State v. Davis
| Decision Date | 28 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-1650 |
| Citation | 143 N.E.3d 343 |
| Parties | STATE of Indiana, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Cliffton W. DAVIS, Appellee-Defendant |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorneys for Appellant: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Tyler G. Banks, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorney for Appellee: Jay A. Rigdon, Rockhill Pinnick LLP, Warsaw, Indiana
[1] Cliffton W. Davis was operating a vehicle in Kosciusko County when he exited a roundabout without signaling a turn. A police officer, believing that Davis's behavior constituted a traffic infraction, initiated a stop of Davis's vehicle. A subsequent search of the vehicle led to the discovery of incriminating evidence and the filing of criminal charges against Davis. Davis filed a motion to suppress that evidence which the trial court granted based upon its conclusion that Davis's failure to signal while exiting the roundabout was not a statutory violation, and therefore the stop of Davis's vehicle was unlawful. The State of Indiana appeals the trial court's order, asserting that the failure to signal when exiting a roundabout is a statutory violation, and even if it is not, the police officer's mistake of law in this case was reasonable and therefore the stop was constitutionally valid. For reasons that we will explain fully in our discussion, we affirm the trial court's suppression order.
[2] On September 21, 2018, Officer Ross Minear of the Warsaw Police Department was traveling eastbound on West Lake Street, approaching a three-spoke, or three-exit, roundabout at the intersection of West Lake Street and Fox Farm Road. Tr. Vol. 2 at 7-8, Ex. A. Officer Minear observed a vehicle driven by Davis exit the roundabout to head westbound on West Lake Street.1 Davis did not signal his exit from the roundabout. Officer Minear initiated a traffic stop of Davis's vehicle based upon the failure to signal. Officer Minear believed that Davis's behavior constituted a traffic infraction because he had "always [been] instructed that you needed to signal for exiting a roundabout." Id. at 11.
[3] After Davis stopped his car, Officer Minear saw Davis bend over "as if attempting to conceal something inside the vehicle." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 9. When Officer Minear approached the vehicle, he also noticed that Davis was nervous and "sweating profusely." Id. Officer Minear asked Davis to exit the vehicle, and as he exited, Officer Minear saw Davis throw a digital scale onto the floorboard of the vehicle. This led to a search of the vehicle, during which officers discovered that there was residue on the scales which field-tested positive for methamphetamine. The officers also found a plastic bag with residue, two glass smoking devices, and multiple other plastic bags. Because Davis "appeared to be under the influence of illegal drugs," he was transported to the hospital for a blood draw. Id. [4] The State charged Davis with level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, and class C misdemeanor operating while intoxicated. Thereafter, Davis filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the traffic stop of his vehicle arguing that the stop was unlawful. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the motion, concluding that the State had failed to prove that Davis violated the Indiana statute regarding turn signals, Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-25, and therefore Officer Minear did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop of Davis's vehicle. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that all evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful stop should be suppressed. The State now appeals.
[5] In this appeal, we must resolve what we perceive to be a vexing question for many Hoosier drivers: Does a motorist violate current Indiana traffic regulation law by not signaling a turn when exiting a roundabout? In short, the answer is no.
[6] We begin by noting that the State appeals following the trial court's grant of Davis's motion to suppress evidence, which effectively terminated the prosecution of this case.2 Because the State appeals from a negative judgment, it bears the burden to show that the trial court's suppression ruling was contrary to law. State v. Brown , 70 N.E.3d 331, 335 (Ind. 2017). When reviewing a trial court's suppression ruling, we determine whether the record contains substantial evidence of probative value that supports the trial court's decision. Id. "We evaluate the trial court's findings of fact deferentially, neither reweighing the evidence nor reassessing the credibility of the witnesses." Id. However, we review the trial court's conclusions of law de novo, giving no weight to the legal analysis below. Sanders v. State , 989 N.E.2d 332, 334 (Ind. 2013).
[7] "Traffic stops, for even minor violations, fall within the protections of the federal and state constitutions." Marshall v. State , 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1258 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied . When a law enforcement officer stops a vehicle for a suspected traffic infraction, that officer seizes the vehicle's occupants under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, and that traffic stop must pass constitutional muster. Meredith v. State , 906 N.E.2d 867, 869 (Ind. 2009) (Fourth Amendment); State v. Quirk , 842 N.E.2d 334, 339-40 (Ind. 2006) ( Article 1, Section 11 ). To avoid any potential constitutional violation, the officer conducting the stop must have had a "reasonable suspicion" at the time of the stop that some traffic law or ordinance had been violated. Meredith , 906 N.E.2d at 869. To deter violations of the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, evidence obtained in violation of those protections is not admissible in a prosecution of the citizen whose right was violated. Clark v. State , 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013). The State has the burden of demonstrating the admissibility of the evidence collected during a seizure or search. Id.
