State v. Ford
| Decision Date | 31 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | 109,806. |
| Citation | 302 Kan. 455,353 P.3d 1143 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Harold Glen FORD, Jr., Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Richard Ney, of Ney & Adams, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Krystal L. Vokins, of Cornwell & Vokins, of Olathe, was on the briefs for appellant.
Steven J. Obermeier, senior deputy district attorney, argued the cause, and Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee.
Consistent with due process protections imposed by the United States Supreme Court, if a district court has a reason to believe a defendant is incompetent to stand trial, K.S.A. 22–3302 requires the court to suspend criminal proceedings and conduct a competency hearing. In 1992, a district court presiding over Harold Glen Ford, Jr.'s, criminal case—in proceedings we will refer to as Ford I —ordered and received a competency evaluation. But there is no record of a subsequent competency hearing. Yet the Ford I court did not suspend proceedings and instead accepted Ford's guilty plea and sentenced him.
More recently—in proceedings we will refer to as Ford II —Ford filed a motion in district court to correct an illegal sentence, arguing the Ford I court lacked jurisdiction to convict him. The Ford II court conducted a retrospective competency hearing, found that Ford had been competent when he entered his plea, and denied Ford's motion. Ford appealed from that decision. His appeal and the State's arguments raise issues regarding: (1) whether a motion to correct an illegal sentence can be used to attack a conviction and (2) whether the district court appropriately applied State v. Murray, 293 Kan. 1051, 271 P.3d 739 (2012) (Murray I ), and State v. Davis, 281 Kan. 169, 130 P.3d 69 (2006), when it determined a retrospective competency hearing was feasible and could rectify the original error of failing to comply with K.S.A. 22–3302.
We hold that future movants cannot use a motion to correct an illegal sentence to claim a violation of K.S.A. 22–3302. We also hold that under the facts of this case a meaningful retrospective competency hearing is feasible and can rectify the district court's failure to comply with K.S.A. 22–3302 during Ford I. But a movant has a right to be present at a retrospective competency hearing. Because Ford was not present for the Ford II hearing and there is no indication he waived his right to be present, we reverse and remand for additional proceedings.
In 1992, after the State charged Ford with first-degree murder (or felony murder in the alternative), aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary, he filed a motion under K.S.A. 22–3302 to determine his competency to stand trial. In the Ford I proceedings, a district court granted the motion the next day, finding “there is reason to believe that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial in this matter and/or unable to aid in his defense.” On November 19, 1992, Dr. Robert Reitz of the Johnson County Mental Health Center sent Ford's completed mental health evaluation to the parties and to the court. He concluded:
The district court file-stamped the evaluation on November 23, 1992.
Ford's case proceeded. On February 12, 1993, the district court accepted Ford's guilty pleas to felony murder, aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Ford to life imprisonment for felony murder, 15 years to life for aggravated robbery, and 5 to 20 years for aggravated burglary. Each sentence was to run consecutively.
Approximately 17 years later, Ford filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, leading to the Ford II proceedings in the district court and this subsequent appeal. He alleged “a hearing was never held and [he] was never examined by a mental health professional” despite the Ford I court's order to determine his competency. Because the Ford I court failed to suspend proceedings and conduct a competency hearing as required by K.S.A. 22–3302, he argued his conviction and sentence were void for lack of jurisdiction. The State responded, attaching a written report of Ford's 1992 mental health evaluation. The State did not, however, point to anything in the court file or record that indicated Ford had received a competency hearing.
The Ford II court ordered a hearing on Ford's motion. Counsel represented Ford at the hearing, but Ford was not personally present. His attorney pointed out that the docket sheet in the Ford I proceedings did not include a specific mention of a competency hearing. Further, neither the court reporter notes nor a transcript could be located for Ford's preliminary hearing and at least one other hearing. The available transcripts did not contain a judicial determination of Ford's competency.
The State presented Ford's 1992 competency evaluation and the testimony of Ford's defense attorney and the assistant district attorney who prosecuted Ford's case. Ford's defense attorney testified that the evaluation would have been sent to the parties and the court. He further testified:
“I am sure that before we proceeded to the next phase of the litigation, there would have either been—either at that time I may have withdrawn my motion to determine competency or we would have waived any further addressing of the competency issue once we received determination by a competent psychiatrist or psychologist that the individual was competent.”
