State v. David A. Schroeder
| Decision Date | 08 September 1995 |
| Docket Number | 95-LW-5626,(ACCELERATED)95-G-1907 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID A. SCHROEDER, Defendant-Appellant. ACCELERATED CASE NO. 95-G-1907 |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
HON DONALD R. FORD, P.J., HON. JUDITH A. CHRISTLEY, J., HON JOSEPH E. MAHONEY, J.
ATTY JAMES M. GILLETTE, 117 South Street, #208, P.O. Box 225 Chardon, OH 44024 (For Plaintiff-Appellee)
ATTY. DAVID A. SCHROEDER, Pro se, 7784 Reynolds Road, Mentor, OH 44060 (Defendant-Appellant)
Appellant, David A. Schroeder, appeals from a Chardon Municipal Court ruling, finding him guilty of speeding, in violation of Chardon Municipal Code 333.03. The relevant facts follow.
Appellant was stopped on November 20, 1994, by a member of the Chardon Police Department, Patrolman Michael R. Barrett, and was issued a speeding citation for going 48 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. zone. Appellant was "clocked" with a LTI 20-20 laser speed detection unit. Appellant pleaded not guilty on December 2, 1994. A bench trial was set for December 27, 1994. Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the charge on several legal and procedural grounds. This motion was overruled, and the case proceeded to trial. Following a guilty finding by the court, appellant appealed, raising the following as error:
Appellant's first assignment concerns the finding of guilt, and the question of whether the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Appellant contends that because one of the speed limit signs was in a state of severe disrepair he could not be convicted of exceeding the speed limit posted on that sign. Appellant testified that as he left Chardon on State Route 44 going north, he passed a clearly marked "Speed Limit 35" sign, then a battered "Speed Limit 35" sign which was difficult to read, and that he was stopped prior to the next sign, which read "Speed Limit 50." Appellant believes because the second sign was difficult to read, that as a matter of law, he could not be convicted of excessive speed in that area.
When attempting to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict, the reviewing court uses the following standard:
"[V]iewing the evidence 'in a light most favorable to the prosecution,' *** '(a) reviewing court (should) not reverse a *** verdict where there is substantial evidence upon which [the trier of fact] could reasonably conclude that all of the elements of an offense have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'***" (Citations omitted.) State v. Schlee (Dec. 23, 1994), Lake App. No. 93-L-082, unreported, at 11.
Conversely, to ascertain whether a conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence, the reviewing court:
"[R]eview[s] the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. ***" (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.) State v. Davis (1988), 49 Ohio App.3d 109, 113.
A review of the record shows that evidence was presented that appellant was observed by the patrolman in a prima facie 35 m.p.h. zone (as demonstrated at least by the first of the 35 m.p.h. signs and the testimony of the officer), was clocked by the laser unit exceeding the posted speed limit, and was pulled over and issued a citation for speeding. Additionally, evidence was presented that the patrolman was trained and certified in the operation of the laser unit, and that it was calibrated and fully functional when it was used to clock appellant's speed on the date in question. Therefore, sufficient evidence exists to sustain the finding of guilt by the judge in this case. We find no manifest miscarriage of justice that would require us to reverse the guilty finding.
Appellant's contention that a reversal is required because one of the signs was in a state of disrepair is not persuasive. Appellant had passed at least one sign just prior to the stop that read that the speed limit was 35 m.p.h. and he had not as yet reached the 50 m.p.h. sign in the distance. The 50 m.p.h. sign designates the "terminal point" where the speed limit changes from 35 to 50 m.p.h. Ohio Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices 51-10. Accordingly, appellant was clearly in a prima facie 35 m.p.h. zone when he was clocked, and the fact that he could see the 50 m.p.h. sign in the distance is irrelevant.
Additionally, evidence was produced in the trial court about the general conditions of the roadway and the level of traffic. At no point did appellant challenge the reasonableness of his speed for the conditions. The state is required to produce evidence sufficient to show that a defendant's speed was unreasonable for the conditions. The defendant must then produce evidence, either directly or through cross-examination, showing that his speed was, in fact, reasonable. Appellant did not do this in this case.
The only evidence present in the record was that appellant was stopped in a...
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