State v. Crawford

• Decision Date: 19 June 1897
• Citation: 41 S.W. 425,64 Ark. 194
• Parties: STATE v. CRAWFORD
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

41 S.W. 425

64 Ark. 194

STATE v. CRAWFORD

Supreme Court of Arkansas

June 19, 1897

Appeal from St. Francis Circuit Court, H. N. HUTTON, Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

E. B Kinsworthy, attorney general, for appellant.

This is a good indictment under § 1868, Sand. & H. Dig.; 55 Ark 532; Sand. & H. Dig., §§ 2074, 2075, 2076; 37 Ark 412; 40 S.W. 85.

Norton & Prewett, for appellee.

The indictment fails to state to whom the cotton was sold. 26 Ark. 323; 27 id. 493; 38 id. 517; 1 Whart. Cr. Law, § 285; 37 Ark. 419. The word "felonious" is not used in connection with the intent. Sand. & H. Dig., § 1868; 24 Ark. 346; 54 Ark. 493, as modified in 54 id. 493.

BUNN C. J. Absent WOOD, J.

OPINION

BUNN, C. J.

This is an indictment for the crime of removing mortgaged property, to which the defendant interposed a demurrer, and, the same being sustained by the court, judgment was rendered for defendant, and the state appeals. The demurrer is as follows, to-wit: "The defendant, C. C. Crawford, demurs to the indictment herein, and for cause says that the same does not state facts sufficient to constitute a public offense, and for the further reason that said indictment does not sufficiently set forth the circumstances attending the commission of the offense." From the argument we infer that one of the particular objections to the indictment raised by the demurrer is that it does not name the person to whom the cotton was sold.

In several jurisdictions among the American states the name of the person to whom the mortgaged property has been disposed of is held to be essential in the indictment, notably Texas, North Carolina and Nebraska. But this is held to be proper in those states, by analog to the doctrine held there as to naming the person to whom the illicit sale of intoxicating liquor is charged to have been made. But we do not hold the same doctrine as to sale of intoxicating liquors in this state, but on the contrary have held that it is not necessary to name the person to whom the liquor has been sold. Hence with us there is no such necessity or reason to name the person to whom mortgaged property has been sold.

Besides in the case of Nebraska, at least, the language of the statute on the subject of disposing of mortgaged property is somewhat different from ours; for, while the language of ours (Sand. & H. Dig., § 1868) is. "It shall be unlawful for any person to sell, barter, exchange or otherwise dispose of, or to remove beyond the limits of this state, or of the county in which a landlord's or laborer's lien exists, or in which a lien has been created by virtue of a mortgage or deed of trust, any property of any kind, character, or description, upon which a lien of the kind, enumerated above exists," etc., the language of the Nebraska sta...