On cross-examination, Ford's counsel conceded he had no specific recollection of the hearing and there was no waiver or withdrawal of the motion on file. He could only guess that he might have withdrawn the Ford I competency motion orally during one of the undocumented hearings.
The assistant district attorney who prosecuted the Ford I proceedings testified to her recollection of standard court procedure after a court-ordered competency evaluation. She indicated the parties and the court would typically discuss the results of the evaluation at the first hearing following its receipt. At the hearing, the parties would have acknowledged receipt of the evaluation, then defense counsel would have withdrawn the motion to determine competency or the court would have made a competency determination. But the prosecutor could not specifically remember what happened in Ford's case nor confirm that this standard procedure had been followed.
After hearing the testimony of Ford's defense attorney and the assistant district attorney, the district court in the Ford II proceedings found that “a competency evaluation was conducted in this case; however, no documentation was found in the docket sheet or other documentation suggesting there was a hearing conducted to determine the competency of Harold Glen Ford, Jr., as required by K.S.A. § 22–3302(1).”
The Ford II district court also explored the issue of Ford's substantive competency during the Ford I proceedings. The State relied heavily on Ford's November 1992 competency evaluation. According to that evaluation, Ford had “no history of previous psychiatric hospitalizations or treatment.” He presented “no evidence of a thought disorder or other psychotic process such as persecutory delusions
, grandiosity and auditory or visual hallucination.” Ford understood the nature of the adversarial process, and was “keenly aware of the severe consequences he faces should he be convicted.” Importantly, Ford appeared “able to assist his attorney,” and the evaluating psychologist concluded that Ford was competent “to stand trial as defined by K.S.A. 22–3301.”
Along with the evaluation, Ford's defense counsel and the prosecutor testified regarding their observations of Ford. Both indicated they never had a concern that Ford was incompetent. Defense counsel explained he asked for a competency hearing after Ford's mother repeatedly questioned why her son would have committed murder and wondered if there was a mental health issue. Counsel indicated he filed the motion in part for her and also out of a general abundance of caution given the serious charges. The prosecutor testified she routinely agreed to defense motions for a mental evaluation and the court routinely granted those motions. Beyond recalling routine practices, she also specifically remembered Ford, in part because she met with him to see whether he would testify against his codefendant after entering his plea. The prosecutor indicated she had no concerns about Ford's mental capacity during his case or at their later meeting.
Based on the evaluation and the attorneys' testimony, the Ford II court denied Ford's motion to correct an illegal sentence, concluding Ford had been competent and that his convictions and sentences were valid.
Ford's attorney failed to timely appeal the denial of Ford's motion to correct an illegal sentence. Eventually, the district court granted Ford's request to appeal out of time. We have jurisdiction under K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22–3601(b)(3) ().
Ford relies on both constitutional and statutory arguments to assert the Ford I court violated his procedural due process rights by not conducting a competency hearing. “[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the criminal prosecution of a defendant who is not competent to stand trial.” Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 439, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992) ; see Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171–72, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Cheever
...P.3d 136 (2014) (appellate courts will not consider new issues raised for first time in Rule 6.09[b] letter). But see State v. Ford, 302 Kan. 455, 463, 353 P.3d 1143 (2015) (court may correct illegal sentence at any time; subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time). These authori......
-
State v. Cheever
...136 (2014) (appellate courts will not consider new issues raised for first time in Rule 6.09[b] letter). But see State v. Ford , 302 Kan. 455, 463, 353 P.3d 1143 (2015) (court may correct illegal sentence at any time; subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time).These authorities ......
-
State v. Cheever
...136 (2014) (appellate courts will not consider new issues raised for first time in Rule 6.09[b] letter). But see State v. Ford , 302 Kan. 455, 463, 353 P.3d 1143 (2015) (court may correct illegal sentence at any time; subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time). These authorities......
-
State v. Delacruz
...defective charging documents do not deprive state courts of subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate criminal cases); State v. Ford , 302 Kan. 455, 465, 353 P.3d 1143 (2015) (disapproving of precedent that had referred to procedural errors in the determination of defendant's competency to ......
-
Appellate Decisions
...retrospectively determine a defendant's competency. Here, three McGregor factors are discussed with factual comparison to State v. Ford, 302 Kan. 455 (2015), and State v. Murray, 302 Kan. 478 (2015). All three factors support the district court's ruling that a retrospective competency deter......