State v. Davis

Decision Date10 March 1970
Docket NumberNo. 53694,53694
Citation175 N.W.2d 407
PartiesSTATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. John Lee DAVIS, a/k/a David Lee Davis, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Ben E. Kubby and John P. Roehrick, Des Moines, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Michael J. Laughlin, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Ray A. Fenton, County Atty., for appellee.

MOORE, Chief Justice.

About 10:00 p.m. September 29, 1968, defendant was arrested with another juvenile, Carl Pilkington, after they were seen by two deputy sheriffs attempting to break and enter a garage owned by Mabel Edwards at 1712 Williams Street, Des Moines, Polk County, Iowa. After Miranda warnings each admitted participation in the attempt to enter the garage and were held in juvenile court custody.

On October 18 after reviewing the past record of defendant Davis the juvenile court judge found he was not amenable to the processes of the juvenile court and ordered the charge referred to the Polk County Attorney for action before the criminal division of the court. Defendant was thereafter indicted, tried, convicted and sentenced to a period of not to exceed five years in the men's reformatory for the crime of attempting to break and enter in violation of Code section 708.10. He has appealed. We affirm.

Defendant assigns one error: 'That the court erred in refusing to instruct upon the issue of entrapment as concerned an informant as the means by which the defense of entrapment could be established, thereby denying defendant of his right to be fully instructed upon all issues.'

Deputy Sheriff Robert Slycord testified that about 9:30 p.m. September 29, 1968 he and deputy Allgood stationed themselves near Mrs. Edwards' garage, in about 45 minutes they observed two men sneak up behind the garage, remove a window and one start to enter with the assistance of the other. The deputies moved closer and shined a flashlight on the two at the garage. Pilkington was immediately taken into custody but defendant Davis ran from the scene and was soon thereafter arrested at his mother's home about a block from the scene. Pilkington's home was also nearby.

Deputy Allgood gave like testimony. He knew Davis from earlier contacts and was able to identify him when the flashlight was used at the scene. Both deputies testified Pilkington and Davis were given warnings of their constitutional rights and on the way to jail each admitted attempting to break and enter Mrs. Edwards' garage that evening.

On cross-examination deputy Slycord state he was acquainted with Pilkington, he was in the area of 1712 Williams in the afternoon or early evening of September 29 and had a conversation with Pilkington. Slycord's cross-examination includes:

'Q. Yes. And at that time, Mr. Pilkington advised you that he was going to enter into that garage, isn't that true? A. That's true.

'Q. Yes. And he said that this defendant, did not want him to go into that garage, isn't that true? A. That's not true.

'Q. Isn't it true, Mr. Slycord, that you advised Mr. Pilkington to make the robbery or to proceed with the robbery? Isn't that true, sir? A. That's true, yes.

'The information that I received from Mr. Pilkington was the fact that he told me that he was going to rob the rear of the garage and break into the place that night. * * *

'Q. Well, in the afternoon or early evening of September 29, you did talk to Pilkington and you did tell him to perform the robbery is that right? A. I didn't tell him to, he told me he was going to.

'Q. And you told him to go ahead and do it, isn't that right? A. I told him to use his own judgment, because he was going to be the one that was in trouble.'

On redirect examination Slycord stated: 'When I had occasion to talk to Mr. Pilkington, earlier that day, I did not suggest the B. & E. to him or to break and enter, and I informed this person at that time that they would be arrested if they attempted to do this. There was no suggestion by me of continuing with this crime.'

On recross-examination Slycord stated: 'I did not do anything to prevent this minor from perpetrating the crime. All I told him was that I would put him under arrest for B. & E. if he did that.'

His redirect examination included: 'On the Direct Examination, I was asked whether or not I advised Mr. Pilkington to make the robbery or proceed with the robbery. What I meant by that was that if he went ahead with the robbery, he was going to get arrested for B. & E. I did not ever actually tell this individual to attempt to rob or break into this garage.'

After the State rested its case in chief and defendant's motion for a directed verdict had been overruled the State made a motion in limine out of the presence of the jury. It sought to avoid any inquiry by defense counsel of the outcome of any charges in juvenile court against Pilkington.

During discussion of the motion in limine the trial court asked what is 'the situation with Carl Pilkington?' to which the assistant county attorney responded: 'Apparently, Mr. Pilkington has been an informer for the sheriff's department and there has been a series of breakings and enterings in which Mr. Pilkington had been involved. Mr. Pilkington has given information on a series of these matters and action has been taken in some of these matters, but in this particular instance no action has been taken against Mr. Pilkington to the best of my knowledge.

'The only purpose that this would serve then in bringing this out before this jury at this time would be to prejudice the case against the State and leaving the inference that one person is being punished and the other is not, which is not the case in this particular situation.'

The trial court overruled the State's motion in limine. Trial in the presence of the jury was then resumed. No mention of the assistant county attorney's remarks was made in the presence of the jury.

Defendant testified he had known Carl Pilkington for approximately two years before the incident, a couple of days before September 29 Pilkington told him he was in trouble, he needed the tools in Mrs. Edwards' garage so he could get money to go to California and he said 'no' to Pilkington's suggestion they break into the garage. Defendant further testified that during the morning of September 29 Pilkington 'kept pressuring me to go with him that night' but he told Pilkington he would not go and Pilkington left. He stated that evening while riding around Pilkington again mentioned the tools and after again refusing he did go to the garage with Pilkington. He described how they surveyed the area before going to the rear of the garage and how a window was removed. He admitted running from the scene and later being arrested at his nearby home. He stated he was induced by Pilkington to go to the garage.

Defendant filed this requested instruction: 'You are further instructed that in this case the theory of the defense of the Defendant is the principle of entrapment. Entrapment is a complete, legal and proper defense and means that where the criminal design does not originate in the mind of the accused, but was the design originated in the mind of the entrapping officer or other person who lured the defendant into the commission of a crime...

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11 cases
  • State v. Mullen
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 27 Marzo 1974
    ...upon which the entrapment defense in Iowa is posited. We have recognized the defense as a part of our criminal law. State v. Davis, 175 N.W.2d 407, 410 (Iowa 1970). We have rightly held government action in merely providing the opportunity or facilities for the commission of crime does not ......
  • State v. Armstrong
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 20 Diciembre 1972
    ...* * 'The giving of instructions is governed largely by the evidence.' See also The Code, § 780.35; Iowa R.Civ.P. 196; State v. Davis, 175 N.W.2d 407, 410--411 (Iowa 1970); Sorensen Health Studio No. 11 v. McCoy, 261 Iowa 891, 896, 156 N.W.2d 341 (1968); Walker v. Sedrel, 260 Iowa 625, 632, ......
  • State v. Lamar, 54582
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 17 Octubre 1973
    ...the materiality of the law claimed applicable thereto. See State v. Armstrong, 203 N.W.2d 269, 274 (Iowa 1972); State v. Davis, 175 N.W.2d 407, 410--411 (Iowa 1970); 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § This means, a trial court is not required to instruct the jury on any issue which finds no evidenti......
  • State v. Overmann
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 28 Agosto 1974
    ...on entrapment. In support thereof, however, defendant did nothing more than request the instruction considered in State v. Davis, 175 N.W.2d 407, 409--410 (Iowa 1970), be given. The expressed reason was, he believed it 'more adequately states the law and is more favorable to the defendant i......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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