State v. Davis
| Decision Date | 11 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. E2013-02073-SC-R11-CD.,E2013-02073-SC-R11-CD. |
| Citation | 484 S.W.3d 138 |
| Parties | State of Tennessee v. William Whitlow Davis, Jr. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
William W. Davis, Jr., pro se (on appeal), Knoxville, Tennessee, and Donald A. Bosch and Ann Short (at trial), Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, William Whitlow Davis, Jr.
Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée S. Blumstein, Solicitor General; Leslie E. Price, Senior Counsel; Randall E. Nichols, District Attorney General; and Sarah Winningham Keith, Assistant District Attorney, for the appellee, the State of Tennessee.
OPINION
We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether the traffic stop of the Defendant, William Whitlow Davis, Jr., violated the constitutional rights of the Defendant. The arresting officer initiated the stop after observing the Defendant cross the double yellow center lane lines with the two left wheels of the Defendant's car. The Defendant subsequently was charged with driving under the influence and a traffic violation. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress, contending that the traffic stop was unconstitutional. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Defendant then pleaded guilty to driving under the influence and reserved a certified question of law regarding the legality of his traffic stop. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment. We hold that the traffic stop was supported by probable cause. Therefore, we affirm the Defendant's judgment of conviction.
The Defendant was charged in August 2010 with two alternative counts of driving under the influence and one count of failing to drive within a single lane in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55–8–123 (2008). The Defendant filed a motion to suppress on the basis that his traffic stop was unconstitutional. At the ensuing hearing, held in August 2013, the following proof was adduced:
Officer Jerry Massey of the Knox County Sheriff's Office testified that, while he was on patrol on October 23, 2009, he received a "be on the lookout" ("BOLO") from dispatch concerning a green BMW. The information he received indicated that the driver "had a loaded handgun in the vehicle and was under the influence." Based on the information in the BOLO, Officer Massey drove to a parking lot at the corner of Northshore Drive and Keller Bend Road and parked. Approximately twenty-five minutes later, he saw a green BMW being driven south on Keller Bend Road. Officer Massey described Keller Bend Road as a curvy, two-lane road without shoulders.
Officer Massey began following the BMW. He testified, Officer Massey stated that he determined the BMW's speed by "pac[ing]" the car while he followed it for approximately one quarter of a mile.
Officer Massey stated that he turned on his cruiser's video camera and again saw the Defendant cross the double yellow center lane lines. Officer Massey turned on his emergency lights, and the Defendant pulled over into a driveway on the right-hand side of Keller Bend Road. When Officer Massey spoke with the Defendant, he noticed "a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from his breath" and "slurred speech."
On cross-examination, Officer Massey acknowledged that he did not find a weapon in the BMW after he searched it. Nor did he find a weapon on the Defendant's person.
The video recording made from Officer Massey's cruiser was played in court during cross-examination. The recording shows the BMW crossing the double yellow center lane lines while negotiating a right-hand curve prior to Officer Massey turning on the cruiser's blue lights. Officer Massey acknowledged that the recording began at 2:28:22, and he explained that, for the first nineteen seconds of the video, he was driving fast enough to catch up to the BMW. Officer Massey stated that there was no oncoming traffic at the time he saw the BMW cross the center lines with its two left wheels. Officer Massey testified that his basis for stopping the Defendant was the "lane violation" and the BOLO.
After Officer Massey's testimony, the defense submitted a video of Keller Bend Road which was admitted into evidence without objection.
On the basis of this proof, the trial court denied the Defendant's motion to suppress.1 The court found that, The trial court found that none of the exceptions contained in section –115 were applicable to the BMW's line crossing and concluded that, based on his observation of the BMW crossing the center lane lines, Officer Massey had "reasonable and articulable facts" to stop the vehicle. The trial court ruled, The trial court also found that the proof did not support Officer Massey's conclusion that the Defendant had been speeding.
The Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to one count of driving under the influence2 and reserved the following certified question of law:
In the early morning hours of October 23, 2009, Knox County Sheriff's Deputy Massey3 observed a vehicle driven by the Defendant traveling on Keller Bend Road in Knox County. Deputy Massey effected a seizure of the Defendant by activating his emergency lights, in response to which the Defendant stopped his vehicle. Deputy Massey subsequently arrested the Defendant and took him into custody for the offense of DUI. Did the trial court correctly conclude that the State carried its burden to show that the traffic stop of the Defendant was justified by reasonable suspicion or probable cause that a criminal offense had been or was about to be committed, based on the manner in which the Defendant was operating his vehicle on Keller Bend Road?
(Footnote added). The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment on the merits, concluding that Officer Massy had both probable cause and reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant. See State v. Davis, No. E2013–02073–CCA–R3–CD, 2014 WL 6883628, at *3 (Tenn.Crim.App. Dec. 8, 2014). We subsequently granted the Defendant's application for permission to appeal.
We will uphold a trial court's findings of fact at a suppression hearing unless the evidence preponderates to the contrary. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn.1996). "Questions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact." Id."We afford to the party prevailing in the trial court the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that evidence." State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Tenn.1998). As to the trial court's application of the law to the facts, however, we apply a de novo standard of review. Id.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no [w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Likewise, Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution provides that "the people shall be secure ... from unreasonable searches and seizures." Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7. This Court has stated that the Tennessee Constitution's search and seizure provision "is identical in intent and purpose with the Fourth Amendment." Sneed v. State, 221 Tenn. 6, 423 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tenn.1968) ; see also, e.g., State v. Scarborough, 201 S.W.3d 607, 622 (Tenn.2006). Accordingly, "under both the federal and state constitutions, a warrantless search or seizure is presumed unreasonable, and evidence discovered as a result thereof is subject to suppression unless the State demonstrates that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn.1997) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) ; State v. Bartram, 925 S.W.2d 227, 229–30 (Tenn.1996) ). A police officer seizes a motorist when he turns on his blue lights in order to pull the motorist over. See State v. Pulley, 863 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tenn.1993).
One of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement is met when a police officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a criminal offense. State v. Echols, 382 S.W.3d 266, 277–78 (Tenn.2012) ; see also Tenn.Code Ann. § 40–7–103(a)(1) (2006) (). "It is well established that a traffic violation—however minor—creates probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle." United States v. Barry, 98 F.3d 373, 376 (8th Cir.1996) (quoting United States v. Barahona, 990 F.2d 412, 416 (8th Cir.1993) ) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Berrios, 235 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tenn.2007) (); State v....
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