State v. Davis

Decision Date08 July 2005
Docket NumberNo. 2003-622-C.A.,2003-622-C.A.
PartiesSTATE v. John DAVIS.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court

Lauren Sandler Zurier, Esq., Providence, for Plaintiff.

Janice M. Weisfeld, Esq., Providence, for Defendant.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION

GOLDBERG, Justice.

In this appeal, the defendant, John Davis (defendant or Davis), asks this Court to set aside his judgments of conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to rob and for breaking and entering and to remand this case for a new trial. The defendant alleges that the trial justice erroneously denied his motion for a new trial. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgments.

Facts and Travel

This crime was a brutal home invasion spanning two apartments in a multifamily dwelling in Providence. The events leading up to this crime began one Friday night in late September 1999, when Michael P. Lizotte (Lizotte) met defendant at a bar. Over the next two weekends, they spent time together at Lizotte's apartment. Lizotte told defendant that he would return from work at 8 p.m. on October 4, 1999, and they made arrangements to meet that evening at Lizotte's apartment.

At around 6:30 p.m., Lizotte's upstairs neighbor, Carlo Catucci (Catucci), answered a knock at his door, and a masked man, later identified as defendant, pushed his way into the apartment and thrust a knife to Catucci's throat. According to Catucci, the man wore a "white tee shirt with a black design of black concentric circles on the front." The assailant forced Catucci to the floor, facedown, tied his hands together, and placed a plastic bag over his face. Catucci then heard two sets of footsteps, signaling the arrival of a second intruder, and both assailants began kicking him. They removed the plastic bag but placed a cloth bag over Catucci's head and gagged his mouth. The intruders proceeded to ransack his apartment, knocking some of Catucci's computer equipment to the floor; this caused Lizotte, who had arrived home early, to shout to Catucci about the noise. Realizing that Lizotte had arrived, the intruders went downstairs to victimize him, affording Catucci an opportunity to free his hands and uncover his head.

When the original intruder returned to his apartment, Catucci was on his knees with his hands free. His attacker was now unmasked, affording Catucci an opportunity to see the man's face. Catucci was stabbed with a knife that was smaller than the first knife; the assailant pinned Catucci against the wall and repeatedly asked him: "Are you friends with your downstairs neighbor?" When Catucci answered "yes," the man led Catucci down the hallway and pushed him down the stairs. Catucci landed at the bottom of the first set of stairs, and he was kicked and punched repeatedly while tumbling down a second set of stairs. At this point the second intruder came from the basement, and he kicked and stepped on Catucci as he walked out the door. Catucci testified that the wounds he suffered in this attack required surgery and a six-day hospital stay.

When the police presented Catucci with a photo array at the hospital, he identified defendant's photograph as his attacker and informed the officers that he was "one hundred percent" sure of his identification.

Lizotte testified that he arrived home earlier than he expected, and when he heard noise from the upstairs apartment, he jokingly yelled to Catucci to "stop making a racket up there." Lizotte testified that he found it unusual that Catucci did not respond. After Lizotte had been in his apartment for a few moments, he answered a knock at his door and was confronted by a masked man dressed in a green army jacket and dark pants. The intruder was armed with a large knife. He wrestled Lizotte to the floor and pressed the knife against his throat. The man stabbed him and tried to strangle him. After a blanket was thrown over Lizotte's body, a second person unsuccessfully attempted to tie his feet. Lizotte testified that he heard a series of whistles from upstairs, followed by Catucci screaming that he had been stabbed. At this point, Lizotte, who was left alone, managed to escape to a neighbor's home.

A grand jury issued a four-count indictment against defendant: count 1, assault with a dangerous weapon of Catucci, in a dwelling, with intent to murder, in violation of G.L.1956 § 11-5-4; count 2, assault with a dangerous weapon of Catucci, in a dwelling, with intent to rob, in violation of § 11-5-4; count 3, assault with a dangerous weapon of Lizotte, in a dwelling, with intent to murder, in violation of § 11-5-4; and count 4, breaking and entering Catucci's apartment, in violation of G.L.1956 § 11-8-2.

At trial, Catucci testified that he was able to see his attacker's face during the struggle and identified defendant as the man wearing the white tee shirt who had assaulted and stabbed him. Catucci identified the knife that defendant used when he first entered his apartment, and that knife was marked exhibit No. 8. Catucci admitted that he did not observe a scar on his attacker, although there was a visible scar on defendant's face.

At trial, Lizotte identified the knife marked exhibit No. 8 as the knife wielded by his attacker. Lizotte testified to the injuries he suffered, including stab wounds and bruises, and explained that the capillaries in his eyes burst when he was choked, causing his eyes to fill with blood. Lizotte testified that, based upon the attacker's physical characteristics, defendant could have been the masked man who initially attacked him, but he did not make a positive identification.

Detective Robert Badessa of the Providence Police Department testified that the knife, marked exhibit No. 8, was found in a blue gym bag at the crime scene, and an examination revealed defendant's fingerprints on the knife.