[8] At specific issue in this case is the traffic regulation statute that Officer Minear relied upon to justify the stop of Davis's vehicle which provides in pertinent part: "A signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously during not less than the last two hundred (200) feet traveled by a vehicle before turning or changing lanes." Ind. Code § 9-21-8-25.3 Davis traveled through a roundabout and then exited the roundabout without signaling a turn. Accordingly, we must determine whether this behavior constituted a violation of Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-25. We think not.
[9] The parameters of Indiana's current turn signal law have not often been discussed.4 Another panel of this Court has determined that Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-5 requires that a motorist use a turn signal even when turning from a parking lot onto a street because "there are no restrictions that it only applies in certain situations or on certain roadways." Datzek v. State , 838 N.E.2d 1149, 1155 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied (2006). But that holding is not particularly instructive for the specific set of facts currently before us. Indeed, although Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-25 would presumably apply to all roadways, including roundabouts, as roundabouts are not specifically excluded from its ambit, we must recognize that this signaling provision was drafted well before roundabouts became widespread in our state. Moreover, any assumption that the signaling statute specifically applies to roundabouts fails to withstand scrutiny when the reality and logistics of roundabouts are considered.
[10] Indiana law defines "roundabout" as "a circular intersection or junction in which road traffic flows almost continuously in one (1) direction around a central island." Ind. Code § 9-13-2-157.5. Other than defining roundabouts, our legislature has enacted few traffic regulation statutes that expressly address roundabouts. For instance, our legislature has mandated that "[a]vehicle passing around a roundabout shall be driven only to the right of the roundabout's central island." Ind. Code § 9-21-8-10. Moreover, our legislature has reserved the right-of-way in roundabouts for vehicles with a total length of at least forty feet or a total width of at least ten feet. Ind. Code § 9-21-8-10.5. This is where this roundabout guidance, both literally and figuratively, begins and ends.
[11] We agree with the State that when motorists are entering a roundabout, they are simply following the roadway and continuing along the natural flow of the road, similar to when coming upon a curve in the road. Accordingly, it would be nonsensical to read the current turn signal statute as requiring motorists to activate their right-turn signals when entering a roundabout, especially if they simply mean to travel in a continuous lane and move through the roundabout. In that circumstance, the driver is not making a choice between alternatives that other motorists need to be alerted to for safety purposes; the driver is neither turning nor changing lanes, so there is nothing to signal.
[12] However, when the act of exiting a roundabout, as involved here, is considered, application of our current signaling law becomes even more problematic. As noted by the State, exiting a roundabout requires the driver to deviate from the natural circular flow of the roundabout. The driver must make a choice between various points of exit, a choice to which other motorists should arguably be notified. But, based upon our current turn signal law, how and when would a motorist be required to signal his exit from a roundabout? This simple question only generates more questions which demonstrate that our current turn signal statute is completely unworkable in this context.
[13] Must a motorist signal when exiting the roundabout...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. McBride
...Indiana Court of Appeals recently applied similar reasoning in considering this same issue under its state's laws. State v. Davis , 143 N.E.3d 343, 347-49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). The Davis court noted that the state's traffic laws expressly addressing roundabouts don't touch on signaling; its......
-
White v. State
...suspicion, is objective, and must ignore "the subjective understanding of the particular officer involved." State v. Davis , 143 N.E.3d 343, 349 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Heien , 574 U.S. at 66, 135 S.Ct. 530 ). The dispositive question is whether a reasonable officer, aware of the facts......
-
Mercado v. State
...apply to motorists exiting roundabouts was a mistake of law that rendered the ensuing traffic stop invalid. State v. Davis , 143 N.E.3d 343, 347-50 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (holding that the officer's mistake of law was unreasonable under Heien ). On the other hand, we have held that an officer......
-
Commonwealth v. Hill
...turn; court declined to "stretch" language of statute governing turn signals to make it apply to roundabouts); State v. Davis, 143 N.E.3d 343, 347 (Ind.App. 2020) (holding defendant did not violate turn signal statute when he did not signal upon exiting roundabout; any assumption that statu......