State v. Cristani

• Decision Date: 22 November 1921
• Docket Number: 34422
• Citation: 185 N.W. 111,192 Iowa 615
• Parties: STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. LEONARD CRISTANI, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

185 N.W. 111

192 Iowa 615

STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. LEONARD CRISTANI, Appellant

No. 34422

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

November 22, 1921

Appeal from Warren District Court.--L. N. HAYS, Judge.

THE defendant was convicted upon an indictment charging him with the crime of arson, and appeals.

Reversed.

Clarke & Cosson and W. H. Berry, for appellant.

Ben J Gibson, Attorney General, and B. J. Flick, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

WEAVER J. EVANS, C. J., PRESTON and DE GRAFF, JJ., concur.

OPINION

WEAVER, J.

The defendant owned and operated a cheese factory at Norwalk, a small town within a few miles of the city of Des Moines. On the night of July 21, 1920, the factory, with its equipment and contents, was destroyed by fire. Thereafter, an indictment was returned by the grand jury, charging the defendant with having feloniously caused said fire, with intent thereby to injure the insurance company or association which had issued him a policy of insurance upon the property so destroyed. To this accusation the defendant entered a plea of not guilty. There was a trial to a jury. At the close of the evidence in chief on part of the State, defendant moved the court for a directed verdict of not guilty. The motion was denied, and being renewed at the close of all the evidence, was again denied. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and defendant's motion for new trial was overruled. From the judgment entered on the verdict, defendant appeals.

I. The first proposition argued for appellant is that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction, and that the motion for a directed verdict of not guilty should have been sustained. A careful reading of the record convinces us that this objection is well taken. It is an elementary proposition of criminal law that, to be entitled to a conviction, the State must first establish the corpus delicti,--the fact that a crime such as alleged has been committed by someone. This being established, the guilty connection of the accused with such offense must also be established, both beyond a reasonable doubt. As stated by this court in State v. Millmeier, 102 Iowa 692, 698, 72 N.W. 275, this rule, as applied to a charge of arson, requires "satisfactory proof that the building was feloniously, willfully, and maliciously burned by someone, and was not an accidental burning. Direct evidence to establish either of these elements is not required; but, where circumstantial evidence is relied upon, it must be of the most cogent and irresistible kind."

The mere fact that the building was burned and that its origin is unknown or involved in mystery, is not evidence that it was feloniously ignited. In addition to the fact of the destruction of the building by fire, it must appear by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the fire was caused by the willful act of some person criminally responsible for it. See State v. Millmeier, supra; State v. Pienick, 46 Wash. 522 (90 P. 645); State v. Carroll, 85 Iowa 1, 51 N.W. 1159. In the absence of such proof, the presumption obtains that the fire was accidental, or at least that it was not of criminal origin. State v. Jones, 106 Mo. 302, 17 S.W. 366; 4 Elliott on Evidence, Section 2807; State v. Albert, 176 Iowa 164, 157 N.W. 727; Phillips v. State, 29 Ga. 105; Boatwright v. State, 103 Ga. 430, 30 S.E. 256; State v. Ruckman, 253 Mo. 487, 161 S.W. 705. It is true, of course, as argued by the State, that the corpus delicti may be established by circumstantial evidence, but this does not make it the subject of mere conjecture or of doubtful inference, nor is it to be found from any combination of circumstances which may reasonably be reconciled with the theory that the fire was not of a felonious origin. Nor is it sufficient if the circumstances relied upon in support of the charge are such as excite suspicion only, but fall short of proof. State v. Vandewater, (Iowa) 176 N.W. 883 (not officially reported); Bruno v. State, 171 Wis. 490 (177 N.W. 610); State v. Korth, 39 S.D. 365 (164 N.W. 93). In the Vandewater case, which in most of its features is quite like the one now before us, we said:

"The most that can be said for the testimony of the State is that it creates a suspicion of the guilt of the defendant, and it goes without saying that mere suspicion is not sufficient. There must be substantive proof of guilt--some fact proven which tends to establish the substantive fact upon which the State relies for conviction. All men are presumed to be honest and innocent; and where facts and circumstances are relied upon to prove guilt, they, when established, must negative every other rational hypothesis except the guilt of the defendant, and must be inconsistent with any rational hypothesis of innocence."

In the Bruno case, presenting a materially stronger combination of circumstances unfavorable to the accused, the Wisconsin court, reversing a judgment of conviction, says:

"Loath as this court has always been and still is to set aside a judgment based upon a verdict of guilty by a jury, and which has passed the careful consideration of a trial court, we are nevertheless compelled, in a case such as this, involving a crime of such a grave nature, and in which the verdict of guilty by the jury was followed by punishment measured by a sentence of 10 years' imprisonment in the state prison, to feel the necessity of bearing steadfastly in mind the well established rule of law that no person shall be convicted of a penal offense unless the testimony be such as will sustain the rigid test of satisfying beyond a reasonable doubt. * * * The testimony in this case, in our judgment, when reasonably and fairly construed, creates no more than a suspicion that the defendant committed this offense. A suspicion merely is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction. Lonergan v. State, 111 Wis. 453, 460 (87 N.W. 455)."

The authorities to the foregoing effect are very numerous, but the citations made are sufficient to indicate the settled rule.

We shall not attempt to discuss the evidence in this case in full detail. No witness pretends to have seen the fire started, or to have any knowledge of its origin. It appears to have been first discovered about midnight of the day in question, and to have begun in an annex or "lean-to" attached to the main building. In this annex was located the heating apparatus used in the manufacture of cheese in the main building. As we understand the record, the fuel employed was oil or kerosene. There appears to be no satisfactory showing as to when the heating apparatus was last used. Neither the defendant nor his helper, Mancuso, is shown to have been in the building during the night. They appear to have been in the habit of frequently going to Des Moines, after the close of their day's work, the defendant himself frequently putting up for the night at the Hawkeye Hotel. On the day in question, defendant was not seen in or about the factory. He explains his absence by saying that he was sick, and remained in the city, staying at the hotel until the following morning. He says he went to bed at about 7:30 P. M., and did not leave the hotel during the night, which statement has corroboration, furnished by the hotel register, and to some extent also by the testimony of the night clerk of the house. During the month previous to the fire, he had patronized a Ford livery garage, taking out a car, on several occasions for an evening drive. On this night, before retiring to his room, he, with Mancuso, went to the livery, and procured a Ford car. According to his story, the car was taken for Mancuso's use; but, as he (Mancuso) was not acquainted at the garage, defendant went with him, and gave the order, Mancuso furnishing the money deposit required. Having procured the car, he testifies, he turned it over to Mancuso, who drove him to the hotel, where he remained for the night. In this story he is supported by Mancuso, who says that he alone used the car, and returned it to the garage about 10 o'clock. Each of them swears that he was in the city all that night, and did not return to Norwalk or to the factory until the following morning, and denies all complicity in the burning of the building. There is no direct evidence of the untruth of this defense. The State put upon the witness stand two apparently disinterested witnesses who testify that, on the evening in question, they, each driving an automobile along the highway between Norwalk and Des Moines, at a point about a quarter of a mile from the cheese factory, found their way obstructed by a Ford automobile standing across the roadway. Thinking that the driver of the standing car was in trouble, they stopped, and one of them, a physician, got out of his car, and going up to the Ford, discovered a man lying upon the back seat. This man arose, and asked what was wanted; and the doctor having explained that he thought the driver might be in trouble, the fellow answered that there was no trouble, and the witnesses left him there. Both witnesses were acquainted with Cristani; but neither recognized him as the man in the Ford; and the doctor, who was in position to speak most positively, says he does not think it was the defendant. Had it been Cristani, it is hardly possible that Dr. Decker is mistaken upon the question of his identity. It appears in the record that the defendant is an Italian by birth, speaking our language quite brokenly, a peculiarity which would have been apparent in the reported conversation, and could hardly have deceived the witness. ...