State v. Crowder
| Decision Date | 24 April 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 1810,1810 |
| Citation | 103 Ariz. 264,440 P.2d 29 |
| Parties | STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Jerry Calvin CROWDER, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Darrell F. Smith, Atty. Gen., by Carl Waag, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Vernon B. Croaff, Public Defender, by Grant Laney, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.
Appellant pleaded guilty to the crime of robbery in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13--641 and 13--643. The imposition of sentence was suspended and appellant was placed on probation for a period of three years. One of the terms of probation was that appellant '* * * will obey all laws of the United States Government and of the State of Arizona and all the states of our nation.' Appellant was arrested for violating the conditions of his probation and subsequently a hearing was held in the Superior Court of Maricopa County on a petition to revoke probation. At the hearing the court found that appellant had been convicted of violating Phoenix City Code, § 27--26 (Code 1951, ch. 29, § 25), prohibiting drunk or disorderly conduct in public. The court revoked his probation and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment in the Arizona State Prison for a period of not less than five years nor more than six years. The record shows that appellant was represented by the Public Defender at all stages of the proceedings. In addition, we should note that no reporter's transcript was made at the hearing to revoke probation.
On appeal appellant contends that the lower court erroneously revoked his probation because the violation of Phoenix city ordinances were not made conditions for revocation of his probation, and that revocation of probation based on the crime of drunk or disorderly conduct is unreasonable. As we said in State v. Maxwell, 97 Ariz. 162, 164, 398 P.2d 548, 549:
'To remain at liberty under a suspended sentence is not a matter of right but a matter of grace and purely in the discretion of the trial court, Varela v. Merrill, 51 Ariz. 64, 74 P.2d 569.'
See also Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 55 S.Ct. 818, 79 L.Ed. 1566. Appellant's rights while on probation are derived and governed solely by statute. A.R.S. § 13--1657, subsec. B provides:
'At any time during the probationary term of the person released on probation, any probation officer may, without warrant or other process, at any time until the final disposition of the case, re-arrest any person so placed in his care and bring him before the court, or the court may, in its discretion, issue a warrant for the re-arrest of any such person and may thereupon revoke and terminate the probation, if the interests of justice so require, and if the court, in its judgment, has reason to believe that the person so placed upon probation is violating the conditions of his probation, or engaging in criminal practices, or has become abandoned to improper associates, or a vicious life.'
It is clear from the statute that a person's probation may be revoked in the sound discretion of the trial court if he engages in 'criminal practices' regardless of whether he has violated one of the express conditions of his probation. The legislative intent is apparent from the use of the disjunctive word 'or' between the last four clauses in this section of the statute. Moreover, when the trial court revokes probation for any violation of § 13--1657, subsec. B and imposes sentence the punishment is imposed by the court for the original crime of which the defendant was convicted.
We are of the opinion that appellant was accorded his rights in conformance with the purposes of this statute and that the trial judge's action was within his sound discretion. State v. Maxwell, supra; State v. Edge, 96 Ariz. 302, 394 P.2d 418.
Appellant next contends that the lower court committed reversible error when it failed to have a court reporter present at the hearing for revocation of his probation. The minute entries of the trial court show 'that there is no reporter's transcript in this matter since the Defendant entered a plea of guilty in open Court without the presence of a Court Reporter and was sentenced in open Court...
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State v. Williams
...of probation is not punishment for the probationary breach, but is instead punishment on the original charge. State v. Crowder, 103 Ariz. 264, 440 P.2d 29 (1968). The difference between a second trial on a criminal charge and a revocation of probation hearing is illustrated in State v. Piet......
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State v. Walter
...sufficient evidence upon which the trial court in its discretion could revoke his probation. State v. Maxwell, supra; State v. Crowder, 103 Ariz. 264, 440 P.2d 29 (1968). We affirm the decision KRUCKER, J., concurs. HOWARD, Chief Judge (specially concurring). I concur in the foregoing opini......
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State v. Fuentes
...See, State v. Robbins, 110 Ariz. 284, 518 P.2d 107 (1974); State v. Pietsch, 109 Ariz. 261, 508 P.2d 337 (1973); State v. Crowder, 103 Ariz. 264, 440 P.2d 29 (1968). All of these cases likewise stand for the proposition that punishment flowing as a result of probation being revoked is not p......
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State v. Kessler
...on his argument. "To remain at liberty under a suspended sentence is not a matter of right but a matter of grace." State v. Crowder, 103 Ariz. 264, 265, 440 P.2d 29, 30 (1968). As a result, a probationer is subject to restriction of his constitutional rights to a greater degree than would b......