State v. Davis

• Decision Date: 01 May 1892
• Citation: 14 Del. 558,33 A. 439
• Parties: THE STATE v. MARTHA E. DAVIS, alias "BLIZZARD.&quot
• Court: Court of General Sessions of Delaware

33 A. 439

14 Del. 558

THE STATE v. MARTHA E. DAVIS, alias "BLIZZARD."

Court of General Sessions of Delaware, New Castle

May 1, 1892

INDICTED for taking and using a female child under fifteen years of age for the purpose of sexual intercourse.

Verdict: Guilty, with a recommendation to the mercy of the court.

Branch H. Giles, for the State.

Carpenter for defendant, contended that the indictment was defective in that it charged Martha E. Davis, a woman, with taking and using a female child for the purpose of sexual intercourse, whereas none but a male could be guilty of using a female for said purpose.

OPINION

CULLEN, J. charging the jury:

Gentlemen of the Jury: This is an indictment against Martha E. Davis, alias Martha E. Blizzard, for a violation of the provisions of a statute of this State passed the 29th of March, 1889, entitled "An Act for the Better Protection of Female Children" (Vol. 18, p. 951, Laws of Delaware.)

The defendant in this indictment is charged in the first count with the using, and in the second count with the taking a child under fifteen years of age and using, against the provisions of the statute, for the purpose of sexual intercourse. We have been asked to charge you in relation to the provisions as contained in this Act with reference to the indictment itself as supporting the allegations upon which the State contends for a conviction.

It is contended on the part of the counsel for the defence that the party as charged in this indictment is not liable under the provisions of this statute. It therefore becomes necessary for us to give you our views as to the construction to be put upon this statute and as to whether the allegations in this indictment, if proved, are sufficient for you to render a verdict of conviction, under this statute.

This statute, you will observe, contains two distinct and separate provisions: the first provision is,--"Whoever takes, receives, employs, harbors, or uses, or causes or procures to be taken, received, employed, harbored or used a female under the age of fifteen years for the purpose of sexual intercourse," etc. And the second provision is,--"Or whoever being proprietor or priprietress of any house of prostitution, reputed house of prostitution, or assignation, house of ill-fame, or assignation, harbors or employs any female in any such house, under the age of fifteen years, under any pretext whatever, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor," etc.

This indictment is framed under the first provision of this statute, and therefore it is not necessary to speak with regard to the second provision of the same, as it has no reference to this immediate indictment; for the defendant must be convicted of the violation of this statute, if at all, under the first provision; otherwise, she must be acquitted.

There appears never to have been any construction put upon this statute by the courts in our State. It is contended on the part of the defendant's counsel that the meaning of this Act is that a party who uses a child under fifteen years of age, in order to be found guilty under the provisions of the statute, must use it for his own special purpose of having sexual intercourse with that child, and that therefore none but a male can be convicted under this provision of the statute.

Gentlemen, the Court don't think so. We cannot put that construction upon this statute, and it never was intended that such a construction should be put upon it. In the construction of a statute you may look not only to what is called the preamble (in this there is no preamble), but you may look to the title of the Act, not with reference to its immediate construction, but as showing what was the object of the Legislature in passing it. The title, as we have seen, is--"An act for the Better Protection of Female Children." We must also construe an Act by using the words according to the general usage. If it is a penal Act, then it must be construed strictly in accordance with the meaning. And if the terms are ambiguous, it may become necessary to take the whole statute together for ascertaining the true meaning; but where the words employed are words relative to the meaning of which there can be no doubt, then there ceases to be any trouble in interpreting a statute.

If the Act stopped where it says: Uses a female child under fifteen years of age, for the purpose of sexual intercourse"-- in the first part of the Act--then it would admit of the construction that whoever did this, did it for his own special purpose; but you cannot strain an act by adding to those words "for the purpose of," the words, "his own particular purpose." The Act not only embraces that particular class, but "Whoever causes or procures to be taken, received, employed, harbored or used"--implying the case in which the party does not take, harbor or use himself or...