State v. Davis
Decision Date | 17 March 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 90,982.,90,982. |
Citation | 130 P.3d 69 |
Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Jeffrey L. DAVIS, Appellant. |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Melissa Kasprzyk, of Wright, Henson, Clark, Hutton, Mudrick & Gragson, LLP, of Topeka, was on the briefs for appellant.
Douglas W. McNett, assistant county attorney, and Phill Kline, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee.
Jeffrey L. Davis appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. After he was charged with rape, aggravated kidnapping, and battery, his attorney filed a motion to determine Davis' competency. Although the district magistrate judge ordered the competency determination, his order was returned without service on the hospital. Despite the lack of a competency determination, Davis' preliminary hearing, arraignment, and jury trial proceeded.
After Davis' convictions of two counts of rape and his accompanying sentence of 620 months' imprisonment were affirmed on appeal, he filed a motion alleging that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict him when it failed to suspend proceedings in order to determine his competency. A different district court judge from the trial judge conducted a hearing on the motion. After finding that Davis waived the illegal sentence issue by failing to raise it on his direct appeal, and after retroactively determining that Davis had been competent at the time of his trial 3 years earlier, the district court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed in State v. Davis, No. 90,982, 2004 WL 2160772, unpublished opinion filed September 24, 2004. We granted Davis' petition for review under K.S.A. 20-3018(b).
The issues on appeal, and our accompanying holdings, are as follows:
1. Did the second district court err in finding that Davis had waived the illegal sentence issue by failing to raise it on his direct appeal? Yes.
2. Once Davis' competency determination had been ordered, did the first district court err in proceeding through trial? Yes.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions.
On September 20, 1999, Jeffrey L. Davis was charged with the rape, aggravated kidnapping, and battery of 16-year-old L.L. in Larned on September 15, 1999. The next day C. Phillip Aldrich was appointed to represent Davis. On October 4, 1999, Aldrich withdrew and the court appointed Douglas Brunson.
On December 22, 1999, Brunson filed a motion to determine competency. After finding no objection from the State, the magistrate judge ordered "that a determination of competency to stand trial should be conducted at the Larned State Hospital." On January 14, 2000, the sheriff returned the order "by permission of the court for reasons defined by LSH [Larned State Hospital]." In other words, no competency evaluation of Davis was performed, and no competency determination was made, by the hospital.
Four months after the filing of the motion, on April 21, 2000, a preliminary hearing was conducted. Following the hearing, Davis was bound over on two counts of rape and one count of aggravated kidnapping.
On May 1, 2000, Davis filed a pro se motion to dismiss Brunson and appoint new counsel. Two days later, on May 3, 2000, the court appointed Julie Fletcher Cowell as Davis' third counsel. Although Cowell appeared with Davis at his arraignment on May 18, she withdrew as counsel 4 days later. On May 24, Andrew Brown was appointed as Davis' fourth counsel.
Brown represented Davis at the jury trial occurring on September 5-6, 2000, where Davis testified on his own behalf. The jury found Davis guilty of two counts of rape.
On September 11, 2000, Brown filed a motion for a new trial and a motion for judgment of acquittal. The trial court denied both motions. Davis was subsequently sentenced to a controlling term of 620 months' imprisonment.
Davis appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions, that the trial court erred in admitting an alleged prior inconsistent statement, and that the charges were multiplicitous. The Court of Appeals affirmed Davis' convictions in State v. Davis, No. 86,158, 53 P.3d 1254, unpublished opinion filed September 20, 2002, rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2002).
Four days later, on September 24, 2002, Davis filed a pro se motion to correct his sentence, pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3504(1) and K.S.A. 22-3402(1). On January 27, 2003, Davis filed a second pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3504(1). Both motions alleged that the trial court lacked jurisdiction when it failed to suspend proceedings in order to determine if Davis was competent to stand trial. On March 28, 2003, Davis filed a motion objecting to a retrospective determination of competency.
A district court judge different from the trial judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on June 20, 2003. There, Mark Schloemer, the Undersheriff of Pawnee County, testified he believed that the competency order had been returned because it was directed to the Larned State Hospital and not the Larned State Security Hospital. He opined that "the one word `security' being left out is significant to the hospital, because it is defined by State statute[;] they are separate entities."
Davis' former attorney, Douglas Brunson, also testified. Although he made a cursory examination of the file, he essentially testified from memory. Brunson stated that he had a lengthy prosecutorial tenure as the Kiowa County Attorney and had extensive experience during his 31 years of practicing law in criminal prosecutions and defense. He testified that he does not file many motions, and when he does, he feels that they are pertinent at the time. Brunson further testified that he assumed he had a good faith basis for the motion to determine competency when filed on December 22, 1999. He additionally stated that he probably talked to the county attorney about "the matter." According to Brunson, he had no distinct recollection of a formalized hearing on his motion but was sure the county attorney was notified. He assumed a hearing had been conducted and defendant Davis had been present because in his experience that was "normal" for competency motions and orders.
Brunson also testified that he did not have concerns about Davis' competency at the time of the preliminary hearing 4 months later:
However, on cross-examination Brunson candidly conceded that he did not hold a degree in psychology or any related field and could make a mistake regarding a client's competency.
The State also proffered the transcript of the May 2000 arraignment in which the district court judge and Davis spoke concerning Davis' understanding of his constitutional rights, the transcript of Davis' September 2000 trial testimony, and all of Davis' pro se motions.
On July 1, 2003, the second district court judge denied Davis' motion to correct an illegal sentence, stating:
The court further noted Davis waived the illegal sentence issue by failing to raise it on direct appeal, citing State v. Johnson, 269 Kan. 594, 7 P.3d 294 (2000).
Davis timely appealed. On September 24, 2004, the Court of Appeals held that it could correct an illegal sentence at any time, citing K.S.A. 22-3504(1). It affirmed, however, the district court's retrospective determination of Davis' competency and concluded the trial court had jurisdiction to conduct the trial in September 2000:
We granted Davis' petition for review.
Davis continues to argue that his sentence was illegal because the district court lacked jurisdiction when it failed to suspend proceedings once his competency to stand trial was in legitimate dispute. An illegal sentence includes one imposed by a court without jurisdiction. State v. Harper, 275 Kan. 888, 890, 69 P.3d 1105 (2003). The issue of whether a criminal sentence is illegal is a question of law. Our review of questions of law is unlimited. State v. Denney, 278 Kan. 643,...
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