State v. Crutchfield

• Decision Date: 28 December 1989
• Citation: 567 A.2d 449,318 Md. 200
• Parties: STATE of Maryland v. Gloria CRUTCHFIELD. 64 Sept. Term 1989.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 200

318 Md. 200

567 A.2d 449

STATE of Maryland v. Gloria CRUTCHFIELD.

64 Sept. Term 1989.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 28, 1989.

Valerie J. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., both on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.

Benjamin Lipsitz (Jay Fred Cohen, Eleanor J. Lipsitz, all on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE and ADKINS, JJ., and CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Retired, Specially Assigned Judge.

MURPHY, Chief Judge.

This case involves the sua sponte declaration of a mistrial by a trial judge in a criminal case and whether, in the circumstances, retrial of the defendant would violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, now applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment under Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). ¹

I.

On January 17, 1987, the Maryland State Police responded to a call regarding a shooting at a home in Mt. Airy, Maryland. Trooper Douglas Wehland, the first to arrive at the scene, discovered Gloria Elizabeth Crutchfield on the porch of the residence ; she implored Wehland to come to the shooting victim's aid. Crutchfield had blood on her skin and clothing. In response to Wehland's inquiry, she stated that she had shot a man, later identified as William Richard Lawrence. The victim was lying on the floor, bleeding. At no time during this period did Wehland advise Crutchfield of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

Emergency medical personnel and other police officers thereafter arrived on the scene, among them Corporal Joseph Marick and Trooper Donald Lewis. Marick took two statements from Crutchfield without advising her of her Miranda rights. In the first statement, which was taken in the kitchen of the residence, Crutchfield told Marick that she and Lawrence argued because he had arrived home late; that she had turned up the thermostat to anger him; and that Lawrence then pulled her hair, struck her, picked up a knife and threatened her. In this statement, Crutchfield admitted that she took a handgun from her pocketbook, and that she and Lawrence struggled over the gun, which discharged toward the ceiling. Crutchfield told Marick that she then regained possession of the gun and, instead of shooting Lawrence in the arm as she intended to do, she shot him in the head. As part of this statement, Crutchfield said that when Lawrence was shot they were still struggling over the gun. In response to Marick's inquiry as to why she had a gun in her purse, Crutchfield said that she didn't know what kind of party she was going to and had it just in case.

Shortly after he took this statement, Marick took Crutchfield to his police cruiser where he asked her to once again relate the details of the shooting. Crutchfield told Marick that after she told Lawrence that she had turned up the thermostat, he went to the front room and knocked things over, after which he returned to the kitchen, pulled her hair and struck her. In this statement, Crutchfield said that she retrieved the gun from her pocketbook; that she struggled with Lawrence over the gun; and that Lawrence shot at her and missed. Crutchfield said that after she regained possession of the gun, she attempted to shoot Lawrence in the arm, but instead shot him in the head. Crutchfield told Marick that, at first, she thought Lawrence had feigned injury to get her attention or affection, but then she saw blood and tried to resuscitate him. She said that she called for emergency medical assistance. She also stated that Lawrence had beat her several times and that she was not going to let him beat her again.

After the two statements were taken by Marick, Trooper Lewis asked Crutchfield to consent to a collection of evidence from the house. She refused. Lewis then took Crutchfield to police headquarters to obtain her clothing as evidence. During the trip, Lewis advised Crutchfield of her Miranda rights and she gave another statement, wherein she related that she and Lawrence were to go to a car show that day; that he had been away from home all day, but called the residence approximately one hour before the shooting; and that from this conversation she thought he was high and may have been using P.C.P. During this conversation, Crutchfield told Lawrence that she was not going to wait for him but was going to a party. Crutchfield admitted to Lewis that before leaving, she went upstairs and took a .22 caliber revolver from a jewelry box and placed it in her purse, which she then placed on the kitchen table. In response to Lewis's questions, Crutchfield said that she took the pistol with her whenever she went out. According to her statement, Lawrence arrived at the residence before she left and the two argued. She told Lawrence that she had turned up the thermostat to 85 degrees, and that he became angry and "went off like a wild man." In this statement, she said that Lawrence struck her, pulled her hair and knocked her down; that her purse, which had been on the kitchen table, was knocked to the floor and the pistol came out of it; that she retrieved the gun, the two struggled over it, that it discharged into the air; and that the struggle continued. Lewis testified that in Crutchfield's statement to him, she said that "[s]he stepped back, ... cocked the gun, [and she] described very vividly how she had to cock the pistol, and ... when he lunged at her, she ... fired and shot him." Lawrence fell to the floor, after which Crutchfield said she called for medical assistance.

