State v. Danielson

• Decision Date: 16 May 2012
• Docket Number: No. 26055.,26055.
• Parties: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Trent DANIELSON, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

814 N.W.2d 401

2012 S.D. 36

STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.Trent DANIELSON, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 26055.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Considered on Briefs Feb. 14, 2012.

Decided May 16, 2012.

Marty J. Jackley, Attorney General, Frank Geaghan, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellee.

Eric D. Whitcher, Lawrence County Public Defender's Office, Deadwood, South Dakota, Attorneys for defendant and appellant.

GILBERTSON, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1.] A jury found Trent Danielson guilty of perjury. Danielson appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict, the trial court erred in denying his motion for a court-appointed private investigator, and the court erred in denying a motion in limine and admitting used transmission parts into evidence. We affirm.

FACTS

[¶ 2.] Rocket Lube of Spearfish, South Dakota, hired Danielson as a mechanic and automobile painter in 2003. Rocket Lube fired Danielson in 2006, claiming that Danielson stole auto parts and did not remit checks for work done by Danielson on vehicles belonging to Dr. Tom Cox.

[¶ 3.] Danielson was indicted on one count of grand theft and the case proceeded to a jury trial. During trial, the State argued that the checks from Dr. Cox were property of Rocket Lube. Danielson testifiedthat he and Dr. Cox had a private agreement and that the checks belonged to him. According to Danielson's testimony, Dr. Cox felt that Rocket Lube was taking advantage of Dr. Cox and thus, Dr. Cox asked Danielson to work on Dr. Cox's vehicles in Danielson's spare time to save expenses. Danielson testified that he replaced a front clutch pack in the automatic transmission of Dr. Cox's 1950 Studebaker. Dr. Cox admitted that he felt that Rocket Lube was overcharging him, but he testified that he thought that Danielson was still acting as an agent of Rocket Lube when performing the work on Dr. Cox's vehicles. The jury found Danielson not guilty of grand theft.

[¶ 4.] Then, in October 2008, a grand jury indicted Danielson on one count of perjury during a felony trial. The indictment alleged that Danielson committed perjury during the grand theft jury trial by testifying falsely that “he had replaced parts inside the transmission of Dr. Tom Cox's 1950 Studebaker pick-up truck.” The indictment further alleged that Danielson did not actually perform this work.

[¶ 5.] Danielson moved to dismiss the perjury indictment as a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, arguing that the jury acquittal was a final determination that he did perform the work in question. The trial court agreed and granted Danielson's motion to dismiss. This Court reversed and remanded on appeal, holding that “Danielson has failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that the jury's not guilty verdict necessarily included an implicit factual finding that he performed the work on the 1950 Studebaker.” State v. Danielson, 2010 S.D. 58, ¶¶ 11–12, 786 N.W.2d 354, 358.

[¶ 6.] On remand, the perjury case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found Danielson guilty of perjury. Danielson appeals.

[¶ 7.] The issues on appeal are:

1. Whether the jury had sufficient evidence to find Danielson guilty of perjury.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Danielson's request for a court-appointed private investigator.

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting used transmission parts into evidence.

4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Danielson's motion to dismiss based on the destruction of evidence.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 8.] Danielson appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal. “We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal as a question of law under the de novo standard.” State v. Overbey, 2010 S.D. 78, ¶ 12, 790 N.W.2d 35, 40. “On appeal, the question before this Court is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions.” Id. “In measuring the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Stark, 2011 S.D. 46, ¶ 21, 802 N.W.2d 165, 172. “We accept the evidence and the most favorable inferences fairly drawn therefrom, which will support the verdict.” Id. In addition, “the jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence.” Id. “This Court will not resolve conflicts in the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, or evaluate the weight of the evidence.” Id. [¶ 9.] Danielson also appeals the trial court's denial of a motion for the appointment of a private investigator, a motion in limine, and a motion to dismiss based on the destruction of evidence. “The appointment of an expert is in the discretion of the trial court.” In re E.L. and R.L., 2005 S.D. 124, ¶ 22, 707 N.W.2d 841, 847. This Court also reviews a “trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss [based on the destruction of evidence] under an abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Williams, 2008 S.D. 29, ¶ 23, 748 N.W.2d 435, 442. In addition, we review “a trial court's evidentiary rulings under an abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Fisher, 2011 S.D. 74, ¶ 32, 805 N.W.2d 571, 578. “An abuse of discretion refers to a discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against reason and evidence.” Id. Furthermore, “[e]ven if a trial court's evidentiary ruling is erroneous, the error must be prejudicial in nature before we will overturn the ruling.” Id. “Error is prejudicial when, in all probability ... it produced some effect upon the final result and affected rights of the party assigning it.” Id.

