State v. Davis, s. 33514-33517
| Decision Date | 15 March 1956 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 33514-33517,s. 33514-33517 |
| Citation | 48 Wn.2d 513,294 P.2d 934 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Plaintiff and Relator, v. James DAVIS, Defendant, The Superior Court of the State of Washington for Walla Walla County, Glenn L. Bean, Judge, Respondent. The STATE of Washington, Plaintiff and Relator, v. Kenneth GEORGE, Defendant, The Superior Court of the State of Washington for Walla Walla County, Glenn L. Bean, Judge, Respondent. The STATE of Washington, Plaintiff and Relator, v. Charles LAMBERT, Defendant, The Superior Court of the State of Washington for Walla Walla County, Glenn L. Bean, Judge, Respondent. The STATE of Washington, Plaintiff and Relator, v. Russell SUMMERS, Defendant, The Superior Court of the State of Washington for Walla Walla County, Glenn L. Bean, Judge, Respondent. |
Arthur L. Hawman, Pros. Atty., Aurel M. Kelly, Howard J. Martin, Walla Walla, for relator.
Conkey & Eggers, Walla Walla, Dyar & Hubbard, Waitsburg, Sherwood & Comfort, Walla Walla, for defendants and respondent.
In a criminal case, when the state can satisfy the supreme court that an appeal is not an adequate remedy, the supreme court will issue a writ of certiorari for the review of an order made and entered by the superior court from which the state could appeal.
The instant cases are consolidated for the purposes of this review. Defendants James Davis, Kenneth George, and Russell Summers were charged in separate informations with conspiracy to kidnap (Count I) and prison riot (Count II). Defendant Charles Lambert was charged with kidnapping (Count I), conspiracy to kidnap (Count II), and prison riot (Count III). All of these offenses arose out of the same act or transaction or connected acts or transactions. The state concedes that the informations must be amended to so state. Laws of 1925, Ex.Sess., chapter 109, § 1, p. 168, Rem.Rev.Stat. § 2059, cf. RCW 10.37.060.
The trial court sustained demurrers and granted motions to quash directed against the count charging kidnapping in the Lambert information and against the count charging conspiracy to kidnap in each of the four informations, leaving one count against each defendant, i. e., prison riot.
The state sought and was granted a writ of certiorari in each case for a review of the order quashing the counts charging kidnapping and conspiracy to kidnap. The defendants have moved to quash the writs.
An appeal, if prosecuted before the trial of the counts alleging prison riot, would entail a long delay and prevent that to which society is entitled and of which the defendants have a constitutional guarantee, i. e., a speedy trial. Constitution, art. I, § 22. Such an appeal, if prosecuted after either conviction or acquittal on the counts alleging prison riot, would be of dubious value, even if successful, because of problems relating to former jeopardy. The delay, the inconvenience, and the expense of a series of trials arising out of the same transaction or connected transactions were the reasons for remedial legislation in 1925. Laws of 1925, Ex.Sess., chapter 109, § 1, p. 168, Rem.Rev.Stat. § 2059, cf. RCW 10.37.060. It is obvious, therefore, that, if the state had a right to join the kidnapping and conspiracy counts to the counts charging prison riot as arising out of the same transaction or connected transactions, appeal would not be an adequate remedy. The motion to quash the writs of certiorari is accordingly denied.
We are confronted with a most unusual situation. By chapter 241 of the Laws of 1955, p. 1007, RCW 9.94.010-9.94.060, it was intended to designate and define three offenses chargeable to prisoners of state penal institutions and two other offenses chargeable to 'any person.' The title of that chapter reads 'An Act relating to crimes of prisoners of state penal institutions, defining prison riot, the holding of hostages, possession of contraband, interference with laboring prisoners, the giving of narcotics and firearms to a prisoner; providing penalties therefor; and empowering officers and guards of penal institutions to have powers of a peace officer in certain situations.' (Numbers added.)
'Prison riot' is defined and the penalty therefor is fixed in §§ 1 and 2 of the act. RCW 9.94.010, 9.94.020. 'The holding of hostages' is purportedly defined and the penalty fixed in § 3 of the act. RCW 9.94.030. (The significance of 'purportedly' is explained later.) 'Possession of contraband' is defined and the penalty fixed in § 4 of the act. RCW 9.94.040. 'Interference with laboring prisoners' and 'the giving of narcotics and firearms to a prisoner' are defined and the penalty for each is fixed in § 6 of the act. RCW 9.94.060. Each of the five is a distinct offense and each carries its own penalty. There is no basis for the state's position that 'the holding of hostages' is included in 'prison riot.'
The trial judge was unquestionably of the opinion--and we think justifiably so--that the legislature intended, by § 3 of chapter 241, RCW 9.94.030, to supersede the kidnapping statute, if ever applicable, in the situation where an inmate of a state penal institution holds or participates in holding an officer of that institution as a hostage by force or violence or the threat thereof.
In addition to the count charging prison riot, each of the defendants was charged with entering into an 'agreement, confederation and conspiracy' with named coconspirators to 'seize, confine and inveigle' named victims,
'* * * with intent to cause them without auhority of law to be secretly confined and imprisoned and to cause them to be held to service with intent to extort or obtain a reward for their release or disposition.'
While each defendant is alleged, in the prison riot charge, to be an inmate of the Washington state penitentiary, none of his co-conspirators are alleged to be such inmates and none...
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State v. Neuman
...we find section 24-13-450 supersedes as a specific statute the general criminal offense statute of kidnapping. See State v. Davis, 48 Wash.2d 513, 294 P.2d 934, 936 (1956) (analyzing statutes designated to define offenses chargeable to prisoners of penal institutions with other offenses cha......
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State v. Carroll
...that RCW 9.22.040 does not define a crime and makes nothing criminal. For this position respondents cite and rely upon State v. Davis, 48 Wash.2d 513, 294 P.2d 934 (1956). There are, however, substantial differences between the statute in Davis and the statute here involved (RCW 9.22.040). ......
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State v. Bower
...115 (1972) (gross misdemeanor conspiracy superseded by the felony of conspiring against certain governmental units); State v. Davis, 48 Wash.2d 513, 294 P.2d 934 (1956) (felony kidnapping superseded by the felony of hostage taking by a prison inmate); 5 State v. Becker, 39 Wash.2d 94, 234 P......
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State v. Walls
...Walker, 76 Wash.2d 607, 458 P.2d 274 (1969); City of Airway Heights v. Schroeder, 53 Wash.2d 625, 335 P.2d 578 (1959); State v. Davis, 48 Wash.2d 513, 294 P.2d 934 (1956); State v. Becker, 39 Wash.2d 94, 234 P.2d 897 (1951). And a related rule holds that where a general statute and a subseq......