State v. Crouse

• Decision Date: 19 September 1918
• Citation: 104 A. 525
• Parties: STATE v. CROUSE.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

104 A. 525

STATE

v. CROUSE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Sept. 19, 1918.

[Ed. Note.—For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Building.]

Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Knox County, at Daw.

Alice Crouse was convicted of arson, and moves in arrest of judgment, alleging exceptions. Exceptions sustained, and judgment arrested.

Argued before CORNISH, C. J., and SPEAR, HANSON, DUNN, and MORRILL, JJ.

Henry L. Withee, Co. Atty., of Rockland, for the State.

Philip Howard, of Rockland, for respondent.

DUNN, J. "Arson" and kindred crimes are defined by sections 1, 2, and 3 of chapter 121 of the Revised Statutes, the section last mentioned reading:

"Whoever willfully and maliciously burns any building of another not mentioned in the preceding section, * * * shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one, nor more than ten years."

Having been convicted upon an indictment, containing a single count, wherein it is charged "that Alice Crouse, of Rockland, in the county of Knox, aforesaid, on the first day of April, A. D. 1918, at Rockland, feloniously, willfully, and maliciously did burn a certain building the property of Lucy Farnsworth, said building being then and there situate on Pleasant street, in said Rockland," with conclusion in usual form, the defendant moves in arrest of judgment, for the assigned reasons that the indictment does not name or describe the kind or nature of the building alleged to have been burned, and because no judgment can be lawfully rendered on said record.

The memorable and time-honored declaration that, in all criminal proceedings, the accused shall have a right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation (Con. of Maine, art. 1, § 6) entitles him to insist that the facts alleged to constitute a crime shall be stated in the indictment with that certainty and precision of designation requisite to enable him to meet the exact charge, and to plead the judgment, either of acquittal or conviction, which may be rendered upon it, in bar of a later prosecution for the same offense. State v. Moran, 40 Me. 129; State v. Learned, 47 Me. 426; State v. Mace, 76 Me. 64; State v. Doran, 99 Me. 329, 59 Atl. 440, 105 Am. St. Rep. 278. He is of right entitled in the beginning to know, and in after time to point out, if he shall so desire, without going beyond the written record, the distinct crimination. The description of the offense must be certain, positive, and complete.

Speaking broadly, an indictment for a statutory crime is sufficient where it charges in the words of the statute. But this applies only in cases where in the statute itself there is a sufficient description of the offense intended to be created by the Legislature. With admirable accuracy it is stated in Commonwealth v. Welsh, 7 Gray (Mass.) 324:

"A charge in an indictment may be made in the words of the statute, without a particular statement of facts and circumstances, when, by using those words, the act in which an offense consists is fully, directly, and expressly alleged, without any uncertainty or ambiguity."

Mr. Bishop, in his work on Criminal Procedure (volume 1, § 98), says:

"Under every sort of Constitution known among us an indictment which does not substantially set down, at least in general terms, all the elements of the offense—everything which the law has made essential to the punishment it imposes—is void; and, besides this, under most of our Constitutions the allegation must descend far enough into the particulars and be sufficiently certain in its form of words to give the defendant reasonable notice of what is meant."

"Wh...