State v. Crowell

• Decision Date: 16 April 1895
• Citation: 116 N.C. 1052,21 S.E. 502
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE. v. CROWELL.

21 S.E. 502

116 N.C. 1052

STATE.

v.CROWELL.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 16, 1895.

Seduction—Limitation—Instructions—Sentence.

1. Code, § 1177, which exempts certain crimes, including "deceit, " from the two-years statute of limitations, applies to seduction under promise of marriage.

2. One "who has never had illicit intercourse, and who is chaste and pure, " is a sufficient definition of a virtuous woman, and the refusal to add thereto "that she must have a mind free from lustful and lascivious desires" was proper.

3. Acts 1885, c. 248, providing that one convicted of seduction under promise of marriage "shall be fined or imprisoned, " at the discretion of the court, does not authorize the imposition of both fine and imprisonment.

4. The fact that a sentence both of fine and imprisonment was imposed, when only one was authorized, does not entitle defendant to a new trial, but the case will be remanded for proper sentence.

Appeal from superior court, Catawba county; Timberlake, Judge.

L. A. Crowell was convicted of seduction under promise of marriage, and appeals. Affirmed.

Jones & Tillett and D. W. Robinson, for appellant.

The Attorney General, for the State.

CLARK, J. The Code (section 1177) excepts from the two-years statute of limitation perjury, forgery, malicious misdemeanors, and deceit. There has never been such an indictable offense as "deceit, " but the meaning of this section has always been that misdemeanors the gist of which was malice or deceit are within the exception. In State v. Christianbury, 44 N. C. 46, it was held that, there being no such offense as deceit, it would apply to "cheating by false token, " of which deceit was the gist, but would not include "conspiracy to cheat, " "the gist of which offense is the conspiracy, and the cheating but an aggravation." Thatdecision did not restrict deceit to "cheating by false token, " but instanced that as an offense coming within the general description of misdemeanors by deceit. The statute against seduction under promise of marriage (Acts 1885, c. 248) had not then been enacted. In State v. Horton, 100 N. C. 443, 449, 6 S. E. 238, Smith, C. J., says that this statute "plainly contemplates a seduction, brought about by means of a promise of marriage, in the nature of deceit." Indeed, deceit is the very essence of this offense—the warp and woof of it, so to speak. There is more warrant for so holding it than the court had for placing cheating by false token under that head, for this offense is perpetrated solely by reason of the trust and confidence placed in the perpetrator by the woman in consequence of the intimate relation existing between them, and by her relying on the promise of marriage, by means of which he procures the indulgence of his desires. In cheating by false token there is not this dependence and breach of confidence and trust. The attorney general properly conceded that this crime would not have come under the other exception in this section, —"offenses committed in a secret manner." That clearly applies to crimes committed in such manner that the offender is unknown to the person injured.

The act of 1891 (chapter 205), defining felonies and misdemeanors, makes this offense, if committed since the act, a felony, as to which there is no statute of limitation. But that act does not apply to this offense, which was committed prior to its enactment. When there is a prayer to put the charge in writing, the entire charge must be written. State v. Young, 111 N. C. 715, 16 S. E. 543. But, as was said by Smith, C....