State v. Cummings

• Decision Date: 01 March 1990
• Docket Number: No. 365A87,365A87
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Edward Lee CUMMINGS.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 66

389 S.E.2d 66

326 N.C. 298

STATE of North Carolina v. Edward Lee CUMMINGS.

No. 365A87.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 1, 1990.

Lacy H. Thornburg, Atty. Gen. by Charles M. Hensey, Sp. Deputy Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the State.

Harry H. Harkins, Jr., Durham, for defendant-appellant.

MARTIN, Justice.

Defendant contends he is entitled to a new trial or, in the alternative, a new sentencing hearing. We find no error in the guilt phase but remand for a new sentencing hearing.

On Tuesday, 14 January 1986, the bodies of two white females were found by members of a crew bailing pine straw. They were approximately one hundred feet apart Edward Lee Cummings was arrested on 20 January 1986 and subsequently indicted for the murders of Karen Marie Puryear and Teresa Annette Puryear on 17 February 1986. The trial was bifurcated upon motion of the defendant. This appeal only concerns the defendant's conviction for the murder of Karen Puryear.

near a pond in a wooded area of land owned by the State of North Carolina about 1.5 miles from a house owned by defendant in Hoke County. The bodies were transported to the state medical examiner's facility in Chapel Hill where Drs. Page Hudson and James Michael Sullivan performed autopsies and identified the remains as Karen Puryear and her sister, Teresa Puryear. Both victims had been shot in the back of the head with a small caliber pistol, undressed, wrapped in clear and black plastic material and sheets, and were buried in shallow graves. Both victims were also missing an extremity. Teresa Puryear's body was in a more advanced stage of decomposition.

At trial, the state presented evidence which tended to show that:

Defendant married Hazel McNeill in 1964. She lived with the couples' four children in their home in Willow Springs until August of 1984.

In May of 1974, defendant met and became involved with Faye Puryear. Mrs. Puryear had three children who were currently living in a foster home but moved back in with her at or around this time. Karen was eleven years old, Brad was nine and Teresa was six. The relationship between Mrs. Puryear and defendant dwindled into a mere friendship. When Karen, the oldest daughter, was 14 or 15 years old, the defendant, age 37 at this time, developed an intimate relationship with her. In September of 1980, Karen became pregnant by defendant and had an abortion. In 1982, she delivered a child fathered by defendant and named him "Little Eddie." In 1983, Karen lost a child fathered by defendant as a result of crib death and in 1984, she had another child by defendant whom she named Crystal. Karen and her children moved into defendant's Willow Springs home after it was vacated by defendant's wife and four children in 1984.

During this time, defendant had difficulty getting along with Teresa Puryear, Karen's younger sister. On 15 September 1983, Mrs. Puryear got a Juvenile Petition to keep her younger daughter in school and three days later, she reported Teresa missing. Teresa was never seen alive again.

In June of 1985, Karen left the defendant and eventually found a home of her own in Raleigh. On 10 October 1985 she lodged a criminal complaint against defendant for nonsupport. Five days later defendant took the children to his home when Karen asked him for money for medicine for one of them. Defendant refused to return the children and Karen started proceedings with Legal Services to get the children back. She, however, did not follow through with this course of action. After being served with the summons in the nonsupport case, defendant on 29 October 1985 brought the children back to Karen to go trick or treating. On 14 November 1985 Karen went to the day care center to pick up her children around 3:30 p.m. Within 10 minutes, defendant drove up in his truck. He picked up Little Eddie and drove off. Karen followed in the same direction with Crystal in her car. This is the last time anyone recalls seeing Karen Puryear alive.

On 15 November 1985 defendant told Mrs. Puryear that, on the previous day, he and Karen had taken the two children shoe shopping and Karen had asked him for $150.00. He refused and she left alone around 5:30 p.m.

Additional facts will be set forth as necessary with respect to the various issues.

Further evidence adduced at trial by the state tended to show that the defendant had killed both women because he believed he had been cheated out of possible profits from drug transactions and because of a general antagonism towards "white and Indian women." The defendant proffered no evidence. After over a month of testimony, the defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree.

