State v. Dankwardt

• Decision Date: 15 December 1898
• Citation: 77 N.W. 495,107 Iowa 704
• Parties: STATE OF IOWA v. E. T. DANKWARDT, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

77 N.W. 495

107 Iowa 704

STATE OF IOWA v. E. T. DANKWARDT, Appellant

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

December 15, 1898

Appeal from Louisa District Court.--HON. W. S. WITHROW, Judge.

FROM a verdict and judgment finding the defendant guilty of attempting to corrupt a juror, this appeal is taken.

Affirmed.

C. L Poor, Lamonte Cowles, and C. A. Carpenter for appellant.

Milton Remley, Attorney General, and Jesse A. Miller for the State.

DEEMER C. J. DEEMER, C. J., and WATERMAN, J., dissent.

OPINION

DEEMER, C. J.

The charging part of the indictment is as follows: "The said E. T. Dankwardt, on or about the 30th day of January, 1897 in the county aforesaid, one Jacob Reiss, a juror, then and there duly sworn and impaneled to try a certain cause then pending and on trial in the district court of Des Moines county, Iowa, to-wit, the case wherein Mary Mahoney was plaintiff and E. T. Dankwardt was defendant, did unlawfully and feloniously attempt to improperly influence the said Jacob Reiss as a juror in said cause in relation to the same by then and there requesting said Jacob Reiss to see that the right was done, that it would not be to his loss, and by the use of language of like import, the exact words being to the grand jury unknown; all said language being used with the purpose and intent on the part of said E. T. Dankwardt to improperly influence said Jacob Reiss in his actions and findings as a juror in said cause." To this the defendant demurred on the grounds: (1) That the facts stated do not constitute a crime; (2) the facts alleged show that defendant did no more than request the juror to do his duty; (3) the acts stated might, under certain circumstances, be lawful, and there are no facts stated showing them to have been unlawful; and (4) it is not alleged that defendant knew Jacob Reiss was a juror at the time the alleged improper attempt to influence him was made. This demurrer was overruled, and this ruling is made the basis for the first assignment of error.

The section of the statute under which the indictment was found is as follows: "If any person attempt to improperly influence any juror in any criminal or civil action, or any one drawn, summoned, appointed or sworn as such juror, * * * he shall be punished," etc. Code 1873, section 3946. It is contended in argument that the words alleged to have been spoken were in themselves innocent and proper, and that, as there are no words showing them to have been used in an improper sense, no crime is charged. This argument is based upon a misconstruction of the language said to have been used by the defendant. The charge is that defendant unlawfully and feloniously attempted to improperly influence the juror Reiss by stating to him: "See that the right is done. It will not be to your loss," and other words of like import, with intent on the part of the defendant to improperly influence the said juror in his actions and findings in the case. It seems to us that the idea that the words were used in a legitimate way and for a proper purpose is distinctly negatived. Among other tests by which an indictment is to be tried, the statute (Code 1873, section 4305) names the following: "The indictment is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom * * * that the act charged as the offense is stated with such a degree of certainty, in ordinary and concise language and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended and the court to pronounce judgment upon a conviction according to the law of the case." Tried by this test, we think it clearly appears that the defendant used the words spoken for an unlawful purpose, and with the intent to improperly influence the juror. It is not necessary or proper, either, in a civil or criminal case, to plead evidence. Ultimate facts only are to be stated. Of course, the means used to accomplish the end must be stated in such a case as this. But we find they are set forth "in ordinary and concise language, and in such manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what was intended."

Further, it is said that the means used to accomplish the end were not unlawful; that it is perfectly proper to say to a juror: "See that the right is done. It will not be to your loss." No doubt this might be true under some circumstances. But where, as in this case, it was said in an attempt to unlawfully influence the juror, and with attempt to improperly influence his conduct as such juror, as charged in the indictment, the act is unlawful. It is quite important that we distinguish this case from one wherein the speaking of the words themselves constitutes a crime,--as in an indictment for libel, where an innuendo is often needed to explain the language used in order that its defamatory sense may appear. In such a case the gist of the offense is the publishing of the words. Here the culpable wrong is the attempt to improperly influence a juror. The words spoken are simply the means used, and no innuendo is necessary.

Again it is said that the indictment simply follows the language of the statute, and that this is insufficient, for the reason that the statute does not set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense. We are quite ready to agree that it would be insufficient to say in the language of the statute that the defendant attempted to improperly influence the juror Reiss, for that would simply be following the statute, and the statute does not set forth all the elements of the crime. See State v. Butcher, 79 Iowa 110, 44 N.W. 239. But here the acts constituting the offense are stated, and every element of the crime appears, unless it be found that it is not alleged that defendant knew Reiss was a juror at the time he made the statements to him. And this brings us to the last objection made to the indictment. It may be that such an allegation was necessary at common law. We have frequently said, however, that the technical exactness of the common law is not required by our statutes. State v. Johnson, 26 Iowa 407; State v. Caffrey, 94 Iowa 65, 62 N.W. 664. The majority of the court are of the opinion that, while it would have been better to have...