State v. Crane
| Citation | 169 Conn. 242,362 A.2d 843 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Decision Date | 29 July 1975 |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Alan R. CRANE. |
Marshall S. Feingold, Special Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).
Robert E. Beach, Jr., Asst. Chief State's Atty, with whom, on the brief, was Robert L. Hurney, State's Atty., for appellee (state).
Before HOUSE, C.J., and LOISELLE, MACDONALD, LONGO, and BARBER, JJ.
The defendant has appealed his conviction of robbery in the first degree in violation of § 53a-134(a) of the General Statutes, and kidnapping in the second degree in violation of § 53a-94. The appeal finds its way to this court under the new appellate rules effective October 1, 1974. Practice Book §§ 629A-635A. 1
On April 23, 1973, Thomas Thornley was struck in the face by an assailant and robbed as he left the Old Saybrook Inn in Old Saybrook. Thornley's assailant then transported him in an automobile that had been leased for Thornley's use by his employer from a commercial leasing dealer, to a wooded area and left Thornley there with the automobile. He managed to recover sufficiently to drive to a friend's home and was taken to a hospital and admitted for treatment of his injuries. Claiming to have met him earlier in the evening at the inn, Thornley identified the defendant at trial by means of a tattoo on his arm, his voice and his profile. The defendant produced alibi witnesses who stated that he remained at the inn throughout the night, leaving only briefly, and for a time insufficient to have committed the crime. The defendant has assigned error in a ruling by the court allowing certain impeachment evidence to be introduced. He further claims that a negligent loss of evidence resulted in a denial to him of due process of law. Error is also claimed in the court's denial of the motion to set aside the jury's verdict of guilty on both counts.
During cross-examination of the defendant the state's attorney asked the defendant if he had on a prior occasion suggested to one Elizabeth Loomis the performance of criminal acts similar to those with which he was charged in the present case. The defendant denied this accusation. As part of its rebuttal, the state produced Elizabeth Loomis who, over objection by the defendant, was allowed to testify in an attempt to contradict the defendant's testimonv. She stated that about two years previously in the Deep River Inn she mentioned to the defendant that she could lure someone at the bar to the parking lot where the defendant could 'mug' him, and that the defendant, 'being a gentleman,' agreed. On cross-examination, she emphasized that she was the one who had made the proposition. The court had previously cautioned the jury as to the effect they were to give testimony concerning credibility, and in its charge it instructed the jury that a prior inconsistent statement by the defendant could be used to test his credibility.
The defendant has assigned as error the court's ruling allowing Miss Loomis to testify on essentially two grounds: (1) Her testimony constituted impeachment of the defendant upon a collateral matter; and (2) her testimony was not inconsistent with the defendant's responses to the state's questions. It is axiomatic that prior inconsistent statements may be admitted into evidence to impeach a witness' credibility in certain, limited situations. Thomas v. Ganezer, 137 Conn. 415, 78 A.2d 539. The defendant contends that the correctness of the court's ruling in allowing this rebuttal testimony is governed by the rule in Martyn v. Donlin, 151 Conn. 402, 408, 198 A.2d 700 and Shailer v. Bullock, 73 Conn. 65, 70, 61 A. 65, that extrinsic evidence may not be used to contradict the testimony of a witness with regard to an irrelevant or collateral fact or as to particular acts of misconduct. See State v. Wilson, 158 Conn. 321, 324, 260 A.2d 571.
The court heard the testimony of Miss Loomis in the absence of the jury prior to ruling on the defendant's objection. Her testimony was to the effect that it was she who suggested the earlier scheme to the defendant and, thus, her testimony actually was not inconsistent with the defendant's denial that the had initiated a prior scheme similar...
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