State v. Dancy
| Decision Date | 31 January 1878 |
| Citation | 78 N.C. 437 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. MILLARD F. DANCY. |
INDICTMENT for an Assault with intent to commit Rape, tried at Fall Term, 1877, of WILKES Superior Court, before Cloud, J.
It was in evidence that the defendant was in the employment of the father of the female child under ten years of age, upon whom the offence was alleged to have been committed, and on a certain occasion, the father hearing a noise therein went to his barn and found the defendant on the child, she being on her back with her clothes up, and discovered other evidences of improper intercouse. Both the defendant and the child were chastised by the father. The defendant was about fifteen years of age. The exception to the charge of His Honor, which is the basis of the decision of this Court, is embodied in the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice BYNUM. Verdict of guilty. Judgment. Appeal by defendant.
Attorney General for the State .
No counsel for the prisoner.
The prisoner, a boy of fifteen or sixteen years of age, was convicted of an assault with an intent to commit a rape, upon a female child of the age of six years. The exception of the prisoner is to the Judge's charge to the jury.
The prisoner's counsel in his argument to the jury attempted to show from the evidence, that the prisoner did not have the intent to commit the offence charged. The case then states that So much of the charge is transcribed as presents the exception, but no other part of it explains or qualifies the language above set forth. The exception is that this language was an expression of the opinion of the Court, as to the guilt of the prisoner and was a violation of the Act. Rev. Code ch. 31 § 130. The parties had taken issue upon these very facts, as indicating or not indicating the intent charged, and upon which the Judge, by his language and emphasis, as we think, very clearly intimated an opinion adverse to the prisoner. It was at this material point in the dispute, especially, that the statute restrained, and was intended to restrain the Judge from any expression of opinion to the jury upon the facts in...
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State v. Rhinehart
... ... of language, or form of expression calculated to impair the ... credit which might otherwise and under normal conditions be ... given by the jury to the testimony of one of the parties ... Speed v. Perry, 167 N.C. 122, 83 S.E. 176; State ... v. Dancy, 78 N.C. 437. It can make no difference in what ... way or when the opinion of the judge is conveyed to the jury, ... whether directly or indirectly, or by the general tone and ... tenor of the trial. The statute forbids an intimation of his ... opinion in any form whatever, it being the intent ... ...
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State v. Rhinehart
...under normal conditions be given by the jury to the testimony of one of the parties. Speed v. Perry, 167 N.C. 122, 83 S.E. 176; State v. Dancy, 78 N.C. 437. It can make no difference in what way or when the opinion of the judge is conveyed to the jury, whether directly or indirectly, or by ......
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State v. Hart
...impair the credit which might otherwise and under normal conditions be given by the jury to the testimony of one of the parties. State v. Dancy, 78 N.C. 437. It can make difference in what way or when the opinion of the judge is conveyed to the jury, whether directly or indirectly, or by th......
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State v. Howard
...440, 86 Am. Dec. 439; Willey v. Gatling, 70 N.C. 410; MacRae v. Lawrence, 75 N.C. 289; Crutchfield v. Railroad Co., 76 N.C. 320; State v. Dancy, 78 N.C. 437; State v. Jenkins, 85 N.C. 544. There are other cases enunciating the same principle, but I have cited those only in which a new trial......