State v. D.L.

• Decision Date: 15 April 2021
• Docket Number: No. 96143-3,96143-3
• Citation: 197 Wash.2d 509,484 P.3d 448
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. D.L., Petitioner.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

197 Wash.2d 509

484 P.3d 448

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.D.L., Petitioner.

No. 96143-3

Supreme Court of Washington.

Oral Argument Date: September 22, 2020

Filed: April 15, 2021

Kate Benward, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Ave. Ste. 610, Seattle, WA, 98101-1683, for Petitioner.

Hilary A. Thomas, Whatcom County Prosecutor's Office, 311 Grand Ave. Ste. 201, Bellingham, WA, 98225-4038, Philip James Buri, Buri Funston Mumford & Furlong, PLLC, 1601 F St., Bellingham, WA, 98225-3011, for Respondent.

Kimberly Noel Gordon, Law Offices of Gordon & Saunders PLLC, 1000 2nd Ave., Suite 3140, Seattle, WA, 98104, Riya Saha Shah, Nadia Mozaffar, Marsha L. Levick, Juvenile Law Center, 1800 Jfk Boulevard, Suite 1900b, Philadelphia, PA, 19103, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Juvenile Law Center.

Melissa R. Lee, Lorraine K. Bannai, Robert S. Chang, Seattle University School of Law, 901 12th Ave., Korematsu Center For Law & Equality, Seattle, WA, 98122-4411, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality.

Joseph August Voss Jr., Attorney at Law, 1225 S. Weller St. Ste. 420, Seattle, WA, 98144-1906, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of TeamChild.

Julia Mizutani, Attorney at Law, Nancy Lynn Talner, Kendrick Washington, ACLU-WA, Antoinette M. Davis, American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, Po Box 2728 Seattle, WA, 98111-2728, Jose Dino Vasquez, Karr Tuttle Campbell, 701 5th Ave. Ste. 3300, Seattle, WA, 98104-7055, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of ACLU of Washington.

Katherine Elizabeth Hurley, La Rond Baker, King County Department of Public Defense, 710 2nd Ave. Ste. 200, Seattle, WA, 98104-1703, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of King County Department of Public Defense.

OWENS, J.

¶ 1 D.L., a 14-year-old boy, pleaded guilty to a single count of child molestation. The commissioner sentenced D.L. to an extended sentence known as a manifest injustice disposition. By pleading guilty, D.L. agreed that the court could use the probable cause affidavit to establish the facts that constituted D.L.’s conviction. But when the court imposed the manifest injustice disposition, it relied on three facts that were not in the probable cause affidavit: (1) that D.L.’s victim had a cognitive disability, (2) that D.L. refused accountability, and (3) that D.L. would not cooperate with treatment. This case asks whether due process requires that the State give a juvenile notice of these specific facts before pleading guilty if they will be used to justify a manifest injustice disposition.

¶ 2 Ultimately, due process requires that juveniles be treated in a manner that is fundamentally fair. As evidenced by our notice requirements in Washington case law and statutes, adequate notice of factual allegations ensures fairness by allowing defendants to make timely, informed, and strategic decisions. Allowing introduction of facts after a plea to justify a longer sentence serves only to undermine the critical strategic decision to forgo trial.

¶ 3 Without adequate notice, juveniles and their attorneys cannot predict which facts might be unearthed and weaponized to extend the juvenile's sentence after the plea. This lack of notice leaves juveniles unable to adequately assess the risk of receiving a disposition outside of the standard range, which could mean confinement until age 21 in some cases. Further, it allows the State to essentially upgrade the charge after already having already locked the juvenile into a guilty plea. This lack of notice causes unfair surprise to young defendants and serves only to undermine juveniles’ and their families’ trust in our juvenile justice system. Our adult defendants in Washington are not treated so unfairly and neither should we so treat our juveniles.

¶ 4 Therefore, we hold today that manifest injustice dispositions cannot be based on facts that the juvenile did not have notice of at the time of plea. The State failed to give D.L. notice of several key facts that supported D.L.’s manifest injustice disposition. As a result, the manifest injustice disposition was improperly imposed. As D.L. has already served his sentence and this case is technically moot, we merely resolve this legal issue without modifying D.L.’s sentence.¹ We reverse the Court of Appeals.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

¶ 5 In 2017, D.L., a 14-year-old boy, was charged with three counts of first degree rape and one count of attempted first degree rape of his 5-year-old half brother. At the time, D.L. had no prior criminal history. D.L. successfully negotiated a plea deal with the prosecutor, reducing the charges to a single count of first degree attempted child molestation. D.L. stipulated in his plea agreement that the trial court could use the probable cause statement to determine the facts that supported his conviction.

