State v. Davidson
| Decision Date | 22 May 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-1497,84-1497 |
| Citation | 17 OBR 277,477 N.E.2d 1141,17 Ohio St.3d 132 |
| Parties | , 17 O.B.R. 277 The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. DAVIDSON, Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
Any motion, however labeled, which, if granted, restricts the state in the presentation of certain evidence and, thereby, renders the state's proof with respect to the pending charge so weak in its entirety that any reasonable possibility of effective prosecution has been destroyed, is, in effect, a motion to suppress. The granting of such a motion is a final order and may be appealed pursuant to R.C. 2945.67 and Crim.R. 12(J).
The state of Ohio, appellant herein, seeks relief from a judgment of the court of appeals which dismissed the state's appeal on the ground the trial court had not issued a final appealable order. We reverse.
On April 28, 1983, there was a collision between cars driven by appellee, Lonnie Davidson, and Alberta Riffel. As a result of the collision, Riffel was seriously injured. 1
According to the state, appellee made statements to the investigating officers at the collision scene indicating he had been in a bar shortly before the accident, and that he had a history of driving under the influence of alcohol. Shortly after making these alleged statements, appellee submitted to an intoxilyzer breath test. The test results indicated he had a breath alcohol concentration of .28, well in excess of the legal limit of .10 established by R.C. 4511.19(A)(3).
Appellee was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol, a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(3), and with driving left of center, a violation of R.C. 4511.25. On June 22, 1983, appellee pled no contest to these charges in Butler County Court, Area II, and was found guilty.
On August 19, 1983, about two months after appellee's conviction, Riffel died, allegedly as a result of the injuries she sustained in the April 28 automobile accident. On September 9, 1983, the Butler County Grand Jury issued an indictment which charged:
" * * * that on or about the 28th day of April 1983, at Butler County, Ohio [appellee] LONNIE DAVIDSON did recklessly cause the death of Alberta Riffel, while the said LONNIE DAVIDSON was operating a motor vehicle, which offense is a felony of the fourth degree, in violation of the Ohio Revised Code, Title [sic ] Aggravated Vehicular Homicide[,] Section 2903.06(A) * * *."
On September 19, 1983, appellee filed the following motions in the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County: (1) a "Motion To Dismiss The Indictment" on double jeopardy grounds, (2) a "Motion For Bill Of Particulars," (3) a "Demand For Discovery," and (4) a "Motion To Suppress." The motion to suppress stated, in relevant part:
"Now comes the defendant, Lonnie Davidson, by and through his counsel, and moves the Court for an order suppressing any and all statements made by this defendant and any member of law enforcement in that he was not advised of his constitutional rights pursuant to any questioning that may have taken place."
Appellee's memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss the indictment stated, in relevant part:
"Thus, we know that the State will provide only that evidence as is contained in the Bill of Particulars and that evidence is, in fact, the exact same evidence that the lower court considered in finding the defendant, Lonnie Davidson, guilty of the crimes of Driving While Intoxicated and Operating Left of Center."
On April 10, 1984, the trial court, relying on Illinois v. Vitale (1980), 447 U.S. 410, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 65 L.Ed.2d 228, ruled on the motion to dismiss the indictment. The court said:
On April 17, 1984, the appellee filed a motion in limine:
" * * * to limit the State of Ohio, the Prosecuting Attorney, and any and all witnesses that may or might be subpoenaed in this case from any mention of alcohol and/or the consumption of alcohol and/or photographs reflecting or depicting the presence of alcohol in or about the scene of the accident which is the subject matter of this prosecution, and/or any reference, directly or indirectly, as to the driving under the influence of alcohol and/or driving left of center, and/or any mention of the prosecution and/or conviction of the defendant driving under the influence of alcohol and/or driving left of center."
On April 27, 1984, the trial court sustained appellee's motion in limine. 2 On May 1, 1984, the prosecutor filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's judgment. The notice of appeal was filed pursuant to R.C. 2945.67 and Crim.R. 12(J). The Court of Appeals for Butler County treated the notice of appeal as a motion for leave to appeal. The appellate court then denied the motion, "since the order appealed from is subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the trial court * * *."
The court of appeals, finding its judgment to be in conflict with the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County in State v. Liberatore (Dec. 8, 1983), No. 46784, unreported, certified the record of the case to this court for review and final determination.
John F. Holcomb, Pros. Atty., Daniel G. Eichel and Gerald R. Leshner, Hamilton, for appellant.
David M. Green, Hamilton, for appellee.
R.C. 2505.03 states that a party may only appeal from the trial court's final order. A final order is any order which, in effect, determines the action in the trial court. R.C. 2505.02. The issue in this case is whether the trial court's order granting the appellee's motion "in limine " was a final appealable order. We hold that it was and that it may be appealed pursuant to R.C. 2945.67 and Crim.R. 12(J).
A criminal defendant has the right to appeal from a trial court's final orders. See Note, Prosecutor Appeals: A Proposal To Revamp The Law In Ohio (1977), 4 Ohio N.U.L.Rev. 353. Historically, the prosecution has enjoyed no such right. See United States v. Sanges (1892), 144 U.S. 310, 312, 12 S.Ct. 609, 609, 36 L.Ed. 445. This created a serious disparity between the rights of the accused, and the right of the accuser, and tipped the scales of justice too far in favor of the criminal defendant. In order to offset this imbalance, Ohio adopted R.C. 2945.67 and Crim.R. 12(J). Cf. Note, Prosecutor Appeals, supra, at 365-369 ().
R.C. 2945.67 deals with appeals by the state in criminal proceedings. It states, in relevant part:
"(A) A prosecuting attorney * * * may appeal as a matter or [of] right any decision of a trial court in a criminal case * * * which decision grants * * * a motion to suppress evidence * * *."
Crim.R. 12(J) supplements and formalizes the statutory procedure. State v. Buckingham (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 14, 16, 402 N.E.2d 536 . It states, in relevant part:
"The state may take an appeal as of right * * * from the granting of a motion to suppress evidence if, in addition to filing a notice of appeal, the prosecuting attorney certifies that: (1) the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay; and (2) the granting of the motion has rendered the state's proof with respect to the pending charge so weak in its entirety that any reasonable possibility of effective prosecution has been destroyed."
The language in both the statute and the rule speaks in terms of appealing from the granting of a "motion to suppress evidence." Appellee argues that a "motion in limine " designed to suppress evidence is entirely different from a "motion to suppress." We disagree. The determination of whether a motion is a "motion to suppress" or a "motion in limine " does not depend on what it is labeled. It depends on the type of relief it seeks to obtain. Any other result would...
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