State v. Cummings
| Decision Date | 06 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | Docket: Ken–16–36 |
| Citation | 166 A.3d 996 |
| Parties | STATE of Maine v. Roland L. CUMMINGS |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Tina Heather Nadeau, Esq. (orally), The Law Office of Tina Heather Nadeau, PLLC, Portland, for appellant Roland L. Cummings
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
[¶ 1] Aurele Fecteau, a ninety-two-year-old retiree living alone in his own home in Waterville, was stabbed to death in his bed during a burglary. Roland L. Cummings was found guilty by a jury of the murder, along with two other crimes. Cummings appeals only from the judgment of conviction of murder entered by the court (Kennebec County, Murphy, J. ) after a trial in which the State presented the murder charge on alternative theories—intentional or knowing murder and depraved indifference murder. Cummings argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that he was the person who committed the murder, and in the alternative, he argues that, due to the evidence of sixteen stab wounds
to Fecteau's torso, the killing was so certainly a knowing or intentional murder that the jury should not have been instructed on depraved indifference murder. Thus, he contends that the court erred in allowing the State to proceed on alternative theories. We affirm the judgment.
[¶ 2] Cummings appeals from the judgment of conviction of murder, 17–A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A), (B) (2016). He does not challenge his additional convictions of burglary of a dwelling (Class B), 17–A M.R.S. § 401(1)(A), (B)(4) (2016), and theft by unauthorized taking or transfer (Class C), 17–A M.R.S. § 353(1)(A), (B)(6) (2016).
[¶ 3] When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the jury could rationally have found the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to the murder conviction. See State v. Maine , 2017 ME 25, ¶¶ 2, 28, 155 A.3d 871. On May 21, 2014, Cummings forced his way into Fecteau's home. Cummings knew Fecteau, who was the father of one of his friends. Cummings stabbed Fecteau sixteen times in the torso, causing his death; took money and jewelry; and fled. That night, Cummings sold two pieces of the stolen jewelry and used a $100 bill stolen from Fecteau to purchase drugs. He also paid a debt to an acquaintance for drugs using half-dollar coins stolen from Fecteau's home.
[¶ 4] One of Fecteau's sons, after unsuccessfully trying to reach his father by phone on May 22 and 23, went to his father's house on May 23. He discovered his father's body, and the police began an investigation.
[¶ 5] In June 2014, Cummings was charged by complaint with a single count of murder alleging intentional or knowing murder or depraved indifference murder. See 17–A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A), (B). Later that month, he was charged by indictment with murder, id. ; burglary of a dwelling (Class B), id. § 401(1)(A), (B)(4); burglary (Class B), 17–A M.R.S. § 401(1)(A), (B)(2) (2016) ; and theft (Class C), id. § 353(1)(A), (B)(6).
[¶ 6] The court held a six-day jury trial from November 12 to 19, 2015. The State's case included testimony from a Maine Crime Lab DNA analyst, who found Cummings's DNA on the out-turned pockets of Fecteau's pants and on one of the rings stolen from Fecteau. After the State presented its case, Cummings unsuccessfully moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 29(a). Cummings presented additional evidence but did not testify. With the State's consent, the court acquitted Cummings of the second burglary count.
[¶ 7] Before the court instructed the jury, Cummings objected to the proposed jury instructions on murder, arguing that the evidence could not support a finding of depraved indifference, and he again moved for a judgment of acquittal. The court overruled the objection and denied the motion.
[¶ 8] The State and Cummings offered closing arguments, after which the court delivered instructions to the jury orally and in writing. With respect to the murder charge, the court instructed on the alternative theories of intentional or knowing murder and depraved indifference murder.
[¶ 9] The jury found Cummings guilty of murder, burglary of a dwelling, and theft. Cummings moved for a new trial, and the court denied his motion. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 33.
