State v. Daniels

• Decision Date: 27 September 2000
• Docket Number: No. 24913.,24913.
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Shawn D. DANIELS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

11 P.3d 1114

134 Idaho 896

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Shawn D. DANIELS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 24913.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Twin Falls, March 2000 Term.

September 27, 2000.

John J. Hansen, Twin Falls County Public Defender; Wells B. Ashby, Assistant Public Defender, Twin Falls, for appellant. Wells B. Ashby argued.

Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Alison A. Stieglitz, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Alison A. Stieglitz argued.

SILAK, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury's verdict, finding Shawn D. Daniels (Daniels) guilty of aggravated assault on a police officer. We affirm.

I. FACTS AND PRECEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

On September 25, 1997, a neighbor observed two men, Shawn D. Daniels (Daniels) and Ryan Anderson Fowler, attempting to break into the back door of a home during daylight hours. The neighbor called police, and two officers, Sergeant Don Hall and Officer Keri Davis, responded to the call. Officer Davis went along the front of the house and took up a position at the front corner of the house. Sergeant Hall went up the driveway and around the rear of the house on the opposite side from Officer Davis. Hall saw the two men facing the back door of the house, identified himself as a police officer and told them not to move. Both men ran along the back of the house away from Officer Hall.

Officer Davis moved to take cover behind the front corner of the house and observed two men run around the corner of the house from the backyard. One of the men, identified as Daniels, assumed a "combat firing position," pointing a black object in the direction from which he had just come. Officer Davis then identified herself as a police officer and ordered Daniels to drop the object. Daniels complied with her order to drop the object and tossed it into the adjacent bushes. A search of the bushes revealed a .45 caliber handgun with two rounds in the magazine and one in the chamber.

B. Procedural Background

On October 29, 1997, a criminal complaint was sworn against Shawn D. Daniels for aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer claiming that Officer Hall was put in fear of imminent danger. The complaint cited sections 18-901, 18-905 and 18-915 of the Idaho Code. Daniels was arraigned on the charges on March 18, 1998. An amended complaint was filed on March 26, 1998, dropping the claim of knowledge of imminent danger from the charges while citing the same sections of the Idaho Code. An information was filed with the court on April 10, 1998, charging aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. A motion to dismiss the information was filed by Daniels on May 15, 1998, claiming insufficient evidence to support the information. A hearing on the motion to dismiss was held on May 21, 1998, and the motion was subsequently denied. Daniels was found guilty by a jury of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer on June 3, 1998 and was sentenced on July 6, 1998 to a five year term with two years fixed and three years indeterminate. Daniels was ordered to pay court costs of $38.50, a fine of $500 and a civil judgment of $2,000 to the victim, Officer Hall. A notice of appeal was subsequently filed.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

The appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

1. Did the state offer sufficient evidence at jury trial to support the conviction by the jury?

2. Did the district court judge err by improperly limiting the defense in the voir dire process, thereby violating Daniels' Sixth Amendment rights?

3. Did the district court judge err by denying Daniels' motion to dismiss information?

4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by sentencing Daniels to a five year prison sentence with two years fixed?

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review for a jury conviction is stated in State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (1992) as being:

[W]hether there was substantial evidence upon which any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Filson 101 Idaho 381, 386, 613 P.2d 938, 943 (1980); State v. Ojeda, 119 Idaho 862, 864, 810 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Ct.App.1991). The jury is accorded the right to determine the credibility of witnesses, to weigh the evidence, and to draw all reasonable and justifiable inferences. Ojeda, 119 Idaho at 864, 810 P.2d at 1150; State v. Fenley, 103 Idaho 199, 203-04, 646 P.2d 441, 445-46 (Ct.App.1982). On appeal, the evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the state. Id.

121 Idaho at 572, 826 P.2d at 921.

The standard of review for a district court's limitations on jury voir dire is an abuse of discretion standard. "It is well settled that the scope of voir dire examination is within the discretion of the trial judge and that his ruling will not be disturbed except for a manifest abuse of discretion" State v. Bitz, 93 Idaho 239, 244, 460 P.2d 374, 379 (1969). This same standard applies to issues involving sentencing and "absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion, a sentence within the statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal." State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 604, 768 P.2d 1331, 1337 (1989).

