State v. Creekmore, 46473
| Decision Date | 04 March 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 46473,46473 |
| Citation | 208 Kan. 933,495 P.2d 96 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. George L. CREEKMORE, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The essential inquiry in determining the voluntariness of a statement is whether the statement was the product of the free and independent will of the accused. Generally if the accused was not deprived of his free choice to admit, deny or refuse to answer, the statement may be considered voluntary.
2. When the trial court conducts a full preliminary inquiry on the admissibility of an extrajudicial statmenet given by an accused, determines the statement was freely, voluntarily and intelligently given and admits the statement into evidence at the trial, this court on appeal should accept that determination if it is supported by substantial competent evidence.
3. The record on appeal is examined and it is held the trial court's findings on admissibility of an extrajudicial statement are supported by substantial competent evidence and no error is shown.
Brian J. Moline, Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
Roger C. Skinner, Deputy County Atty., argued the cause, Vern Miller, Atty. Gen., and Keith Sanborn, County Atty., were with him on the brief for appellee.
George L. Creekmore was found guilty and sentenced on two counts of incest and two counts of carnal knowledge of a female under the age of eighteen years. All charges arose from acts engaged in with his natural daughter. The appeal to this court raises one question.
Appellant complains that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence an extrajudicial statement obtained by two investigating officers. He claims the statement was involuntarily induced by promises and by indirect coercion.
Prior to the opening of the trial appellant's counsel filed a motion to suppress the statement given by the appellant. A full evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of the statmeent was held by the court in the absence of the jury. The hearing was conducted as provided by K.S.A. 60-408 and as suggested by State v. Milow, 199 Kan. 576, 433 P.2d 538, and State v. Pittman, 199 Kan. 591, 433 P.2d 550. At the hearing testimony was taken from various witnesses, including the two detectives who took the statement, the attorney who represented appellant at the preliminary hearing, two sons of the appellant and the appellant himself. The 48 page record on appeal is composed mainly of the testimony and proceedings on the motion to suppress.
At the conclusion of the hearing the trial court found the appellant had been fully advised of his constitutional rights, was aware of the consequences of the statement and that no threat, promise, duress, coercion or compulsion was used to induce the statement. The court determined the statement of the appellant was freely, voluntarily and intelligently given and should be admitted into evidence.
When the trial court conducts a full preliminary inquiry on the admissibility of an extrajudicial statement given by an accused, determines the statement was freely, voluntarily and intelligently given and admits the statmeent into evidence at the trial, this court on appeal should accept that determination if it is supported by substantial competent evidence. (State v. Pittman, supra.)
In determining the voluntariness of a statement made by an accused the totality of the circumstances leading to and accompanying the giving of the statement should be considered. (State v. Harden, 206 Kan. 365, 480 P.2d 53.) Failure to have counsel present does not ipso facto make the statement involuntary. It depends upon the surrounding facts and circumstances. (State v. Cantrell, 201 Kan. 182, 440 P.2d 580, cert. den. 393 U.S. 944, 89 S.Ct. 315, 21 L.Ed.2d 282.) Factors generally considered as bearing on the voluntariness of a statement by an accused include the duration and manner of the interrogation; the ability of the accused on request to communicate with the outside world; the accused's age, intellect and background; and the fairness of the officers in conducting the interrogation. The essential inquiry in determining the voluntariness of a statement is whether the statement was the product of the free and independent will of the accused. Generally if the accused was not deprived of his free choice to admit, deny or refuse to answer, the statement may be considered voluntary. (Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562.)
In the present case appellant was being held at the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Garcia, 60313
...State v. Prince, 227 Kan. 137, 144, 605 P.2d 563 (1980); State v. Watkins, 219 Kan. 81, 97, 547 P.2d 810 (1976); State v. Creekmore, 208 Kan. at 934 [, 495 P.2d 96 (1972) ]. The burden of proving the statement was voluntary rests with the State. State v. Kanive, 221 Kan. at 35 [, 558 P.2d 1......
-
State v. Young
...was freely and voluntarily given and admissible in evidence. (State v. Watkins, 219 Kan. 81, 547 P.2d 810; and State v. Creekmore, 208 Kan. 933, 934, 495 P.2d 96.) The judgment of the lower court is ...
-
State v. Goodseal
...and Sixth Amendment rights, such findings will not be disturbed on appellate review. . . .' (p. 777, 529 P.2d p. 184.) In State v. Creekmore, 208 Kan. 933, 495 P.2d 96, we '. . . Factors generally considered as bearing on the voluntariness of a statement by an accused include the duration a......
-
State v. Holloway
...to support the trial court's finding that the appellant's statement was freely, voluntarily and intelligently given. (State v. Creekmore, 208 Kan. 933, 495 P.2d 96, and State v. Brown, 217 Kan. 595, 538 P.2d The defendant contends the trial court erred in giving the jury an instruction on r......