to have the consequences of his behavior to finally understand that he needs to change." Accordingly, the circuit court denied Cramer's motion to reduce sentence.
In his opening brief, Cramer asserted that the trial court committed reversible error in denying his motion for substitution of counsel and for a continuance of the sentencing proceeding, in violation of his constitutional right to counsel of his choice. Although Cramer acknowledged that trial courts are given "wide discretion" in determining whether to grant a continuance, he contended that the circuit court abused its discretion because it "simply said that the motion was untimely and failed to engage in weighing Cramer's constitutional right to a reasonable delay of sentencing against the needs of fairness and the demands of its calendar." (Citing United States v. Gonzalez–Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006) ).9
In its answering brief, the State argued that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in denying Cramer's motion because the request for substitution of counsel was "tentative and conditional" upon the granting of a three-week continuance. In addition, the State asserted that Cramer "made no representation that he was dissatisfied or had lost confidence in [DPD Sears] or that he had discharged present counsel, and that he wanted or had retained [ ] Aluli as his new counsel." The State, citing State v. Torres, 54 Haw. 502, 510 P.2d 494 (1973),10 argued that in denying Cramer's motion, it was "apparent that the [circuit] [c]ourt was concerned about the orderly flow of business in the court system."
Cramer filed a reply brief and argued, inter alia, that the State provided no support for its contention that he needed to justify his assertion of the right to private counsel of his choice, and that Torres was distinguishable because it...
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