State v. Davies
| Decision Date | 20 December 1965 |
| Parties | STATE of New York, Appellant, v. Donald F. DAVIES, Respondent, and Associated Building Contractors of the Triple Cities, Inc., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., of the State of New York , for appellant.
Twining & Fischer, Binghamton (Maxwell B. Spoont, Binghamton, of counsel), for respondent Donald F. Davies.
Before HERLIHY, J. P., and REYNOLDS, TAYLOR, AULISI, and HAMM, JJ.
This is an appeal from an order and judgment of the Supreme Court, Broome County, granting a motion to dismiss the complaint as to the respondent, Donald F. Davies, on the ground that the court did not have personal jurisdiction over respondent (CPLR 3211 [a]).
This action was brought by the State against the Associated Building Contractors of the Triple Cities, Inc., its officers, including respondent Davies its executive secretary, and its member corporations for alleged violations of § 340 of the General Business Law. Specifically the complaint asserts that the defendants conspired and agreed to eliminate specifications from certain public agencies' building construction contracts, to influence agencies, owners and architects to eliminate such specifications, to boycott and refuse to bid on contracts containing such specifications, and to adopt uniform terms and conditions relating to such contracts. It is also alleged that the defendants engaged in threats and other means of compulsion to obtain these ends and that respondent Davies in particular secured information, examined specifications, prepared bids, and engaged in a boycott, all with reference to a named public project and all in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. As relief, the State sought an injunction (General Business Law, § 342) and civil monetary penalties (General Business Law, § 342-a). Since respondent Davies was a resident of Ohio at the time the action was commenced, personal jurisdiction was sought to be effected pursuant to CPLR 302, and it is from the denial by the court below of the applicability of this section to respondent Davies that the present appeal is brought.
The court below determined that § 302 is not applicable to a nondomiciliary who, at the time of the commission of the acts which would invoke § 302, was a domiciliary. Since CPLR § 313 allows personal service outside the State only as to nonresident domiciliaries, such a position would preclude personal jurisdiction over the instant respondent. We cannot perceive that the legislature could have intended such a 'gap' and accordingly we hold that § 302 is applicable to a defendant who is a domiciliary at the time he commits one of the prescribed acts but a nondomiciliary at the time of service as well as a defendant who is a nondomiciliary both at the time of the commission of the act and at the time of service (see, O'Connor v. Wells, 43 Misc.2d 1075, 252 N.Y.S.2d 861; Voskrensenkaya v. Bary [Sup.Ct.], 152 N.Y.L.J., No. 27, p. 9, col. 2 [Aug. 6, 1964]; Samoiloff v. Bary [Sup.Ct.], 152 N.Y.L.J., No. 18, p. 9, col. 1 [July 24, 1964]; McLaughlin, Civil Practice, 1964 survey of N.Y.Law, 16 Syracuse L.Rev., 419, 436). Kurland v. Chernobil, 260 N.Y. 254, 183 N.E. 380 is inapposite here.
Respondent asserts that even assuming he is subject to service despite his change of domicile, his actions did not come within the purview of CPLR §§ 302(a)(1) or 302(a)(2) and even if they did, the present suit by the State is improper. If the present suit were brought by private individuals there would seem little question that §§ 302(a)(1) and 302(a)(2) would be applicable since we find that the cause of action asserted arose from the transaction of business within ...
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...Lancaster v. Colonial Motor Freight Line, Inc., 177 A.D.2d 152, 581 N.Y.S.2d 283, 287 (1st Dep't 1992); see also State v. Davies, 24 A.D.2d 240, 265 N.Y.S.2d 358 (3d Dep't 1965), aff'd., 18 N.Y.2d 950, 277 N.Y.S.2d 146, 223 N.E.2d 570 While the defendants assert that the telephone and mail ......
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