During the sentencing phase the jury found as an aggravating circumstance that the crime was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. The jury found no mitigating circumstances. Edward L. Cummings was sentenced to death.

GUILT PHASE

I.

Defendant first assigns as error the trial court's denial of his motion for disclosure of notes and tape recordings of interviews of potential trial witnesses. Prior to trial defendant filed a document entitled "Motion for Disclosure of Information Necessary to Prepare for Defense of Case" requesting: (1) all members of the Hoke County and Wake County Sheriffs' Departments and the City of Raleigh Police Department who participated in the investigation to turn over all information developed during the investigation; (2) the prosecutor to review all the material submitted and disclose any exculpatory material to defense counsel; (3) the prosecutor to disclose any oral or written statements of the defendant; and, (4) Judge Farmer to personally monitor compliance with the previous requests. Judge Farmer granted requests (2) and (3) and denied requests (1) and (4). Defendant contends that he is entitled to the disclosure of all information developed during the investigation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and failure to produce it deprived him of his due process rights to a fair trial. Defendant makes no assertions of any particular material which was withheld or suppressed but is merely speculating that something may have been. From the record it is clear that the prosecutor had produced all the material compiled to date and understood his continuing duty to disclose. Nothing erroneous or prejudicial resulted from the ruling. This assignment of error is without merit.

II.

Defendant concedes that the United States Supreme Court and the North Carolina Supreme Court have upheld the practice of "death qualification" of prospective jurors under the federal and North Carolina Constitutions. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986); State v. Barts, 316 N.C. 666, 343 S.E.2d 828 (1986). However, defendant asserts that prejudicial error was committed in the selection of his jury even under the existing law. We disagree.

The United States Supreme Court has held that the "proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment" is whether the views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851-52 (1985). Such sworn duties of a juror in a capital sentencing hearing include consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, weighing such circumstances under the court's instructions, and exercising the guided discretion necessary for a reliable sentence. In the case at bar, whenever the prosecutor challenged a juror for cause based on opposition to the death penalty, the trial court asked, "Is your view of the death penalty such that it would prevent or substantially impair your performing your sworn duties as a juror?" If the prospective juror answered affirmatively, the court allowed the challenge for cause. Defendant contends that, at this point in the proceedings, the jurors did not know what their sworn duties would be and, therefore, were dismissed on the basis of their given response rather than on the basis of individualized findings of unfitness to serve. A review of the record reveals numerous explanations by the court and the prosecution of the prospective juror's possible duties during the sentencing phase should the trial proceed to that point.

Thus, we hold that the potential jurors had been indoctrinated into the nature of their responsibilities and that an affirmative response to the Witt question posed by the trial court was a valid basis for allowing the prosecutor's challenge for cause. Furthermore, this Court declines defendant's

request to reconsider the constitutionality of its holding in Barts.

III.

Defendant also asserts as error the trial court's refusal to allow him to further question or "rehabilitate" the prospective jurors who were challenged for cause by the state on the basis of opposition to the death penalty. While acknowledging that we have already decided that defendants are not entitled to engage in attempts to rehabilitate, State v. Zuniga, 320 N.C. 233, 357 S.E.2d 898, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 959, 108 S.Ct. 359, 98 L.Ed.2d 384 (1987) and State v. Oliver, 302 N.C. 28, 274 S.E.2d 183 (1981), appeal after remand, 309 N.C. 326, 307 S.E.2d 304 (1983), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 970, 108 S.Ct. 467, 98 L.Ed.2d 406 (1987), defendant argues that the recent United States Supreme Court decisions in Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80, reh. denied, 487 U.S. 1250, 109 S.Ct. 11, 101 L.Ed.2d 962 (1988) and Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987), reh. denied, 487 U.S. 1250, 109 S.Ct. 11, 101 L.Ed.2d 962 (1988), merit a reconsideration of our holding. We disagree. Both of the United States Supreme Court cases are distinguishable from the case sub judice. Neither case turns on what defendant requests:...