State v. Crusins

• Decision Date: 15 February 1895
• Citation: 57 N.J.L. 279,31 A. 235
• Parties: STATE v. CRUSINS et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

31 A. 235

57 N.J.L. 279

STATE

v. CRUSINS et al.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Feb. 15, 1895.

(Syllabus by the Court)

Prosecution of John N. Crusins and others for keeping a disorderly house. On motion for arrest of judgment. Motion denied.

Argued November term, 1894, before MAGIE, LIPPINCOTT, and DIXON, JJ.

C. H. Winfield, for the State.

Allan L. McDermott, for defendants.

DIXON, J. At the December term, 1893, of the Hudson county oyer and terminer, the defendants were indicted in the usual form for keeping a disorderly house, and In May, 1894, they pleaded guilty. The judges of the oyer and terminer being unable to agree upon a sentence, the state caused the proceedings to be removed into this court, and now prays judgment on the plea. The defendants move in arrest of judgment, basing their motion upon a written stipulation, signed by their counsel and the public prosecutor, and sent up by the court below as part of its record, which states the conduct for which the defendants were indicted. Such conduct, the defendants insist, was, at the time of their indictment, not punishable. We think this stipulation cannot be considered upon a motion in arrest of judgment. That motion must be determined solely by the record, using the term in its proper sense. So employed, it imports the history of only those proceedings which take place in the orderly progress of a cause, and which the common law or statutes require to be perpetuated. In the present case, these comprise merely the indictment, with its incidents, the arraignment of the defendants, and their plea. The plea of guilty conclusively established the truth of the indictment, so far as the legal propriety of conviction was concerned, and, so long as that plea stands, there is nothing to justify a statement or an investigation of facts for the purpose of ascertaining whether the defendants should be convicted or not. In the face of such a plea, the stipulation can have no place in the record, and therefore is utterly void of significance on a motion to arrest the judgment.

The defendants further urge that, in case we consider their acts, as set forth in the stipulation, legally dispunishable, then they should be permitted to withdraw their plea, and plead not guilty, and to this prayer the prosecutor makes no objection. The application Is, of course, addressed to our discretion; but it ought to prevail if, in our judgment, the plea of guilty is not warranted by the truth. The stipulation is to the effect that from January 16, 1892, up to the presentation of the indictment, in December, 1893, the defendants kept a place in Hudson county where persons resorted for the purpose of betting on horse races, and where the practice of betting on horse races, commonly known as "book making," was habitually carried on, within the inclosure of the North Hudson Driving Park Association, and upon the races authorized by it within its inclosure, and during the race days. The stipulation also sets out that the association was Incorporated under our statutes, for the improvement of horses in running, racing, and trotting. On February 27, 1893, the legislature passed a law which, the defendants insist, declared that such conduct as is described in the stipulation should not constitute a nuisance, or the keeping of a disorderly house, or any other misdemeanor or criminal offense, and that the persons engaged therein should not be indictable. This law also enacted that all laws and parts of laws, both statutory and common, inconsistent therewith, should be thereby repealed. The defendants contend that by this statute their conduct subsequent to its passage was not criminal, and their conduct previous to its passage was rendered dispunishable. The argument presented to support this contention with respect to the previous conduct is that such conduct was criminal by force of the common law only, that pro tanto the common law was repealed by the statute, and that the effect of such repeal was to extinguish the criminality of prior offenses for which judgment had not been pronounced against the offenders, upon the principle that, after the repeal or expiration of a law, no penalty can be imposed or punishment inflicted for violations of the law committed while it was in force, unless some special provision be made for that purpose by statute. The principle thus invoked seems to be thoroughly established. 1 Hale, P. C. 291; Yeaton v. U. S., 5 Cranch, 281; Com. v. Marshall, 11 Pick. 350; Den v. Du Bois, 16 N. J. Law, 285, 300; Hartung v. People, 22 N. Y. 95; Com. v. Kimball, 21 Pick. 373; Norris v. Crocker, 13 How. 429; U. S. v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88; 23 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 512. But we think it is not applicable to the present case, because the criminality of the defendants' conduct depends on statute, and by section 4 of "An act relative to statutes" (Revision, p. 1120) It was enacted "that no offence committed, and no liability, penalty or forfeiture, either civil or criminal incurred previous to the time when any statutory provision shall be repealed or altered, shall be discharged or affected by the repeal or alteration of any statute under which such offence, liability, penalty or forfeiture was incurred, unless it be expressly declared in the act of the legislature whereby such repeal or alteration shall be made that offences, liabilities, penalties or forfeitures already committed or incurred shall be thereby released or discharged; and indictments and prosecutions for such offences, liabilities, penalties and forfeitures shall be instituted and proceeded with in all respects as if such prior statute had not been repealed or altered," except as to mere matters of practice. The statute on which, in our opinion, the criminality of the defendants' conduct may be rested, is section 192 of the crimes act (Revision, p. 261). This enacts that "assaults, batteries, false imprisonment, affrays, riots, routs, unlawful assemblies, nuisances, cheats deceits, and all other offences of an indictable nature at common law, and not provided for by this or some other act of the...