State v. Cummings

• Decision Date: 27 January 2021
• Docket Number: #29010
• Citation: 954 N.W.2d 731
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Morgan CUMMINGS, Defendant and Appellee.

954 N.W.2d 731

STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.Morgan CUMMINGS, Defendant and Appellee.

#29010

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

ARGUED FEBRUARY 11, 2020

OPINION FILED January 27, 2021

JASON R. RAVNSBORG, Attorney General, STACY R. HEGGE, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, South Dakota, SARAH E. HARRIS, Bennett County State's Attorney, Martin, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellant.

TERRY L. PECHOTA, Rapid City, South Dakota, Attorney for defendant and appellee.

JENSEN, Chief Justice

[¶1.] Agents from the South Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation and the Bureau of Indian Affairs spoke with Morgan Cummings and his father Charlie Cummings at their home located on Indian trust land concerning property crimes that had occurred outside Indian country.¹ Morgan and Charlie agreed to speak with the officers and produced evidence implicating Morgan in a burglary in Bennett County. Morgan was later charged in state court. The circuit court granted Morgan's motion to suppress statements he made to a state officer, determining that the officer lacked authority to investigate crimes in Indian country. We granted the State's petition for intermediate appeal of the circuit court's order suppressing Morgan's statements. We now reverse the circuit court's decision.

Facts and Procedural History

[¶2.] In January 2017, various state law enforcement agencies were investigating recent burglaries and thefts that had occurred outside Indian country in Martin, South Dakota. Morgan Cummings was a suspect. Morgan was eighteen at the time and lived with his father, Charlie Cummings, in Sunrise Housing; which is in Indian country on the east side of Martin.² On January 9, 2017, at approximately 1:15 p.m., Special Agent Rasmussen of the South Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) and Special Agent Hooper of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) went to the Cummings’ house to investigate the burglaries and thefts. DCI Special Agent Patterson was also present, but he did not testify; and there is no showing that he possessed any federal authority in Indian country.

[¶3.] As a BIA officer, Agent Hooper was authorized to investigate and make arrests for crimes committed in Indian country and "serve warrants, summonses, or other orders relating to a crime committed in Indian country ...." 25 U.S.C. § 2803. Agent Hooper was also authorized "when requested, [to] assist ... any Federal, tribal, State, or local law enforcement agency in the enforcement or carrying out of the laws or regulations the agency enforces or administers." Id. Agents Rasmussen and Hooper were members of the Northern Plains Safe Trails Drug Enforcement Task Force. Agent Rasmussen was federally deputized to investigate drug offenses in Indian country pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 801 et. seq.

[¶4.] Upon approaching the Cummings’ residence, the officers knocked on the front door. Charlie answered, and the officers identified themselves as drug task force officers, said they were investigating recent burglaries and thefts that had occurred outside Indian country, and asked to speak to Morgan. Charlie invited the officers in and woke Morgan. Morgan agreed to follow Agent Rasmussen out to Rasmussen's vehicle to talk. The vehicle was unlocked, and Morgan sat in the passenger seat. He was told that he was free to leave at any time. Morgan and Agent Rasmussen talked for twenty minutes. During the conversation, Morgan made certain admissions, including admitting to taking a saddle that the officers were investigating as stolen. He agreed to show Agent Rasmussen where the saddle was located in the basement.

[¶5.] While Morgan and Agent Rasmussen were outside, Agent Hooper discussed the stolen items they were looking for with Charlie and asked for consent to search the home. Charlie offered to show the officers the items that had been described. Charlie led Agent Hooper to a saddle and saddle blanket, along with other items. Those items were placed in a pile in the kitchen. When Morgan and Agent Rasmussen returned to the house, Agent Rasmussen asked Morgan to show him where other stolen items were located; and Morgan did so. After all the items were collected, Charlie and Morgan both signed a consent to search form.

[¶6.] Morgan was indicted for third-degree burglary, grand theft, and intentional damage to property in state court. He moved to suppress his statements and the items provided to law enforcement, claiming law enforcement's actions violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Specifically, Morgan argued Agent Rasmussen did not have the authority to question him in Indian country, his statements were involuntary, and the search was not consensual. Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court suppressed Morgan's statements relying exclusively on our decisions in State v. Spotted Horse , 462 N.W.2d 463 (S.D. 1990), and State v. Cummings , 2004 S.D. 56, 679 N.W.2d 484, to conclude that Agent Rasmussen did not have authority to investigate state criminal offenses in Indian country. The court refused to suppress the physical evidence, determining that Agent Hooper had investigative authority within Indian country as a BIA officer and that Charlie's decision to voluntarily produce the physical evidence was an intervening event that removed the taint of Agent Rasmussen's interview of Morgan.