[¶ 10] After a sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Cummings to life imprisonment for murder, ten years' imprisonment for burglary, and two years' imprisonment for theft, with the burglary and theft sentences to be served concurrently with the murder sentence. The court ordered Cummings to pay $4,500 to the Victims' Compensation Fund to reimburse the fund for a portion of the Fecteau family's funeral expenses. Cummings appealed from the judgment of conviction of murder and applied for review of his sentence. See 15 M.R.S. §§ 2115, 2151 (2016) ;1 M.R. App. P. 2, 20. The Sentence Review Panel denied his application for sentence review. State v. Cummings , No. SRP–16–37 ; see 15 M.R.S. § 2152 (2016) ; M.R. App. P. 20(f). We now consider Cummings's appeal.
[¶ 11] Cummings first argues that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find him guilty of murder because his DNA was found only on a stolen ring and on the pockets of pants recovered from Fecteau's apartment—not on Fecteau's body—and his possession of stolen items cannot establish that he killed Fecteau.
[¶ 12] "When reviewing a judgment for sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State [to] determin[e] whether the fact-finder could rationally have found each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Maine , 2017 ME 25, ¶ 28, 155 A.3d 871 (alterations in original) (quotation marks omitted). We defer to all credibility determinations and reasonable inferences drawn by the fact-finder, "even if those inferences are contradicted by parts of the direct evidence." Id. (quotation marks omitted).
[¶ 13] Relevant here, a 17–A M.R.S. § 201(1).
[¶ 14] On the record presented, there is more than sufficient evidence from which the jury rationally could find, based on reasonable inferences drawn from circumstantial and DNA evidence connecting Cummings with the murder and burglary, that Cummings was the person who caused Fecteau's death. See 17–A M.R.S. §§ 35(1)(A), (2)(A), 201(1)(A) (2016) ; Maine , 2017 ME 25, ¶ 28, 155 A.3d 871 ; see also State v. Belhumeur , 2015 ME 150, ¶ 6, 128 A.3d 646 (). The remaining question is whether depraved indifference murder was properly submitted to the jury as an alternative to intentional or knowing murder.
[¶ 15] Cummings argues that the sixteen stab wounds
inflicted on Fecteau were so likely to cause death that they could only have been inflicted with the conscious object to cause death or with knowledge that death was practically certain to result. See 17–A M.R.S. §§ 35(1)(A), (2)(A), 201(1)(A). He therefore contends that the evidence can demonstrate only intentional or knowing murder—not depraved indifference murder, id. § 201(1)(B) —and that because one or more of the jurors may have improperly found him guilty based on depraved indifference, the conviction must be vacated for a lack of unanimity.
[¶ 16] With respect to questions of law, including the construction of statutes, our review is de novo. See State v. Kendall , 2016 ME 147, ¶ 14, 148 A.3d 1230 ; State v. Kimball , 2016 ME 75, ¶ 10, 139 A.3d 914. "A person acts intentionally with respect to a result of the person's conduct when it is the person's conscious object to cause such a result," whereas "[a] person acts knowingly with respect to a result of the person's conduct when the person is aware that it is practically certain that the person's conduct will cause such a result." 17–A M.R.S. § 35(1)(A), (2)(A). A person acts with "depraved indifference to the value of human life" in Maine if the person's "conduct, objectively viewed, created such a high tendency to produce death that the law attributes to him the highest degree of blameworthiness." State v. Saenz , 2016 ME 159, ¶ 23, 150 A.3d 331 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶ 17] To find a defendant guilty of depraved indifference murder, "the adjudicator must conclude that the defendant consciously ... engaged in conduct that he should have known would create a very high degree of risk of death or serious bodily injury and it must also under the circumstances [have been] unjustifiable for him to take the risk." Id. (alterations in original) (quotation marks omitted). "Put differently, death-producing conduct will justify a verdict of guilty of depraved indifference murder if a jury could find that that conduct was so heinous in the eyes of the law as to constitute murder." Id. (quotation marks omitted).
[¶ 18] The depraved indifference murder statute, section 201(1)(B), has replaced a common law definition of murder that allowed a fact-finder to convict a person of murder upon "proof of conduct which objectively evaluated is characterized by a high death producing potential." State v. Woodbury , 403 A.2d 1166, 1172–73 (Me. 1979) (quotation marks omitted). Depraved indifference is derived from the concept of "implied malice," which is distinct from the state of mind characterized by the Criminal Code as recklessness because recklessness requires a subjective...
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