The standard for review for the denial of a motion to dismiss the information is also based on the abuse of discretion as stated in State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 546, 873 P.2d 800 (1993):

A magistrate's determination that probable cause exists to bind a defendant over to the district court for trial "should be overturned only on a clear showing that the committing magistrate abused his or her discretion." State v. Owens, 101 Idaho at 636, 619 P.2d at 791, citing State v. O'Mealey, 95 Idaho 202, 506 P.2d 99 (1973); Carey v. State, 91 Idaho 706, 429 P.2d 836 (1967). Where a defendant receives a fair trial, errors connected with the preliminary hearing will afford no basis for disturbing the judgment of conviction. State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 660 P.2d 1336, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 934, 103 S.Ct. 2101, 77 L.Ed.2d 308 (1983).

125 Idaho at 556, 873 P.2d at 810

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The State Offered Sufficient Evidence At Trial To Support The Verdict Of The Jury.

Daniels argues that the state presented inadequate evidence for the jury to return a verdict of guilty on two elements of the charged offense, namely an unlawful attempt and the apparent ability to carry out the act. Daniels cites the requisite elements for an attempt as: "1) an intent to commit it, 2) an overt act toward its commission, 3) failure of consummation, and, 4) an apparent possibility of commission." (Black's Law Dictionary, Abridged, 6th ed.1991). The Idaho Code, however, does not specify that there must be the immediate possibility of commission of the crime charged. The underlying elements of the crime of assault as defined in I.C. § 18-901(a) are: a) an unlawful attempt, b) coupled with apparent ability c) to commit a violent injury on the person of another.

Daniels cites two Idaho cases as standing for the proposition that a present ability is necessary to be guilty of the crime charged, and that if there is no present ability, there is also no intent. The first case cited, State v. Yturaspe, 22 Idaho 360, 125 P. 802 (1912) states:

[I]f the evidence shows that the gun pointed at the assaulted party is unloaded, although threats are made, there is not only an absence of a present ability to commit violent injury, but there is also an absence of an intent to inflict a bodily injury, because the party charged can have no intent to inflict bodily injury, knowing at the time the gun is drawn that the same is unloaded, and that no injury can be inflicted because of the inability to discharge the same. This rule of law necessarily means the proof must show an intent and also a present ability. We think that the above is the correct rule of law, notwithstanding the fact that there are cases holding that the pointing of a rifle at another, with a threat to use it, is of itself evidence of intent to inflict a violent injury and evidence of ability to commit such injury.

(emphasis added). We do not think that the present ability mentioned in Yturaspe requires the instantaneous ability but rather indicates having opportunity coupled with all of the necessary means prepared and immediately available for use. Thus, the unloaded gun in Yturaspe indicated that all preparation had not been completed in order to commit an assault.

The second cited case, State v. Bush, 50 Idaho 166, 295 P. 432 (1930), upholds the same principle, i.e. that an unloaded gun did not give the perpetrator the ability to carry out the threat. The Bush Court applied the rule from Yturaspe, stating that the gun must be loaded to rise to the level of an attempt. See Bush at 168, 295 P. at 434.

Daniels further cites the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions (ICJI) for support of his argument that his actions were mere preparation rather than a substantial step. ICJI 1453 defines a substantial step as follows:

For an act to be a step towards committing the crime, the act must be more than merely preparing to commit the crime.... To be a step towards committing the crime, the act must be something done beyond mere preparation which shows that the defendant began carrying out the plan to commit the crime.

ICJI 1453.

The instruction clearly states that merely preparing to commit an act is not enough to be guilty of a crime involving attempt. The evidence must show more than mere preparation occurred in the commission of the crime.

Daniels argues that the Yturaspe and Bush cases stand for the proposition that the inability to immediately complete the crime negates intent as well. Daniels asserts that the emphasized sentence in the quote from Yturaspe indicates that in the absence of an immediate ability to carry out an assault, there is no intent. Daniels essentially argues that the assumption of a "combat stance" while pointing a loaded gun towards a point where a...