Crutchfield also told Lewis that at some point during the confrontation, Lawrence had what she thought was a steak knife. In response to Lewis's inquiry as to her state of mind when she shot Lawrence, Crutchfield said that she did not intend to kill him, but only to shoot him in the arm or the leg to slow him down and stop him from beating her. At that point Lewis asked Crutchfield about taking a taped statement. She asked to talk to someone before continuing. She later spoke to her father and thereafter declined to answer any further questions.

Crutchfield was subsequently indicted in the Circuit Court for Carroll County for first degree murder, second degree murder, manslaughter and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony. At a suppression hearing held on September 14, 1987, the court (Gilmore, J.) denied Crutchfield's motion to suppress her statements.

The case was removed to the Circuit Court for Garrett County where a jury trial began on February 29, 1988 before Chief Judge Frederick A. Thayer, III. Crutchfield again moved to suppress the statements she had made to the officers. In reliance on Judge Gilmore's denial of the motion at the earlier suppression hearing, Judge Thayer also denied the motion.

Upon the conclusion of Marick's testimony at the trial, the jury was excused and the trial was recessed. Judge Thayer called counsel into chambers and expressed concern that Crutchfield's statements to Marick had been improperly admitted in evidence. That evening Judge Thayer reviewed the transcript of the suppression hearing before Judge Gilmore, as well as the law governing the admissibility of statements given during custodial interrogation by police. The following morning Judge Thayer declared a mistrial, indicating for the record that Crutchfield neither consented nor objected to the mistrial. He found that Corporal Marick's testimony at trial "demonstrated that there was custodial interrogation of the defendant without prior Miranda advice" as to the statements made by Crutchfield to him in the residence and in the patrol car. Judge Thayer recognized from Marick's trial testimony that Judge Gilmore "had some bad information before him." In his sua sponte declaration of a mistrial, Judge Thayer said that the "only means of permitting ... [Crutchfield's trial] to begin again afresh" was to take this action, it being his belief that "it now would be a travesty to proceed to a conclusion in this case."

Crutchfield later moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that the sua sponte declaration of the mistrial was not based on manifest necessity and violated the double jeopardy provision of the Constitution. Judge Thayer denied the motion.

Crutchfield filed an immediate appeal from Judge Thayer's order, as authorized by Neal v. State, 272 Md. 323, 322 A.2d 887 (1974). The Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that Crutchfield's retrial was barred by double jeopardy principles because the mistrial was not based upon manifest necessity and Crutchfield did not consent to it. In so holding, the intermediate appellate court first recognized that the trial judge expressed "his belief that the damage done to [Crutchfield's] case by the admission of highly prejudicial evidence that should have been excluded was irreparable." Crutchfield v. State, 79 Md.App. 101, 103, 555 A.2d 1070 (1989). It noted that the two statements made to Marick were "extremely damaging to [Crutchfield] because they were inconsistent with her other statements and her self-defense theory of defense [and] had been made in response to interrogation while ... in custody and before she had been advised of her Miranda rights." Id. It further said that where a mistrial has been declared sua sponte by the trial judge without the defendant's explicit acquiescence, "retrial will not be barred if there was a manifest necessity for the mistrial; however, if the trial was needlessly aborted, retrial will be barred." Id. [79 Md.App.] at 105, 555 A.2d 1070. As to this, the court concluded that while "a great deal of deference must be given the trial judge's determination; ... great deference should be given [to the defendant's] determination as to whether his own interests would be better served by aborting the trial or by submitting his fate to the jury that is already...