State v. Davis
| Decision Date | 26 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | SC 20335 |
| Citation | 344 Conn. 122,277 A.3d 1234 |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Brock DAVIS |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Pamela S. Nagy, supervisory assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott, state's attorney, Gail P. Hardy, former state's attorney, and John F. Fahey, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.
In State v. Davis , 338 Conn. 458, 460, 258 A.3d 633 (2021), this court agreed with the defendant, Brock Davis, that, on two separate occasions, the trial court improperly failed to inquire into whether defense counsel, Kirstin B. Coffin, had a conflict of interest.1 We therefore remanded the case to that court for a determination of whether Coffin did, in fact, have such a conflict and, if so, whether it adversely affected her representation of the defendant. Id., at 460, 475, 258 A.3d 633. Because a new trial would have been required if the trial court answered these two questions in the affirmative, we did not reach the defendant's additional claim that the trial court had improperly admitted into evidence testimony from lay witnesses identifying him in a surveillance video recording.2 Id., at 479, 258 A.3d 633.
In accordance with this court's remand order, the trial court, following a hearing, determined that the defendant had failed to establish that Coffin was burdened by an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected her performance. On appeal, the defendant challenges that determination. We reject this claim, and, because we also reject the defendant's remaining claim, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The defendant was convicted of murder in connection with the stabbing death of the victim, Joseph Lindsey, on December 9, 2015, in Hartford. Id., at 460–61, 258 A.3d 633. Following his conviction, the defendant was sentenced to a term of incarceration of fifty years. Id., at 460, 258 A.3d 633. On appeal to this court, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had violated his right to the effective assistance of counsel by failing to conduct any inquiry into Coffin's alleged conflict of interest when the issue was twice brought to the court's attention—first in a motion to dismiss counsel, which the defendant filed as a self-represented party on May 24, 2017,3 and again during the defendant's sentencing hearing on June 5, 2019.4 Id., at 460, 469, 258 A.3d 633. We agreed with the defendant that the trial court had a duty on both occasions to inquire into Coffin's alleged conflict of interest. Id., at 469, 258 A.3d 633. However, because we could not determine, on the basis of the record before us, whether the defendant's conflict of interest claim had any merit, we remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of that question. Id., at 475, 258 A.3d 633. Specifically, we instructed the trial court to conduct a hearing at which the defendant would have the burden of establishing "(1) that [Coffin] actively represented conflicting interests and (2) that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected [Coffin's] performance." (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 477, 258 A.3d 633. The court was further instructed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in writing, to be filed with the Office of the Appellate Clerk for our review. Id., at 478, 258 A.3d 633. We did not address the defendant's remaining claim that the trial court had improperly admitted into evidence testimony from three lay witnesses identifying him in surveillance video footage, concluding that, if necessary, we would reach that claim when the trial court submitted its written findings to us. Id., at 479, 258 A.3d 633.
On remand, the trial court, Gold , J., conducted a hearing at which both the defendant and Coffin testified. The defendant testified that the conflict of interest alleged in his May 24, 2017 motion to dismiss counsel was premised on Coffin's prior representation of Tristan Durant—the son of the victim in this case—which the defendant stated he learned about during a February, 2017 meeting with Coffin at the prison where he was being held. The defendant testified that he was "shocked" to learn of Coffin's prior representation of Durant and immediately asked Coffin to recuse herself, which she declined to do. When asked why he did not raise the issue with the trial court the next time he was in court, on March 29, 2017, the defendant stated that he is "a layman" and "kind of froze up."
Coffin testified that, based on her case file notes, the prison visit in question occurred on January 9, 2018, not in February, 2017, as the defendant had stated. Coffin also testified that the issue of her prior representation of Durant arose because, a day before her meeting with the defendant, while reviewing a supplemental police report in the defendant's case, it had come to her attention that Durant was the victim's son. Upon learning of Durant's connection to the case, Coffin spoke to the trial prosecutor, who assured her that Durant, with whom the police had spoken only briefly during their investigation of the victim's murder, would not be called as a state's witness because he had nothing relevant to offer about the crime. Coffin stated that, when she met with the defendant the next day, she informed him about her prior representation of Durant. According to Coffin, the defendant "didn't have a problem with it," did not ask that she withdraw her representation, and did not mention the matter again until his sentencing hearing on June 5, 2019.
On January 3, 2022, the trial court issued a memorandum of decision in which it concluded that the defendant had failed to establish that Coffin was burdened by an actual conflict of interest as a result of her prior representation of Durant. Because a court's duty to inquire into an attorney's potential conflict of interest is triggered only when the issue is raised in a timely manner; see, e.g., State v. Vega , 259 Conn. 374, 389, 788 A.2d 1221, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 836, 123 S. Ct. 152, 154 L. Ed. 2d 56 (2002) ; the court began its analysis with findings related to that issue. Specifically, the court found that "Coffin's testimony regarding when she disclosed to the defendant her prior representation of ... Durant, and how the defendant reacted to that disclosure, provide[d] the accurate account of the events that transpired." In so finding, the court credited Coffin's testimony that the defendant had first learned of her representation of Durant during a prison visit on January 9, 2018, approximately nine months after the defendant filed his May, 2017 motion to dismiss counsel, and not in February, 2017, as the defendant claimed. The court observed that Coffin's ability to pinpoint the precise date of the disclosure was not based solely on memory but, rather, on " ‘very detailed notes’ " she had taken for her file. On the basis of this finding, the court determined that Coffin's representation of Durant could not have been the basis of the nondescript conflict of interest mentioned in the defendant's May, 2017 motion.5 The court further found that the defendant's objection to Coffin's representation of Durant at the time of his sentencing was not timely raised because, by that time, the defendant had known about Coffin's potential conflict for nearly eighteen months. In the court's view, the defendant, for strategic reasons, had "sat silent for eighteen months waiting to see how his trial would turn out" and, then, only after being convicted, brought his alleged concern regarding Coffin's representation of Durant to the court's attention.
The court further determined that, "[e]ven if it were to overlook the untimely nature of the defendant's claim and [to] consider how ... Coffin's representation of ... Durant may have impacted her ability to defend the defendant," it would conclude that the defendant had "failed to sustain his burden of establishing that ... Coffin actively represented conflicting interests that adversely affected her performance." Specifically, the court credited Coffin's testimony that she had represented Durant in May, 2014, in connection with misdemeanor domestic violence charges and that her representation encompassed two court appearances during that same month, the latter of which marked the resolution of the case by plea agreement. The court also credited Coffin's testimony that she never met the victim while representing Durant and had no reason to think Durant possessed any information relevant to the defendant's case. The court further found that (1) Coffin did not acquire any information during the course of her representation of Durant that, due to her ongoing duty of loyalty to him, she was prevented from using in her defense of the defendant, (2) Coffin was told by the prosecutor that Durant would not be called as a state's witness during the defendant's trial, and (3) the strategies and tactics Coffin employed on behalf of the defendant were unencumbered and uninfluenced by anything relating to her prior representation of Durant. In sum, the court credited Coffin's testimony that she did not view her prior representation of Durant as creating any sort of conflict that would detract from her representation of the defendant. In light of these findings, the court concluded that, even if the defendant had asserted a timely objection to Coffin's alleged conflict of interest, he failed to demonstrate that such a conflict actually existed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as needed.
We first consider the defendant's claim that the trial court incorrectly concluded that Coffin's prior representation of Durant did not create an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected her representation of the...
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