¶ 6 For sentencing, the prosecutor and defense agreed to recommend a special sex offender disposition alternative (SSODA) if D.L. qualified; otherwise, the plea agreement stated that the prosecutor would recommend a sentence within the statutory range of 15 to 36 weeks. During the plea colloquy, the court informed D.L. that it could impose a sentence outside of the standard range and commit D.L. to a facility until age 21. Sentencing was then scheduled to occur after D.L. completed the screening for the SSODA.

¶ 7 The screening process did not go well for D.L. D.L. missed treatment dates, refused to cooperate, and denied accountability. As a result, neither the State nor D.L. recommended the SSODA. In addition, D.L.’s probation officer filed a notice of intent to seek a manifest injustice disposition and filed a supporting memorandum contrary to the prosecutor's recommendation. The memorandum alleged, among other things, (1) that the victim was cognitively impaired from a lack of oxygen at birth, (2) that D.L. denied accountability, and (3) that D.L. refused to cooperate during the SSODA screening process. None of these facts were contained in the probable cause statement. D.L.’s attorney filed a memorandum in response.

¶ 8 At sentencing, two probation officers testified and D.L.’s attorney cross-examined them. The commissioner imposed a manifest injustice disposition and ordered D.L. to 40 weeks in a juvenile detention center—4 weeks beyond the standard range. The commissioner entered findings on the record that a manifest injustice disposition was necessary because (1) the victim was particularly vulnerable due to his age and developmental disability and (2) D.L. was likely to reoffend based on his postconviction denial of the acts and lack of cooperation during screening. D.L. appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, although noting that this absence of notice draws strong concerns regarding "the appearance of fairness." State v. Loomer , No. 77360-7-I, 4 Wash.App.2d 1030, 2018 WL 3120844 at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Jun 25, 2018) (unpublished), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/773607.pdf. We grant review as to whether D.L.’s due process right to notice was violated when he received a manifest injustice disposition based on facts that he did not have notice of at the time of plea.

II. ISSUE PRESENTED

¶ 9 Before entering a plea, are juveniles entitled to notice of all facts—existing at the time of plea—that will be used to support an extended sentence?

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Fundamental Fairness Standard Governs Juvenile Constitutional Rights

¶ 10 Whether juveniles have a constitutional right to notice of the specific facts that support a manifest injustice disposition is an issue of state and federal constitutional law that we review de novo. State v. Bradshaw , 152 Wash.2d 528, 531, 98 P.3d 1190 (2004) (citing City of Redmond v. Moore , 151 Wash.2d 664, 668, 91 P.3d 875 (2004) ).

¶ 11 D.L. received a manifest injustice disposition that was four weeks longer than the standard range sentence for the crime. Manifest injustice dispositions allow a court to extend a juvenile's sentence upward or downward from a standard range sentence. See RCW 13.40.020(19). A manifest injustice disposition requires a finding "that [the standard range disposition] would either impose an excessive penalty on the juvenile or would impose a serious, and clear danger to society." Id . The upward maximum of a manifest injustice disposition is confinement until age 21. RCW 13.40.300 (1).

¶ 12 Juveniles are entitled to adequate notice " ‘of the alleged misconduct with particularity’ " that "must be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded." In re Gault , 387 U.S. 1, 33, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967) (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENF'T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 87 (1967)). The question is whether this right extends to facts that will be used to support a manifest injustice disposition. Although Gault did not squarely address this issue, this court and the United States Supreme Court have nonetheless relied on Gault and its successor In re Winship , 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970), to extend due process² rights to juveniles in a variety of contexts. In extending such rights, we have asked whether the right at issue is one that ensures procedures are "fundamentally fair"³ and adheres to notions of "fair play." McKeiver v. Pennsylvania , 403 U.S. 528, 543, 91 S. Ct. 1976, 29 L. Ed. 2d 647 (1971) ; Schall v. Martin , 467 U.S. 253, 263, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 81 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1984) ; State v. Quiroz , 107 Wash.2d 791, 798, 733 P.2d 963 (1987) (quoting Sheppard v. Rhay , 73 Wash.2d 734, 737, 440 P.2d 422 (1968) ). Accordingly, we must ask whether providing notice of facts used to support a manifest injustice disposition is required to ensure fundamental fairness.

B. Juveniles Are Deprived of Fundamental Fairness When a Court Imposes a Manifest Injustice Disposition Based on Facts That the Juvenile Did Not Have Notice of at the Time of Plea

¶ 13 The quintessential requirement of notice is that it must be given...