State v. Crawford
| Citation | 104 N.W. 822,96 Minn. 95 |
| Decision Date | 27 October 1905 |
| Docket Number | 14,494 - (27) |
| Parties | STATE v. C. D. CRAWFORD and Another |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal by defendant C. D. Crawford from a judgment of the district court for Sherburne County, Giddings, J., whereby he was convicted of the crime of murder in the first degree and sentenced to be hanged. Affirmed.
Appeal -- Questions by Juryman.
Where questions improper in form are asked of and answered by a witness in a criminal case, and no objection is made nor exception taken, no error is saved which is subject to review by an appellate court as a matter of right; and if such inquiries are made by a juryman with the court's permission, failure of the court to interpose objections is not necessarily reversible error.
New Trial.
In criminal cases, the granting or refusing of a new trial for errors of law should not be determined by mere technical conformity with or infringement of rules of practice and evidence.
New Trial.
New trials should be granted only when the substantial rights of the accused have been so violated as to make it reasonably clear that a fair trial was not had. State v Nelson, 91 Minn. 143, followed and applied.
Homicide -- New Trial.
The defendant in this case was found guilty of murder in the first degree and was sentenced to be hanged for the murder of a fellow traveler in a box car, while the accused and another were engaged in holding up the murdered man and other inmates of that car. The principal assignment of error was based upon questions asked by a juror of a witness, with the court's permission, involving a conclusion or opinion as to whether the accused stepped aside to take aim at his victim, to which no objection was made and no exception was taken. Four eyewitnesses to the shooting testified, without attack impeachment, or inconsistency, to every detail of the homicide. The revolver which fired the bullet and the bullet which was taken from the brain of the dead man were produced, identified, and connected with the accused. He himself took the stand in his own defense and admitted the robbery and shooting, but denied intent to kill. Under such circumstances, a new trial is refused and the judgment affirmed.
Ernest S. Cary and Charles S. Wheaton, for appellant.
Edward T. Young, Attorney General, C. S. Jelley, Assistant Attorney General, and Frank T. White, County Attorney, for the State.
The accused, C. D. Crawford, jointly indicted with one George R. Palmer for murder in the first degree, was convicted on separate trial and was sentenced to be hanged. On application of his counsel, a stay of execution was granted. [2] The case comes before this court upon an appeal from the judgment of the trial court.
The assignments of error are twenty-three in number. Upon argument in this court, counsel for the accused expressly waived all except the one to which reference will especially be made hereafter. A brief statement of the facts in this case is essential to the proper understanding of the questions thus raised.
Crawford and his codefendant, Palmer, knew each other before the night of the murder. Crawford had been in the army and was familiar with the handling of firearms. He and Palmer, together with five other young men, Lundin, Freeman, Bjorquist, Conradson, and Kenner, were riding together on a freight train, in a combination mail and baggage car, with the consent of a brakeman. Crawford, testifying on his own behalf, confirms the narrative of the other eyewitnesses in almost all essential particulars.
In substantially his own language, the tragedy occurred as follows: He had said to Palmer, while they were on the car: "Let's hold them up." Palmer replied: "All right; I've a flash light." He passed the light over to Crawford, who then had both the light and a revolver. Palmer found a club in the car. "They each knew what each of them had to do, and what he had to do in order to make this hold-up effective." Crawford held the flash light in his left hand on the heads and faces of the men, "on one and then the other," and followed the light with his revolver in his right hand. Palmer flourished his club. Both Crawford and Palmer cried out: "Throw up your hands!" Although no one offered any resistance, Crawford fired one shot in the air just to "scare" the prospective victims. At the rear end of the car was a sorting table, about five feet long and four feet wide. Lundin and Bjorquist had lain down on it and had gone to sleep, each lying on his right side, each with his face to the front end of the car. Bjorquist awoke, got off the table, and held up his hands. Lundin remained on the table. After the first shot was fired, Lundin, lying with one hand in his overcoat pocket, did not get up; but, when Palmer tried to waken him, it seemed to Crawford "as if he kind of raised up a little." Palmer then stepped away and, according to Crawford, said to Crawford, "Wake him up;" according to all other eyewitnesses, "Shoot the son of a bitch." Crawford, then only a few feet away from Lundin, passed the light backward and forward and followed the light with the revolver. He "shot the revolver immediately after Palmer said 'Wake him up.'" He said:
The witnesses indicated the way in which Crawford held the flash light in his left hand, so that the light fell on Lundin's face, and the gun in his right hand. He raised or moved up his arm when he was getting ready to shoot Lundin. Conradson testified, without objection, that Crawford Without objection, Kenner testified at one place "that Crawford just took deliberate aim and fired." At another place, in answer to the question: "Did you mark that as the place where he was standing at the time the first shot was fired?" He said, "No, sir; I don't think so, and, if I did, I was mistaken, because he stepped over there at the time he fired the second shot, so that he would have a chance to get a line on his [Lundin's] face."
The two defendants then proceeded to rob their four living companions. When they came to the dead man, Palmer seems to have hesitated; but Crawford said: Thereupon Palmer robbed the body, taking from it, among other things, a watch. Having taken everything they could find, Palmer said: "We are having damned poor luck this fall," or "damned poor picking this fall." Crawford thereafter ordered Conradson to open the car door, and Palmer said: The men in the car proceeded to obey. One of them got out of the car just as the rapidly moving train was about to go over a bridge. He waited until the bridge was passed and then jumped. The others followed. None were seriously hurt. The two defendants stayed on the train some time longer, then left it and went to the shores of the river where they divided the "swag" or "junk" as Crawford describes it. This included the watch which was taken from the body of the dead man and identified by his father, the jeweler who sold it, and otherwise, and which was found in Crawford's possession when he was arrested.
Toward the close of the case of the state there occurred the only matter which is now properly before us upon assignment of error. The record reads:
By One of the Jurors: Q. I would like the witness a question to ask. The Court: You may ask it. Q. Mr. Conradson, you say that after he the first shot did fire, and before he did the second shot fire, he did to one side step? A. Yes, sir. Q. Now I would like to ask you if your best judgment is if he, after he the first shot did fire, and before he did the second shot fire, he did to one side step that he might the better aim take? A. Yes, sir; so that he could see Lundin's face better and get out of our line and get a better view of Lundin. Q. And you say that he careful aim did take? A. Yes, sir. Q. And then did you hear the report? A. Yes, sir. Q. Now, then, after you the report did hear, did you right away know that Lundin was hit? A. No, sir. Q. How long after you the report did hear before you knew that the man on the table sleeping was hit? A. I didn't know that he was hit. I knew that he didn't get up, and I thought he must be shot. That is all I knew about it.
Counsel for the accused insists that it is the duty of the court in its sound discretion to allow the juror to ask any proper and competent question, but it was likewise the duty of the court in its sound discretion, with regard to the rights of the defendant, to determine whether or not the questions were proper and competent questions before allowing the same to be submitted to the witness, and not to allow incompetent questions to be asked, and that failure to object to this question involving the opinion of this witness was error. In support of this he cites typical authorities to the effect that it is a ...
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