The jury found defendant guilty of count 2—assaulting Catucci with a dangerous weapon, in a dwelling, with intent to rob—and count 4—breaking and entering Catucci's apartment—and returned verdicts of not guilty on counts 1 and 3—assaulting Catucci and Lizotte with intent to murder. After the jury returned its verdict, defendant moved to dismiss, for an arrest of judgment, and for a new trial. The trial justice heard and denied defendant's motions. On count 2, defendant was sentenced to a term of forty years, twenty-five years to serve, and the balance suspended with probation, and a consecutive ten-year sentence as a habitual offender; and on count 4, defendant was sentenced to an additional consecutive ten-year suspended sentence, with probation. This appeal ensued.

Issues Presented

The defendant assigns two grounds of error to the trial justice's denial of his motion for a new trial. Davis argues that by not discussing the conflicting testimony surrounding the identification of the person who entered Catucci's apartment and stabbed him, the trial justice failed to consider all the material evidence. Also, defendant contends that a new trial was warranted because the jury verdict did not disclose whether the jury unanimously convicted defendant of the offenses charged as a principal or as an aider and abettor. We affirm the judgment.

Standard of Review

"In deciding a motion for a new trial, the trial justice acts as a thirteenth juror and exercises independent judgment on the credibility of witnesses and on the weight of the evidence." State v. Salvatore, 763 A.2d 985, 990-91 (R.I.2001) (quoting State v. Banach, 648 A.2d 1363, 1367 (R.I.1994)). When ruling on a motion for a new trial, the trial justice must perform three analyses:

"First, `the trial justice must consider the evidence in light of the charge to the jury, a charge that is presumably correct and fair to the defendant.' * * * Next, the trial justice should form his or her own opinion of the evidence. * * *
In doing so, `[t]he trial justice must * * * weigh the credibility of the witnesses and [the] other evidence and choose which conflicting testimony and evidence to accept and which to reject.' * * * Finally, `the trial justice must determine by an individual assessment of the evidence and in light of the charge to the jury, whether the justice would have reached a different result from that of the jury.'" Id. at 991 (quoting Banach, 648 A.2d at 1367).

We will disturb the trial justice's judgment only "if the trial justice has overlooked or misconceived material evidence relating to a critical issue or if the justice was otherwise clearly wrong." Id. (quoting Banach, 648 A.2d at 1367). "In cases in which the trial justice has articulated a sufficient rationale for denying a motion for a new trial, the decision will be given great weight." Id. (quoting Banach, 648 A.2d at 1367). The record, therefore, should disclose "a few sentences of the [trial] justice's reasoning on each point" and that the trial justice "cite[d] evidence sufficient to allow this [C]ourt" to determine whether the appropriate standards were applied. Id. (quoting Banach, 648 A.2d at 1367).

Discussion

In denying defendant's motion for a new trial, the trial justice referred to evidence presented by the state that supported the jury's verdict. The trial justice recounted Catucci's testimony that he had an opportunity to view his assailant's face and "distinctive looking tee shirt." He also noted that Catucci identified Davis's photograph from a photo array and told a police detective that he was "one hundred percent" confident of his identification. The trial justice discussed the fact that Davis's fingerprints were discovered on the bigger knife and that Catucci identified that knife as the weapon his assailant used when he first entered the apartment. Also, the trial justice declared that he had "no doubt that [Catucci's] testimony was credible and that his identification was well-founded." The trial justice agreed with the jury's verdict and denied defendant's motion for a new trial.

We are satisfied that...

To continue reading

Request your trial
34 cases
  • State v. Delestre
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • 12 Enero 2012
    ...a jury must agree unanimously as to whether a defendant acted as a principal or as an aider and abettor in State v. Davis. See 877 A.2d 642 (R.I.2005). On appeal, defendant relies on some language in our opinion in Davis as the basis for his contention that, for a conviction to be sustainab......
  • State v. Pona, 2005-95-C.A.
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • 15 Junio 2007
    ...the credibility of witnesses and on the weight of the evidence." State v. Stansell, 909 A.2d 505, 511 (R.I.2006) (quoting State v. Davis, 877 A.2d 642, 646 (R.I.2005)). "It is incumbent upon the trial justice to `pass upon the weight and credibility of the evidence and accept or reject conf......
  • State v. Dipetrillo
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • 17 Mayo 2007
    ...(1952) ("[T]he prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime charged * * *."); State v. Davis, 877 A.2d 642, 648 (R.I.2005) ("The state bears the burden of proving `every element necessary to constitute the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.'" ......
  • Jaiman v. State
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • 16 Noviembre 2012
    ...“defendant's manner of participation, whether as a principal or [as] an aider or abettor, is not an element of the crime.” State v. Davis, 877 A.2d 642, 648 (R.I.2005) (emphasis added). The prosecution is not required to “persuade a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt” with respect to ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT