State v. Crooks
| Citation | 64 S.W.3d 887 |
| Decision Date | 23 January 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 24113.,24113. |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Frank D. CROOKS, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Amy M. Bartholow, Asst. Public Defender, Columbia, for Appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Richard A. Starnes, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for Respondent.
Frank D. Crooks, Jr., ("Appellant") was charged with two counts of selling a controlled substance near a school, a violation of § 195.214, RSMo 2000.1 The jury convicted him of one count and acquitted him of the second count. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he knew his residence was within 2,000 feet of school property and that he sold methamphetamine ("meth"). He also challenges the admission of evidence of Appellant's prior drug sales. We affirm.2
Officer Frank Lundien ("Lundien") of the Joplin Police Department was the only witness to testify about drug purchases from Appellant. Lundien testified that he first met Appellant on November 24, 1999, when he went to Appellant's home to purchase drugs. Lundien stated he was there to pay Appellant $150 owed by another person (Lundien's confidential informant) for a previous drug deal. Appellant told Lundien that he did not recall the person owing him money for anything but Lundien insisted, so Appellant told him he could leave the money. Lundien then asked Appellant if he could "help him out," meaning purchase meth from him. Appellant asked Lundien how much he wanted to buy and Lundien said an eight-ball which is an eighth of an ounce of meth. Appellant sold one gram of meth to Lundien for $100. Lundien left and deposited the drugs into the evidence locker at the Joplin Police Department later that day; however, he left blank the space on the property record form that asked for the name of the person from whom the evidence was taken. Lundien said he did not put Appellant's name on the sheet because he was worried about internet security.
Appellant specifically recalled his whereabouts on November 24, 1999. He testified he was at his ex-wife's house and a friend's home all day for an early Thanksgiving and did not come home until late that evening. He also recalled that he called the police to his home that night for a neighborhood dispute. The parties stipulated that the police had in fact responded to Appellant's home that night. Appellant denied selling Lundien any drugs that day. The jury acquitted the Appellant of the November 24th drug charge.
The second charge was for a drug purchase on December 11, 1999. Lundien testified he and a confidential informant went to Appellant's residence to purchase meth. When they arrived at Appellant's home, the informant yelled Appellant's name and the Appellant responded. After going inside the home, Lundien told Appellant he needed to make some money, but Appellant responded that "he didn't have much" and "what he did have he barely broke even with." Appellant then showed Lundien some white powder in a bag. He told Lundien he could have the bag after Appellant took a "bump" off it, meaning a small portion of the contents for his personal use. Appellant took the bag, turned his back toward Lundien, and "messed around in" some drawers of a computer desk he was near. He then turned around and gave Lundien the bag with less powder in it. Lundien paid Appellant twenty-five dollars for the bag. Appellant told Lundien that it was "good stuff" and that he could add some "cut" to it, which means Lundien could add Vitamin B-12 to dilute the powder so that he had more to sell.
Appellant testified that he had no specific recollection of December 11, 1999. Nonetheless, he denied selling any drugs to Lundien that day. Appellant testified that Lundien asked him about selling drugs on several occasions and that Appellant always told him he did not know what he was talking about and he did not have anything. The jury convicted Appellant of a drug sale on that date.
The case was submitted to the jury at 5:15 p.m. At 6:38 p.m. the jury sent a note to the court that read, At 7:08 p.m. the court sent three standard inquiries to determine whether the jury was deadlocked on guilt or punishment. Seven minutes later, without answering the inquiries, the jury returned their verdicts.
In Point One, Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence that Appellant knew his residence was within 2,000 feet of school property. In examining the sufficiency of the evidence, we are limited to a determination of whether there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact might have found Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable double. State v. Chaney, 967 S.W.2d 47, 52 (Mo. banc 1998). In making that determination this court accepts as true all of the evidence favorable to the state, including all favorable inferences drawn from the evidence, and disregards all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Id. To make its case the state must prove that 1) Appellant sold a controlled substance; 2) the sale was within 2,000 feet of a school; and 3) Appellant did so knowingly with regard to all of the facts and circumstances. MAI-CR 3d 325.30. In this point Appellant disputes the evidence concerning his knowledge that there was a school within 2,000 feet of his home.
Appellant cites to State v. White, 28 S.W.3d 391, 397 (Mo.App. W.D.2000) as being factually similar. In White, the sole testimony concerning the distance between the distributing point and the school was the admission of a computer-generated map showing the school to be within the prescribed distance. Although the defendant did not challenge the actual computed distance between the residence and the school, he challenged the evidence to establish that he knowingly delivered the controlled substances within 2,000 feet of a school. In reversing the conviction, the Western District stated:
There was no evidence regarding the size and height of the school building(s), how many blocks away the school is from the residence, and whether the school is visible from the residence. The State failed to show that White had ever seen the school, had ever traveled past the school, or had heard about the school's location. From the record, there is nothing from which the jury could reasonably infer whether the school was a highly visible large complex, or a single classroom in the basement of a residential building.
... Evidence that the school premises was a large complex, with one or more large and highly visible buildings, and that normal ingress and egress from the residence would have taken White by the school, would have permitted an inference that he had knowledge of the location and distance of the school.
The evidence supporting the conviction was that Appellant testified he knew the school might be no more than five or six blocks from his house. He testified he lived down the street from the school, that he knew the school was there but did not know the parking lot was there. Lundien testified the high school encompassed the entire block. He measured the distance from the high school and Appellant's house using a roller tape from the police department. The total direct distance was 818 feet; the distance by road between the house and the school was 1,042 feet. Lundien further testified that he went by the school on each of the two occasions that he went to Appellant's house to buy drugs and saw children from the school walking by Appellant's house around lunch time. We find sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that Appellant had knowledge that the...
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