ANALYSIS

[¶ 10.] 1. Whether the jury had sufficient evidence to find Danielson guilty of perjury.

[¶ 11.] Danielson argues that the jury did not have sufficient evidence to find him guilty of perjury. Danielson specifically challenges materiality and mens rea. Danielson argues that whether certain repair work was done or not done was not material to the grand theft trial, and thus, any alleged false statement does not constitute perjury under SDCL 22–29–1. Danielson also argues that the State did not prove that he intentionally misled the jury in making any alleged false statement. Danielson asserts that the alleged false statement could have been a result of faulty memory or mistake.

[¶ 12.] The State responds that materiality is an issue for the jury to decide. The State contends that Danielson's testimony about repair work was material to the grand theft trial because it bolstered and affected Danielson's credibility and his claim of right defense. The State further asserts that perjury is a general intent crime and alternatively argues that even if perjury is a specific intent crime, the State established that Danielson had the specific intent to make a false statement of material fact.

[¶ 13.] Perjury is codified in SDCL Chapter 22–29. Under SDCL 22–29–1,

Any person who, having taken an oath to testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, before any competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any state or federal proceeding or action in which such an oath may by law be administered, states, intentionally and contrary to the oath, any material matter which the person knows to be false, is guilty of perjury.

“It is sufficient for a [perjury] conviction ... that a finding of guilty is based upon admissible evidence.” SDCL 22–29–18.

[¶ 14.] Regarding materiality, “[i]t is no defense to a prosecution for perjury that the accused did not know the materiality of the false statement, or that the false statement did not in fact affect the proceeding in or for which the false statement was made.” SDCL 22–29–4. “It is sufficient that the false statement was material and might have been used to affect such proceeding.” Id. Furthermore, “[a] statement is sufficient to support a charge of perjury ‘if it is material to any proper matter of inquiry, and if, furthermore, it is calculated and intended to bolster the testimony of a witness on some material point, or to support or attack the credibility of a witness.’ ” State v. Maves, 358 N.W.2d 805, 810 (S.D.1984) (quoting State v. Lachowitzer, 314 N.W.2d 307, 310 (S.D.1982)). “A statement made by a witness during the course of a trial is also material if it ‘has a legitimate tendency to prove or disprove some relevant fact irrespective of the main fact at issue, or ... is capable of influencing the court, officer, tribunal, or other body created by law on any proper matter of inquiry.’ ” Lachowitzer, 314 N.W.2d at 310 (quoting State v. Deets, 195 N.W.2d 118, 122 (Iowa 1972)). The materiality element is an issue for the jury to decide. State v. Pechan, 1996 S.D. 123, ¶¶ 9–12, 554 N.W.2d 663, 664–65.

[¶ 15.] In this case, the State presented several witnesses, including three expert witnesses. The State's experts generally opined that the 1950 Studebaker's transmission had not been disassembled recently and that it contained mostly original, manufacturer-issued parts. The State introduced a partial transcript of the grand theft trial, which included all of Danielson's testimony in that trial. After the State's case-in-chief, Danielson moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the State did not establish materiality because the State only introduced a partial transcript from the grand theft trial which did not include the State's case-in-chief and also because the State did not introduce the grand theft indictment. The State responded that materiality is established through Danielson's claim of right defense in the grand theft trial which is asserted in Danielson's testimony, eliminating the need to introduce the rest of the grand theft trial transcript. The trial court denied Danielson's judgment of acquittal motion, noting that...