State v. Cyr

• Decision Date: 04 April 1991
• Citation: 588 A.2d 753
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. James CYR.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 753

588 A.2d 753

STATE of Maine v. James CYR.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued March 19, 1991.

Decided April 4, 1991.

Janet Mills, Dist. Atty., Patricia Mador (orally), Asst. Dist. Atty., Auburn, for plaintiff.

Peter B. Bickerman (orally), Lipman & Katz, Augusta, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and ROBERTS, WATHEN, CLIFFORD, COLLINS and BRODY, JJ.

CLIFFORD, Justice.

The State appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Androscoggin County, Alexander, J.) dismissing an indictment charging James Cyr with arson (17-A M.R.S.A. § 802(1)(B) (1983 & Supp.1990)) because of prejudicial preindictment delay. On appeal, the State contends that the court's finding that the preindictment delay caused actual and unjustifiable prejudice is clearly erroneous. The State also contends that the court erroneously shifted the burden of proof to the State on the issue of unjustifiable prejudice. Finding no error, we affirm.

In the fall of 1983, James Cyr acquired a building in Lewiston. With bank financing and financial assistance from associates and investors, Cyr converted the building into a country-western nightclub known as JR's. The nightclub opened in mid-December 1983.

On January 9, 1984, the nightclub was severely damaged by fire. Cyr was on the premises at the time the fire broke out and the evidence clearly indicates that the fire was of incendiary origin. Cyr, who was alone at the time, maintains that the fire was started by a masked man, armed with a knife, who accosted Cyr at the back door of the club. Cyr testified that the masked man forced his way into the building, collected all of the money he could find, then tied Cyr to a chair using telephone wire, and, after beating him about the head, left him in the bathroom. Cyr further testified that he began to smell smoke and managed to escape from the bathroom and make his way to the Big Apple convenience store across the street for help. At trial, the Big Apple clerks testified that Cyr appeared to have been beaten about the eyes and mouth and his hands were tied behind his back with telephone wire. By the time firefighters arrived, the flames and smoke were visible and the building was severely damaged. A police officer took a number of pictures of Cyr's face showing cuts and bruises. The chair, telephone wire and photographs were taken into police custody and placed in an evidence locker at the police station. They could not be found at the time of trial.

In the days following the fire, the Lewiston police and fire departments and Cyr's insurance carrier conducted extensive investigations to determine the origin and cause of the fire. The investigations were completed sometime during April 1984. Although the reports caused insurance investigators to suspect Cyr's story, the insurance carrier nonetheless paid the claim sometime during the summer of 1984.

On May 23, 1989, more than five years after the fire investigation was completed, Cyr and an associate were indicted by an Androscoggin County grand jury on charges of arson. ¹ 17-A M.R.S.A. § 802(1)(B). Between April 1984 and May 23, 1989, there were no new developments in the case--no new evidence was found, no new studies were conducted and no new witnesses or statements regarding the fire were made available to authorities.

Prior to trial, Cyr moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the five-year preindictment delay and the State's loss of potentially exculpatory evidence had prejudiced his case. The court reserved judgment on the motion until after trial. ² During the trial, the State entered evidence to establish that Cyr was heavily in debt, and that he set fire to his business intentionally in order to collect insurance proceeds, then inflicted his own injuries to support his story that a robber set the fire. The jury found Cyr guilty of arson.

Cyr filed post-trial motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial seeking to overturn the jury's verdict on three grounds: (1) insufficiency of evidence to support the verdict; (2) prejudice from the State's failure to preserve exculpatory evidence; and (3) prejudicial preindictment delay. The court found that there was sufficient evidence produced at trial to support the jury's verdict. ³ The court further found that Cyr had failed to meet his burden of proof on the issue of prejudice caused by the State's failure to preserve exculpatory evidence. ⁴ Finding that Cyr had established actual and unjustifiable prejudice as a result of the delay in indicting him, the court granted Cyr's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground of prejudicial preindictment delay. ⁵ On appeal, the State contends that the court's finding that Cyr's due process rights were violated by prejudicial preindictment delay is clearly erroneous. We disagree.

The primary guarantee against a citizen being subjected to overly stale criminal charges is provided by statutes of limitations. The due process clauses of the Maine and United States constitutions have a limited role to play in protecting defendants against oppressive delay. State v. Hutchins, 433 A.2d 419, 422 (Me.1981). In deciding due process challenges based on preindictment delay, we apply the standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). State v. Berkley, 567 A.2d 915, 917 (Me.1989). Under this standard, the defendant must first demonstrate "actual and unjustifiable prejudice" resulting from a delay in seeking an indictment. Only then does the court inquire as to the reasons for the delay that may be offered by the State and determine, on balance, whether the prejudice caused by the delay remains unjustified. Id. There may be many and varied legitimate reasons for delay. The discretion of a prosecutor as to the time to seek an indictment is broad. Id. Generally, as long as the prosecutor acts within the time period of the statute of limitations, there is no constitutional...