State v. Cumberland Club

Decision Date26 September 1914
PartiesSTATE v. CUMBERLAND CLUB.
CourtMaine Supreme Court

Agreed Statement from Superior Court, Cumberland County.

Action by the State against the Cumberland Club to abate defendant as a liquor nuisance. On agreed statement. Case to stand for trial.

Argued before SAVAGE, C. J., and CORNISH, HALEY, and HANSON, JJ.

Samuel L. Bates, Co. Atty., of Portland, for the State. William C. Eaton, of Portland, for respondent.

SAVAGE, C. J. By Revised Statutes, C. 22, § 1:

"All places of resort where intoxicating liquors are kept, sold, given away, drank or dispensed in any manner not provided by law, are common nuisances."

The defendant has been indicted for a violation of this statute. The case has come before the court upon an agreed statement of facts, with a stipulation that if the facts therein set forth constitute the offense charged in the indictment, the case is to stand for trial; otherwise the respondent is to be discharged.

The agreed statement of facts shows, besides other things not material, that:

"The defendant is a corporation chartered in 1878, for the purpose of establishing a clubhouse in the city of Portland, and of promoting literary and social intercourse among its members. It has the power to fix and limit the right of members in and to the corporate property, and the manner in which the same shall determine. Since 1878 the club has owned and maintained a clubhouse in Portland. The clubhouse at the time of the alleged offense was a three-story building, containing reception and reading room, dining rooms, kitchen, pantries, refrigerating room, card rooms, billiard room, sleeping rooms, etc. The club also maintained a 'locker room.' In this room were two sideboards and 250 lockers.' The lockers were built of practically uniform size, 12 inches high, 12 inches wide, and 18 inches deep. These lockers were not rented, but, excepting those which were empty and unused, each of these lockers had been purchased and was owned by an individual member of the club, and would remain his property so long as he continued a member. Each locker was fitted with a lock and key, and no two keys were interchangeable, nor was there any master key nor any method of unlocking except by means of the key of the owner. The two sideboards were equipped with glasses and mixing utensils. In the center of the room was a large circular table, and the room was otherwise furnished with several small tables and chairs. It was usual and customary for such members as owned lockers to keep intoxicating liquors therein, and to drink the same in this room and in the dining room, when they so desired. The locker room was most used by members of the club on week days between the hours of 4 and 7 in the afternoon, and on Saturday evenings, during which time the average number of members present in the room would be 10. On rare occasions, not exceeding three or four times a year, the number of members present in this room at one time would be as high as 20."

"On the 15th day of November, 1913 [a time within the period covered by the indictment], 146 lockers were owned and used by members of the club, and contained in the aggregate 1,003 bottles, each bottle containing more or less intoxicating liquor. These liquors consisted of whisky, gin, vermuth, rum, champagne, wine, beer, ale, and other liquors, the property of the respective owners of the lockers. It is agreed that the condition so existing on said November 15th is a fair example of the condition there existing during all the period covered by the indictment."

"Any and all intoxicating liquor so kept and drank in the club during the period covered by the indictment was purchased and owned by respective members of the club, and no officer, agent, servant or employé of the club participated in any way in the purchase or sale of such liquor or in the payment therefor. During the period covered by the indictment there has not been in the said clubhouse, nor anywhere on the premises of the club, any intoxicating liquor except such as was owned by an individual member thereof, and kept by him in his individual locker, as aforesaid, nor during said period has there been in the clubhouse, or anywhere on the premises of the club, any intoxicating liquors sold or kept with intent to sell by any person, copartnership, or corporation whatsoever."

"During the period covered by the indictment, each member of the club who bought or sent intoxicating liquor to the clubhouse to be placed in his locker paid to the club a service charge of 25 cents a bottle for spirituous liquors and 4 cents a bottle for beer and malt liquors. This service charge was imposed and collected as payment for ice, sugar, the use of glasses and mixing utensils and attendance of servants."

"During the period covered by the indictment, the number of resident members has been approximately 160, of nonresident members, 95, and of army and navy members, 5; and at least 40 per cent., thereof, during said period, have neither...

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8 cases
  • State v. Heald
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • 3 Enero 1978
    ...unless the act discloses a legislative intent otherwise. State v. Blaisdell, 118 Me. 13, 15, 105 A. 359 (1919); State v. Cumberland Club,112 Me. 196, 200, 91 A. 911 (1914). Giving legislative terms such as in the instant case convicted of a felony the more extended of two meanings as the ge......
  • Smith v. State
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • 8 Septiembre 1950
    ...common and popular sense, unless the context shows the contrary. State v. Blaisdell, supra, State v. Cavalluzzi, supra, State v. Cumberland Club, 112 Me. 196, 91 A. 911. While in a colloquial sense it may be said that one who is arrested on a charge of crime is arrested for a criminal offen......
  • Depositors Trust Co. of Augusta v. Johnson
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • 2 Agosto 1966
    ...common and popular sense, unless the context shows the contrary.' State v. Blaisdell, 118 Me. 13 at 15, 105 A. 359, 360; State v. Cumberland Club, 112 Me. 196, 91 A. 911. See, R.S.1954, c. 10, § 22(I), now 1 M.R.S.A. § And this rule applies in the interpretation of revenue acts. Crane v. Co......
  • THE LEME, Civ. No. 783.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Oregon
    • 12 Enero 1948
    ...in this connection the mere fact that the parties live in the place will not prevent it from being a place of resort. State v. Cumberland Club, 112 Me. 196, 91 A. 911. 8 See Ex parte Colonna, 314 U.S. 510, 62 S.Ct. 373, 86 L.Ed. 379; Manaka v. Monterey Sardine Industries, D.C., 48 F. Supp. ......
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