[¶7.] The circuit court denied the State's motion for reconsideration following a hearing, but the circuit court clarified its ruling by determining that Morgan's statements to Agent Rasmussen were voluntary.³ The State petitioned for intermediate appeal from the circuit court's ruling, raising the sole issue of whether the court erred in suppressing Morgan's statements.

Standard of Review

[¶8.] "We review the circuit court's grant or denial of a motion to suppress involving an alleged violation of a constitutionally protected right under the de novo standard of review." State v. Smith , 2014 S.D. 50, ¶ 14, 851 N.W.2d 719, 723. We review the circuit court's findings of fact for clear error, but conclusions of law are given no deference. Id.

Analysis and Decision

[¶9.] The State argues that the circuit court erred in relying on our decisions in Spotted Horse and Cummings to conclude that Morgan's statements must be suppressed "[b]ecause Agent Rasmussen was without authority to conduct the investigation in Indian country." The State argues Spotted Horse and Cummings are inapplicable because the officers were lawfully present at the Cummings’ home and the interaction between the officers and the Cummings was entirely consensual. The State also claims that nothing prohibited Agent Rasmussen from going to the Cummings’ home in Indian country to investigate crimes that occurred off the reservation and cite Nevada v. Hicks , which recognized the authority of state officers to enter Indian country to investigate and enforce off-reservation crimes. 533 U.S. 353, 121 S. Ct. 2304, 150 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2001). Alternatively, the State asks that we reverse the holdings of Spotted Horse and Cummings .

[¶10.] Morgan relies upon the continued applicability of Spotted Horse and Cummings. He argues that Agent Rasmussen had no authority to enter Indian country and engage in any law enforcement activity without authorization from tribal authorities. As a result, Morgan maintains that the State cannot rely on consent given by him or his father because Agent Rasmussen was not legally present at the Cummings’ home when he requested consent to search and speak with Morgan.

[¶11.] Spotted Horse and Cummings both arose from similar facts. In each case, a state law enforcement officer observed a tribal member commit a state motor vehicle offense outside of Indian country. The state law enforcement officer pursued the driver into Indian country at high speeds until the driver eventually stopped. The state officer in each case then arrested and transported the tribal member out of Indian country to face charges in state court.

[¶12.] In Spotted Horse , the Court relied on Ker v. Illinois , 119 U.S. 436, 7 S. Ct. 225, 30 L. Ed. 421 (1886), to deny a challenge to the state court's jurisdiction to hear the case, but held the "seizure of [the defendant] by [the officer] was clearly a violation of [the defendant's] Fourth Amendment rights ...." 462 N.W.2d at 468-69. Spotted Horse viewed the officer's "actions in pursuing [the defendant] down the reservation highway, into the housing area and onto his front lawn to be a constitutional violation, far above simple statutory violations" and held "that the evidence attained by the unconstitutional arrest is not admissible against [the defendant]." Id. at 469.

[¶13.] Cummings reaffirmed the holding in Spotted Horse , that the arrest of the defendant in Indian country violated the Fourth Amendment, and affirmed a circuit court's order suppressing evidence obtained from the arrest. Cummings , 2004 S.D. 56, ¶ 18, 679 N.W.2d at 489. This Court also rejected the State's argument that Nevada v. Hicks effectively nullified Spotted Horse . Id. ¶ 16.

[¶14.] In Hicks , the United States Supreme Court determined a tribal court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate tort claims arising from a state officer's execution of a state search warrant. The warrant authorized a search of the plaintiff's home on a reservation for evidence pertaining to an off-reservation crime. 533 U.S. at 357, 364, 121 S. Ct. at 2309, 2313. Applying accepted Indian law jurisdictional principles, the Court recognized that states may exercise some legal process and authority on Indian fee land:

Our cases make clear that the Indians’ right to make their own laws and be governed by them does not exclude all state regulatory authority on the reservation .... Though tribes are often referred to as "sovereign" entities, it was "long ago" that "the Court departed from Chief Justice Marshall's view that the laws of a State can have no force within reservation boundaries."

Id...