State v. Cyr
| Decision Date | 23 December 1985 |
| Citation | 501 A.2d 1303 |
| Parties | STATE of Maine v. Albert J. CYR. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Paul Aranson, Dist. Atty., Robert Ellis (orally) Portland, for plaintiff.
Downeast Law Offices, P.A., James A. Bushell (orally), Portland, for defendant.
Before McKUSICK, C.J., and NICHOLS, VIOLETTE, WATHEN, GLASSMAN and SCOLNIK, JJ.
Defendant Albert J. Cyr appeals from his conviction in the Superior Court (Cumberland County) as an habitual motor vehicle offender. 29 M.R.S.A. § 2298 (Supp.1985-1986). He argues on appeal that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as the result of a police stop of his motor vehicle. We deny the appeal.
Preliminarily, we address the newly-adopted procedure by which this case is presented on appeal. Defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while an habitual offender. After unsuccessfully moving to suppress any evidence resulting from the stop of his vehicle, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to M.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2). 1 The rule, which became effective on January 31, 1985, allows an adverse pretrial ruling to be preserved for appellate review without the necessity of trial. 2 See M.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2) advisory committee's note to 1985 amend., Me.Rptr., 479-487 A.2d LIV-LV. The rule is designed to conserve prosecutorial and court resources without creating an undue burden on the appellate process. In that regard, we require that both the prosecution and the trial court certify that the record is adequate for appellate review, that the case is not appropriate for application of the harmless error doctrine, and that the plea was not entered to delay the proceedings. Id., see Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2) advisory committee note to 1983 amend., 91 F.R.D. 289, 323 (1982). In the present case, a supporting certificate was filed by both the prosecutor and the presiding justice. On the basis of our independent review of the facts set forth in the certificates, we are persuaded that this case represents an appropriate use of the conditional guilty plea. Cf. State v. Drown, 447 A.2d 466, 471 (Me.1982); Cole v. Peterson Realty, Inc., 432 A.2d 752, 755 (Me.1981); State v. Placzek, 380 A.2d 1010, 1012 (Me.1977) ().
Turning to the merits of the appeal, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing may be summarized as follows: Just after midnight on June 21, 1984, a Westbrook police officer was driving on Route 25 towards Westbrook. He saw a pickup truck with its lights off in the parking lot of Lake Region Furniture, a retail business. The truck was parked closer to the road than to the building. The officer knew that Lake Region as well as other local businesses had been burglarized recently. As the police cruiser went by, a person seated in the driver's seat ducked down as if to avoid detection. Although his suspicion was aroused, the officer did not stop but continued to drive slowly because he was transporting an arrestee. In his rearview mirror, the officer observed the truck leave the parking lot and follow the cruiser towards Westbrook. After being informed that no other police unit was available to intercept the truck, the officer stopped the truck at an intersection, some two to three minutes after the first observation. Defendant was found to be the operator of the vehicle and was unable to produce an operator's license.
Defendant's claim of an illegal motor vehicle stop is without merit. An investigatory stop is lawful if police can point to specific and articulable facts which, together with the rational inferences drawn from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion that an individual may be engaged in criminal activity. State v. Garland, 482 A.2d 139, 142 (Me.1984); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). We will reverse the Superior Court's denial of a motion to suppress based on a finding of reasonable suspicion only if that finding is clearly erroneous. State v. Thurlow, 485 A.2d 960, 963 (Me.1984). The evidence in this case adequately supports the Superior Court's conclusion that the investigatory stop was justified.
The officer testified that he knew Lake Region Furniture and other local businesses had been burglarized recently. His suspicion was further aroused because the defendant ducked down as if to avoid detection. See State v. Griffin, 459 A.2d 1086, 1090 (Me.1983) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Schlosser
...935 (1983) (defendant's fast movements and leaning forward as officer approached did not create reasonable suspicion). Cf. State v. Cyr, 501 A.2d 1303 (Me.1985) (occupant of vehicle, in heavy crime area late at night, ducking down as if to avoid detection as officer drove by constituted bas......
-
Crosby v. State
...a less upright position, without more, does not generate the inference that Crosby changed positions to avoid being seen. 19. State v. Cyr, 501 A.2d 1303 (Me. 1985), provides a useful counterpoint where an individual's slumping down in the driver's seat readily suggested that he wished to a......
-
State v. Richford
...denial of a motion to suppress based on a finding of reasonable suspicion only if that finding is clearly erroneous. State v. Cyr, 501 A.2d 1303, 1305 (Me.1985); State v. Thurlow, 485 A.2d 960, 963 (Me.1984). If Officer Roach's conduct did indeed rise to the level of an investigatory stop, ......
-
State v. Carsetti
...facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Cyr, 501 A.2d 1303, 1305 (Me.1985). Whether the police had the required articulable suspicion for a particular vehicular stop is a question of fact to be determine......