State v. Daniel
| Decision Date | 07 May 1991 |
| Docket Number | CA-CR,No. 2,2 |
| Citation | 817 P.2d 18,169 Ariz. 73 |
| Parties | The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Mark Aaron DANIEL, Appellant. 90-0256. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Appellant was convicted after a jury trial of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and two counts of armed robbery, all class 2 felonies, and conspiracy to commit first-degree burglary, first-degree burglary and two counts of aggravated robbery, all class 3 felonies. The jury found one prior, non-dangerous class 3 felony, and the court imposed concurrent sentences of 12 years each on the class 2 felonies and 10 years each on the class 3 felonies. We reverse.
Two men with nylon stockings covering their heads robbed a Fry's Food Store at gunpoint and escaped in a car. Appellant was the driver of the car, although he maintains he had no knowledge of the robbery until later. When police attempted to stop the car, he pulled to the curb, the two men got out and ran away, and appellant drove on. He eventually parked at the apartment complex of his cousin, from whom he had borrowed the car, and then phoned his cousin to report the car stolen. Police found the car, searched it and discovered evidence linking one Stacey Tims to the robbery. After his arrest and proper Miranda warnings, Tims confessed to this and several other robberies, and implicated appellant and one other man, Marvin Johnson, in this robbery. Tims refused to testify at the trial of Johnson and appellant, but the state introduced, over objection, a redacted version of Tims' confession, and both men were convicted. No other substantial evidence linked appellant to the crimes. Appellant argues that: (1) his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was violated by the trial court's admission of Tims' redacted confession; (2) a juror knew two of the state's witnesses; and, (3) evidence seized in the search of appellant's cousin's car was wrongfully admitted because the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the car earlier in the evening.
Our standard of review for trial court rulings regarding the admission of evidence is abuse of discretion. State v. Albrecht, 158 Ariz. 341, 343, 762 P.2d 628, 630 (App.1988).
The Tims confession, while hearsay, was admitted under Ariz.R.Evid. 804(b)(3), 17A A.R.S. as a statement against the penal interest of an unavailable declarant after a corroboration hearing. The trial court correctly relied upon State v. Canaday, 141 Ariz. 31, 684 P.2d 912 (App.1984), which involved the admissibility of collateral inculpatory statements under Ariz.R.Evid. 804(b)(3). 1
In Canaday, our Court of Appeals found that the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is not violated by a collateral inculpatory statement against penal interest of an unavailable declarant if the statement has "the indicia of reliability." Canaday, 141 Ariz. at 34, 684 P.2d at 915. The court further found that the trial court must conduct a careful reliability inquiry with "proof of corroborating circumstances ... that clearly indicate the truthfulness of the statement." Canaday, 141 Ariz. at 35, 684 P.2d at 916. Thus, the court implied that the reliability test for exculpatory and inculpatory statements is the same in Arizona. The court went on to hint that further restrictions on admissibility might be in order if the statement was made while the declarant was in custody, even though the court knew of no cases in which a collateral inculpatory statement made in a custodial situation was admissible. It stated that "there may be custodial interrogations which do have sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to fall within the hearsay exception to be admissible in the face of the confrontation clause." Canaday, 141 Ariz. at 36, 684 P.2d at 917. In the present case, the trial court conducted a thorough corroboration hearing pursuant to Canaday and, finding evidence of corroborating circumstances "overwhelming," admitted the statement at appellant's trial.
Nevertheless, we reverse because of the recent decision in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), in which the United States Supreme Court held that evidence corroborating the truthfulness of the statement is irrelevant and may not be considered in examining the indicia of reliability of an accusatory hearsay statement. The Court found that "inherent trustworthiness" alone must be used to establish reliability. Under this test, the circumstances of the making of the statement must be examined; for example, an "excited utterance" is presumed inherently trustworthy because of circumstances which eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching or confabulation. Wright, 497 U.S. at ----, 110 S.Ct. at 3149, 111 L.Ed.2d at 655.
Accordingly, we must examine the circumstances of Tims' statement to determine whether they indicate an...
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