State v. Crumpton
| Decision Date | 22 March 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-02734,95-02734 |
| Citation | 676 So.2d 987 |
| Parties | 21 Fla. L. Weekly D737 STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Eric L. CRUMPTON, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Raymond O. Gross, Judge.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Erica W. Raffel, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Brad Permar, Assistant Public Defender, Clearwater, for Appellee.
The state appeals from an order granting the appellee's motion to suppress evidence in which the trial court determined that the appellee was the subject of an unlawful police detention as opposed to a consensual police encounter. Because there exists no substantial, competent evidence to support this determination, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
In a written order rendered after the suppression hearing in this case, the trial court discounted the appellee's testimony, specifically finding it "added nothing and probably clouded the issue because much of what was said was probably not believable." Instead, it relied primarily on the testimony of the arresting officer. Accordingly, we review the officer's testimony to determine whether it supports the trial court's ultimate assessment that an illegal detention occurred. In doing so, we "adhere to the well-settled proposition that a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress comes to this court clothed with a presumption of correctness and must be accepted by this court if the record reveals evidence to support the findings." State v. Spurling, 385 So.2d 672, 674 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 392 So.2d 1379 (Fla.1980).
The arresting officer testified that during the early morning hours of November 2, 1994, he and another uniformed officer were parked in a marked police unit alongside a street awaiting a determination of whether a person they had in custody was the subject of an outstanding warrant. At this time, he observed the appellee, whom he knew from prior encounters, across the street in the company of eight to ten individuals. Some of these individuals were congregating in people's yards, others were at a bus stop, and still others, including the appellee, were standing in the street. The officer turned on his spotlight, shone it on the group, and announced over his unit's public address system that "it was time to leave" the area. 1 His perceived authority for ordering the group to disperse was twofold. One, this area had experienced nighttime criminal activities, including narcotics sales. Two, citizens living in the area had requested the police to enforce the no trespassing signs they had posted on their property. The officer testified, however, that the appellee was not standing on property posted with a no trespassing sign.
Before complying with the officer's order, the appellee bent toward the ground and then, as he stood back up, turned away from the officer and appeared to place something in his right front pants pocket. Concerned that the appellee may have placed a weapon in his pocket, the officer alerted his partner to keep an eye on the appellee for "officer safety."
The appellee, along with another individual from the group, then began walking across the street in the general direction of the police unit. The officer, who was still sitting in his unit, greeted the appellee by asking "how things were going" and if he "minded" coming over to the unit and telling the officer what he had placed in his pocket. The appellee replied it was a piece of rock cocaine. Flabbergasted, the officer asked him to repeat what he said approximately three times, and, on each occasion, the appellee repeated the same answer. The officer, along with his partner, immediately exited the police unit and, with the consent of the appellee, retrieved a paper napkin with one piece of rock cocaine from the appellee's right front pants pocket. The officer then arrested appellee for possession of cocaine.
The officer further testified that prior to this verbal contact, the appellee had not engaged in any conduct indicating that he possessed a weapon or caused a safety concern. Furthermore, according to the officer, he had no indication that appellee had committed, was committing, or was about to commit, a crime. Finally, the officer related that although he never advised the appellee that he was free to leave, he in fact had that option. At no time, however, did appellee attempt to leave or refuse to speak with the officer.
Against this factual backdrop, the trial court determined that the officer exercised his authority in two respects--by ordering the group to disperse and by asking the appellee to approach the police unit. It further determined that a reasonable person under these circumstances would have felt "compelled to step over to the cruiser." The trial court concluded, therefore, that the officer's "request was made without benefit of lawful authorization and the citizen encounter ceased and became, in effect, a de facto arrest at the time the officer directed the Defendant over to the car even though the officer's testimony was 'he would have been free to go.' " As we will explain, a strict application of the law regarding consensual encounters to the objective facts of the officer's testimony does not support the trial court's conclusion.
In Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185 (Fla.1993), the supreme court recognized the absence of a litmus test for distinguishing a consensual police encounter from a seizure. It observed, however, that "a significant identifying characteristic of a consensual encounter is that the officer cannot hinder or restrict the person's freedom to leave or freedom to refuse to answer inquiries, and the person may not be detained without a well-founded and articulable suspicion of criminal activity." Id. at 187-188. The court then reaffirmed its prior holdings that "a person is seized if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would conclude that he or she is not free to end the encounter and depart." Id. at 188.
Our decisions predating Popple echo these fundamental principles. See, e.g., State v. Jenkins, 616 So.2d 173 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 623 So.2d 494 (Fla.1993); State v. Boone, 613 So.2d 560 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); State v. DeCosey, 596 So.2d 149 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); State v. Starke, 574 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); State v. Wilson, 566 So.2d 585 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); State v. Simons, 549 So.2d 785 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (cited Popple, 626 So.2d at 188). Furthermore, as we observed in Simons, an appellate court's assessment of whether a police encounter occurred must be made "in light of all surrounding circumstances to...
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State v. R.R., 96-1445
...have voluntarily abandoned the contraband, and it could have been used as evidence against him. (Emphasis added.) In State v. Crumpton, 676 So.2d 987 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) the second district concluded that an order to disperse, given by a police officer to the defendant and others, was not th......
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F.E.H., Jr. v. State, 4D09-740.
...(holding that one officer asking defendant to "[c]ome here for a minute, can I talk to you," was not a seizure); State v. Crumpton, 676 So.2d 987, 988-89 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (asking defendant if "he `minded' coming over to the unit and telling the officer what he had placed in his pocket" di......
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Langley v. State, 98-00513.
...the officer's request or otherwise terminate the encounter. See Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 188 (Fla.1993); State v. Crumpton, 676 So.2d 987, 989 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that a reasonable person, facing six police officers and a police dog, would......