State v. Cumpton
Decision Date | 08 February 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 20,216.,20,216. |
Citation | 1 P.3d 429,129 N.M. 47,2000 NMCA 33 |
Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald CUMPTON, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Joel Jacobsen, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, for Appellee.
Phyllis H. Subin, Chief Public Defender, Shelly A. Scott, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for Appellant.
Certiorari Denied, No. 26,215, April 4, 2000.
{1} Ronald Cumpton (Defendant) appeals his sentence on a plea to several counts arising from a traffic accident resulting in death and bodily injury. Defendant pled guilty without a plea and disposition agreement to vehicular homicide, and he pled no contest to incidents involving death or great bodily harm, tampering with evidence, and unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. He received the basic sentences authorized by statute, with no aggravating or mitigating circumstances increasing or reducing them. Feeling there were mitigating factors which, as of right, should have entitled him to a reduction of his sentence, he appeals. Defendant also appeals claiming NMSA 1978, § 66-7-201 (1989) is vague, as there is no way to distinguish between subsections (B) and (C) in defining the elements of the crime. We disagree and affirm the district court on both issues.
{2} Defendant began the evening of April 12, 1998 around 4:00 or 5:00 in the afternoon by drinking and having an argument with his fiancee. The police were called and removed Defendant from the scene. He requested to be taken to his place of employment, where he picked up a company-owned 1992 International tanker truck and drove off. He drove from Artesia north to Lake Arthur and back. He had a beer with a hitchhiker he picked up and took another beer with him for the road. He visited his cousin Robert. This cousin and his wife told police Defendant was extremely drunk when he was at their house. Defendant left them and briefly visited another cousin's house. He began to return to his cousin Robert's house. At about 11:00 p.m., Defendant ran a stop sign at an intersection.
{3} As Defendant's truck crossed the intersection, Michelle Perea and her fiancé, Maurice Ingram, were simultaneously traveling across the intersection. Perea saw the truck was not stopping at the intersection and slammed on her brakes. Perea's vehicle struck the right rear tire and axle of the truck. Both air bags in Perea's vehicle deployed, pinning the occupants in the vehicle.
{4} The crash seriously injured Michelle Perea, fracturing her left femur, right ankle, and right arm. She was thirteen weeks pregnant with twins, one of whom died shortly after the accident, and the other of whom was born prematurely and also died. No direct evidence was presented as to the proximate cause of their deaths. Maurice Ingram, the father of the twins, died at the scene.
{5} Following the crash, Defendant exited his truck, went to the Perea car, removed Ms. Perea's and Mr. Ingram's eleven-month-old boy from a rear seat and handed him to a passerby. Defendant checked on Maurice Ingram, but could not find a pulse. He believed Ingram was dead. He attempted to free Perea from behind the steering wheel, but was unsuccessful. He asked a passerby if 911 had been called and was told it had. Defendant began to panic and called his cousin. He returned to the tanker and left the scene of the accident. He went to his cousin's house where he walked in the door, grabbed a bottle of Southern Comfort, and guzzled about half of it with the intention of masking his alcohol level at the time of the accident. Defendant was followed to his cousin's house from the accident scene by a witness. He was arrested at his cousin's house.
{6} Defendant was charged with homicide by vehicle, great bodily injury by vehicle, knowingly leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal injuries, tampering with evidence, and unlawful taking of a motor vehicle.
{7} Defendant entered pleas of guilty and no contest as noted above. There was no plea and disposition agreement; he pled "straight up" to the information. He was questioned by the district court as to his knowledge of the nature of the plea and the charges against him. The district judge then certified the results of the plea proceeding, indicating Defendant's voluntary and knowledgeable entry of the plea with understanding of its consequences. The district court sentenced him to:
The district court suspended all but fourteen (14) years in the custody of the Corrections Department and two (2) years statutory parole. Defendant entered an unconditional plea, never contested the case against him, and reserved no right to contest his sentence.
{8} Felony sentencing by the district court is governed by NMSA 1978, § 31-18-15 (1993). Basic sentences for various degrees of crime are authorized; a sentence in a felony case is presumed by the statute to be the basic sentence. See § 31-18-15(B). The district court may alter the sentence in consideration of aggravating or mitigating circumstances as provided in other statutes. The statute requires the judge to put any aggravation or mitigation determinations on the record. See NMSA 1978, § 31-18-15.1 (1993). No record is required to be made when the judge simply imposes the basic sentence for the particular degree of crime. Basic sentences were imposed by the court below.
{9} Defendant asserts the district court refused to consider mitigating evidence. The fact is the court merely did not mitigate. Defendant argues the sentences imposed by the district court are too harsh. The sentences are those prescribed as basic by the legislature.
{10} Accordingly, Defendant does not present us with a viable appellate issue to review. See State v. Augustus, 97 N.M. 100, 101, 637 P.2d 50, 51 (Ct.App.1981)
(. )
{11} Defendant may well be a reformed, religious, and remorseful person as he argued below and on appeal; these are factors properly taken into account should a judge wish to mitigate a sentence. Defendant is also a person who got drunk, killed one person, injured another seriously, deprived an eleven-month-old child of his father, ran from the scene, and tried to conceal evidence of his crime. These could easily be germane facts should the judge wish to do otherwise. These facts were all known to the district court by way of the pre-sentence report, as Defendant told the court in his statement at sentencing.
109 N.M. 416, 785 P.2d 1035 (1990). The focus of Defendant's remorse has shifted in this appeal from the cost of human life and the suffering he caused, to remorse for acquiescing in his own punishment without objection. Defendant stated at his sentencing, Defendant's sentences for the crimes of which he was convicted were neither mitigated nor aggravated by the district court. Defendant is entitled to no more than a sentence prescribed by law, and he received one in this case.
{13} Defendant also appeals his sentence for accident involving death or personal injuries, arguing the statute is vague because there is no way to distinguish between the elements of the offense contained in Section 66-7-201(B) and (C). Defendant is wrong. Section 66-7-201(B) states:
Any person failing to stop or to comply with the requirements of Section 66-7-203 NMSA 1978 where the accident results in great bodily harm or death is guilty of a fourth degree felony and shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-15 NMSA 1978.
Section 66-7-201(C) states:
Any person who knowingly fails to stop or to comply with the requirements of Section 66-7-203 NMSA 1978 where the accident results in great bodily harm or death is guilty of a third degree felony and shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-15 NMSA 1978.
(Emphasis added.)
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...length of the sentence. “Defendant is entitled to no more than a sentence prescribed by law,” State v. Cumpton, 2000–NMCA–033, ¶ 12, 129 N.M. 47, 1 P.3d 429, and there is no abuse of discretion when mitigating circumstances are considered and rejected. Our holding is limited to Section 31–1......
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State v. Suskiewich, 33,979.
...finds aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the sentence may deviate from these guidelines. State v. Cumpton, 2000–NMCA–033, ¶ 8, 129 N.M. 47, 1 P.3d 429.{33} Here, the district court sentenced Defendant to sixteen years, but suspended four years, for a total sentence of twelve years of ......
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...the statutory scheme does not require the trial court to depart from the basic sentence. State v. Cumpton, 2000-NMCA-033, ¶ 12, 129 N.M. 47, 1 P.3d 429. Moreover, because the trial court did not alter the basic sentence upward or downward as permitted by Section 31-18-15.1, there is no need......
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