State v. Daniels

• Decision Date: 22 March 1904
• Citation: 46 S.E. 991,134 N.C. 671
• Parties: STATE v. DANIELS.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

46 S.E. 991

134 N.C. 671

STATE v. DANIELS.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

March 22, 1904

Appeal from Superior Court, Duplin County; Geo. H. Brown, Judge.

George W. Daniels was convicted of murder, and appeals. Reversed.

Clark C.J., dissenting.

The defendant moved for a new trial upon the ground, among others, of misconduct of the jury. The court heard the testimony, and found the facts as follows: "During the progress of the trial, and before the charge of the court the jury, in a body, by the officer in charge, were carried to Dr. Jones' office for medical treatment to one juror. While there, some person walked up and spoke to two of the jurors, and shook hands with them, and talked a minute or more; and the jury walked away in one direction, and he walked the other. The court is unable to ascertain who the person was, and to whom he spoke. The court finds, upon the testimony of the officers and two jurors, that W. H. Maxwell father of deceased, was passing by the jury on the street bowed to the juror Hollingsworth, and extended his hand, and the juror shook it, but no word was passed. The court finds that on another day, before the charge was delivered, said Maxwell passed the jury near a stable, where they had gone for a private purpose, and shook hands with Juror Miller as he passed, but no word was spoken." The court declined to grant the motion.

Stevens, Beasley & Weeks, for appellant.

Carlton & Williams and the Attorney General, for the State.

CONNOR J.

The prisoner was charged with the murder of one Maxwell, and from a conviction of murder in the first degree, and the judgment thereon, appealed. The prisoner's counsel requested several prayers for special instructions, all of which were refused. In the view we take of the case, it is unnecessary to pass upon the exceptions to his honor's refusal to give them. There was, besides the prisoner, but one eyewitness to the homicide. Rufus Stroud, introduced by the state, testified that he saw Maxwell alive last in the woods, dipping turpentine. George Daniels shot him. He saw the prisoner standing in the path; the deceased standing by the side of a pine. The prisoner asked the deceased why he went to his house last night, and the deceased said he did not go. The prisoner said: "You are a damned liar. You did. I am going to kill you. Throw up your right hand." The prisoner then shot him. He was in about 10 or 11 steps from the deceased. Shot once. When he shot, the witness ran off. The deceased ran to him and said, "I am shot." He died in a short time. The deceased was about three feet from the prisoner when shot, and had a turpentine dipper in his hand. There was evidence on the part of physicians that the deceased died from wounds inflicted by the prisoner. The prisoner testified in his own behalf that he was at his tobacco barn the night before the homicide. That he left there that morning about sunup. Susan Whaley and Hannah and their children stayed with him from midnight till he left. All started to the prisoner's house. He told Susan to prepare breakfast. The night before he had taken his gun to the tobacco barn, and as he passed by the barn, going down the path, he stopped and shot the gun. Went down the path towards the Pink Hill Road, calling the women. Had started to George Turner's, where they said they were going. Was going along the path, about 50 yards from the fence. Saw the deceased. He was about 40 yards in the woods from the road. Was standing on one knee on the ground, and one hand on a log. Did not know he was in the woods at this point. Was calling Susan and Hannah as loud as he could. Some one said, ""What is the matter?" Looked in the direction of the voice, and the deceased arose and said, "What do you want?" He said, "I want my people." The deceased said, "You shan't have them. I will protect them." The deceased was coming towards the prisoner with a dipping iron in his hand--a piece of flat iron, 12 inches long, and nearly 1 inch thick to a point, and handle 5 feet long. The deceased said that the prisoner had been talking about him. He was very mad. The prisoner said, "Will, if you don't quit coming on me, I will shoot you." He said, "Shoot, shoot." Was then about 10 or 15 steps off, and had about stopped when the prisoner shot. Had the dipper in one hand, up against the tree, and with his hands spread out against two trees. He was not in striking distance, making no effort to strike the prisoner with the dipper. Had no previous difficulty with the deceased. The prisoner was looking "for his folks." Snapped the gun at him before it fired. The prisoner had not seen the deceased before on that morning. Did not know where he was. Did not know whether the women were in the woods. The prisoner and the deceased were perfectly friendly, had not had any difficulty, and was not mad with him. When he shot, was "scared" of him. He weighed about 140 pounds. "I shot him because I was scared of him, with the dipper, coming towards me. Was on good terms with him. Never went there to shoot him. Did not expect to see him." The prisoner ran off, and went to Jim Maxwell's, and told him he had shot Will Maxwell, and he asked him why, and he told him "that Maxwell was coming with a turpentine dipper at me." Told several others. Went to Stroud and surrendered. "Told him to take me in charge." There was much testimony in regard to the prisoner's mind before and after the homicide. Several witnesses described his conduct, and expressed the opinion that he was crazy, some of the witnesses saying that "he was insane." Dr. Smith, who heard the testimony, gave it as his opinion that "he was not insane." Dr. Kennedy testified that he had known the prisoner four years, and had heard the testimony. "From the evidence of the witnesses, and my previous knowledge of him, I would not say he was bright. I think he was crazy, from the way he did and the way he acted."

The prisoner excepted specially to portions of the charge. The only exception which we deem it necessary to discuss is to the following instruction: The court stated to the jury that "only two persons have testified that they were eyewitnesses to the homicide. The one is the prisoner, and the other is Rufus Stroud." The court then read the evidence of Rufus Stroud, and charged the jury that, "if you find those facts to be true beyond a reasonable doubt, the prisoner is guilty of murder in the first degree, because they show premeditation and deliberation upon the part of the prisoner." There was evidence proper to be submitted to the jury to show premeditation, and, if believed by them, to justify the verdict of murder in the first degree. Hence there was no error in the refusal of his honor to instruct the jury as prayed by the prisoner in that respect. The sole question, therefore, to be considered, is whether his honor was correct in saying to the jury that, if they found the facts to be as testified by Stroud, "the prisoner is guilty of murder in the first degree, because they show premeditation and deliberation."

Whether an act is the result of premeditation and deliberation is a fact to be found by the jury, and not a conclusion of law to be drawn by the court. In State v. McDonald, 133 N.C. 680, 45 S.E. 582, Mr. Justice Walker, writing for the court, said: "When an act becomes criminal only by reason of the intent, unless the intent is proved, the offense is not proved, and this intent must be found by the jury as a fact from the evidence. It is for them to infer and not for the court." The authorities cited in the opinion fully sustain and illustrate the principle. It may be that, as an inference to be drawn by the jury, we should not hesitate to say that they came to a correct conclusion. In the light of the charge, they were not permitted to draw an inference, but, upon finding the account of the homicide to be true, as testified by Stroud, it became their duty, and they were required, as a conclusion of law, to find the prisoner guilty of murder in the first degree. Assuming that the jury followed his honor's instruction, and "took the law from the court," as it was their duty to do, they did not consider, pass upon, or decide the question of fact, the existence of which is an essential element in the crime charged. They did not and could not inquire whether the act was premeditated. The case as presented may be likened unto a special verdict in which the question is submitted to the court, as one of law, whether, upon the facts found, there was premeditation. The statute (Acts 1893, p. 76, c. 85, § 3) declares that the jury must fix the degree of murder. To do this, they must find the fact that the murder was committed either by means of poisoning, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate certain enumerated crimes or other felony. The judge should...