State v. Dalton
| Decision Date | 20 December 1919 |
| Docket Number | 581. |
| Citation | 101 S.E. 548,178 N.C. 779 |
| Parties | STATE v. DALTON. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Macon County; Ray, Judge.
Jerry Dalton was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals. New trial.
In a prosecution for murder of a woman, defendant having testified that he shot her accidentally while drawing pistol when threatened by a man in whose automobile the woman had been riding, erroneous instruction that if defendant without premeditation was attempting to shoot the man under such circumstances as would be murder in the second degree or manslaughter, but accidentally killed the woman, he would be guilty of murder in the first degree because doing a felonious act at the time of the accidental killing, held prejudicial to defendant.
R. D Sisk, of Franklin, and J. N. Moody, of Murphy, for appellant.
The Attorney General and Frank Nash, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
It was proved on the trial that, on the afternoon of November 10 1918, in said county, the prisoner shot and killed the deceased, Maude Grant; and also killed Merrill Angel, who was with her at the time.
The facts in evidence on the part of the state tended to show that the prisoner, who had been drinking heavily for several weeks and was angered because the deceased, spoken of in some of the testimony as "his girl," was with Merrill Angel, saw the two pass in the latter's automobile, and as they returned shortly after, the prisoner signaled to the car, and when it came to a stop he approached it from the left side where Merrill Angel was at the wheel, Maude being on the same seat, and began a conversation with him beginning in a low tone and growing louder as it proceeded; that Maude got out of the car on the opposite side from the prisoner, and as she walked towards the front, the prisoner fired a pistol shot at her, and, as she was falling, immediately fired another, one of the shots inflicting a mortal wound from which she presently died. The prisoner then fired a third shot through the wind shield of the car, killing Merrill Angel. One of the bystanders, Will Stepp, testifying to the occurrence, in part said:
The prisoner, a witness in his own behalf, testified in part as follows:
Further, witness testified:
There was much other testimony on the issue, but the above is sufficient for a proper apprehension of the question chiefly involved in the prisoner's appeal, presented in an exception as follows: In one aspect of the evidence, the court instructed the jury:
"If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that he (the prisoner) came to the car, and that he was not assaulted by Angel, or an attempt made to take his life or do him great bodily harm, at the hands of Angel, but if he purposed in his mind to shoot Angel or do him great bodily harm, and that he did not have premeditation and deliberation when he undertook it. but did it under circumstances that if he had shot him and killed him, it would be murder in the second degree or manslaughter, and in carrying out that intention he had accidentally killed Maude he would be guilty of murder in the first degree because he would be doing a felonious act, or attempting a felonious act, when he accidentally killed the girl."
To this portion of the charge, exception was duly taken, and, on the record, we are of opinion that this objection of the prisoner must be sustained.
In cases of this character, it is the generally accepted principle that, where one man, engaged in an affray or difficulty with another unintentionally kills a bystander, his act shall be interpreted in reference to his intent and conduct towards his adversary, and criminal liability for the homicide or otherwise and the degree of it must be thereby determined. A very correct statement of the general principle is given in 13 R. C. L. tit. Homicide, § 50, pp. 745, 746, as follows:
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State v. Greenfield
...death of the person intended to be killed. The intent is transferred to the person whose death has been caused." State v. Dalton , 178 N.C. 779, 781, 101 S.E. 548, 549 (1919) (citation omitted). In the self-defense context specifically, we have stated that[i]f the killing of the person inte......
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State v. Sheffield
... ... highest rank to be murder." State v. Benton, 19 ... N.C. 196; State v. Fulkerson, 61 N.C. 233; State ... v. Cole, 132 N.C. 1069, 44 S.E. 391 ... The law ... is thus stated where numerous authorities are cited, in ... State v. Dalton, 178 N.C. 779, 781, 101 S.E. 548, ... 549: "In cases of this character, it is the generally ... accepted principle that, where one man, engaged in an affray ... or difficulty with another unintentionally kills a bystander, ... his act shall be interpreted in reference to his intent and ... ...
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State v. Oxendine
... ... He could not therefore ... have contemplated or intended it." ... For the ... error, as indicated, the appealing defendant is entitled to a ... new trial on the charge of culpable homicide. The cases of ... State v. Sisk, 185 N.C. 696, 116 S.E. 721, State ... v. Dalton, 178 N.C. 779, 101 S.E. 548, and State v ... Lilliston, 141 N.C. 857, 54 S.E. 427, 115 Am. St. Rep ... 705, in no way conflict with our present position ... Touching ... the indictment for secret assault, his honor instructed the ... jury as follows: ... ...
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State v. Heller
... ... be guilty of murder in the first degree ... It is ... conceded that this instruction would be correct under ... appropriate circumstances. State v. Burney, 215 N.C ... 598, 3 S.E.2d 24; State v. Sheffield, 206 N.C. 374, ... 174 S.E. 105; State v. Dalton, 178 N.C. 779, 101 ... S.E. 548; State v. Fulkerson, 61 N.C. 233. See, ... also, State v. Lilliston, 141 N.C ... [55 S.E.2d 801.] ... 857, 54 ... S.E. 427, 115 Am. St. Rep. 705. Here, however, the defendant ... says the facts do not call for its application, and hence it ... ...