State v. Dawes
| Decision Date | 08 June 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 37677,37677 |
| Citation | 404 P.2d 20,66 Wn.2d 578 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Petitioner and Relator, v. Roy A. DAWES and Ruth Dawes, his wife, Tacoma Savings & Loan Association, a corporation, C. H. Laubach and Ann M. Laubach, his wife, Harry M. Sather and Katherine E. Sather, his wife, Pierce County, and City of Sumner, a municipal corporation, Respondents, Superior Court of the State of Washington for Pierce County, John D. Cochran, Judge, Additional Respondent. |
John J. O'Connell, Atty. Gen., Theodore O. Torve, Delbert W. Johnson, Asst. Attys. Gen., Olympia, for petitioner.
Eisenhower & Carlson, Paul Sinnitt, Willis C. Oldfield, Tacoma, John G. McCutcheon, Pros. Atty., Thomas M. Baker, Jr., Tacoma, for respondents.
This is a sequel to the case of State ex rel. Dawes v. Washington State Highway Commission, 63 Wash.2d 34, 385 P.2d 376 (1963), in which we found that, as a condition precedent to the maintenance of an action of eminent domain, the Highway Commission had afforded respondent Dawes, as an abutting property owner, a hearing pursuant to RCW 47.52.072--47.52.075.
By writ of certiorari, the state now seeks a review of an order adjudicating public use in the action of eminent domain. The order grants in part the property and property rights sought by the state as described in the petition and notice in condemnation, but denies an adjudication of public use for a portion of respondents' property.
The following sketch, prepared by the court from various exhibits, is for illustrative purposes only. Engineering accuracy is not claimed.
We expand the facts set forth in our prior opinion.
Linden Drive in the City of Summer extends north and south. (Generally, it extends northeasterly--southwesterly, but for ease of reference we assume the northsouth decription.) It is the present route of Primary State Highway No. 5. The Washington State Highway Commission, deeming it necessary to relocate P.S.H. No. 5, instructed the Director of Highways to prepare a plan for the establishment of a limited-access highway. The plans as proposed establish a freeway extending east to west and passing under Linden Drive at substantially right angles to it. Linden Drive will be elevated approximately ten feet above its present level.
Respondents are the owners of 1.95 acres of valuable income property located, for the most part, in the northwest quadrant formed by the overpass intersection of Linden Drive and the proposed freeway. The property is indentified on the sketch by the double line. The east side of the property abuts Linden Drive for about 225 feet. It is important to note that the north boundary of the property abuts Le Grange Street, which extends to an intersection with Hunts Avenue, Thompson Street and Linden Drive.
In general the state's plan calls for the construction of a 'partial cloverleaf' interchange having two western quadrants as illustrated by the 'EL' and 'ER' loops on the chart. As proposed, 'EL' would leave the freeway, pass under Linden Drive, curve north, cross Le Grange Street, curve southeast, cross the northeast corner of respondents' property, and lead into Linden Drive on a tangent. Thus, west bound traffic would leave the freeway on the 'EL' off-ramp, traverse the loop, make a 'free right turn' and proceed south on Linden Drive. In addition to the necessary right of way, the state seeks to condemn all of respondents' property encompassed by the 'EL' off-ramp loop and Linden Drive. The area within the confine of the interchange would be leveled, graded and seeded.
Shorn of legal descriptions and technicalities, the order adjudicating public use permits the state to condemn that portion of the Dawes property necessary to construct P.S.H No. 5 as a limited-access highway and that portion lying within the 'ER' loop. The court further found:
that there is no legitimate reason and it is not necessary to take the * * * (Dawes) property within the loop formed by the EL line and the DL line. * * * A connection can be made with Le Grange Street (from P.S.H. No. 5) allowing traffic to go to the intersection that exists between Hunt(s) and Thompson and to proceed in the same manner as traffic now proceeds in that area without the necessity of any continuous loop in the area of the property owned by * * * (Dawes). The court further finds that a taking of any property that might be needed of the * * * (Dawes) to get to a point where it could properly connect with Le Grange and thence into Hunt(s) and Thompson Avenues would be proper, but not beyond that point nor any right to limit or restrict access to Le Grange Street or Linden Drive.
In short, the trial court 're-engineered' the northwest quadrant of the partial cloverleaf by (1) eliminating that portion of the 'EL' loop north of Le Grange Street; (2) holding that state acquisition of the property within the 'EL' loop was not for a public purpose; and (3) permitting access from the abutting property to both Le Grange Street and Linden Drive, thereby destroying the very characteristics of a limited-access highway.
A plethora of statute and decisional law has been made applicable to roads and highways since the day they were simply an opening through the forest, Conestoga wagon tracks across the plains, or a trial over a mountain pass. During the past two decades or so, in a constant search to improve the method of transporting persons and goods safely by motor vehicles, a new dimension has been added--freeways, limited-access highways, overhead crossings, ramps, acceleration and deceleration lanes, partial cloverleafs, cloverleafs, split-level interchanges, and a multitude of new engineering and constructional concepts.
This development has raised many novel questions of conflicts of theory between the planners of limited-access highways and owners of abutting properties. One legal writer expressed it thus: Reconciliation of public highway use and private land use must be achieved within the constitutional limitations which define the public's power to appropriate or regulate private property for the benefit of the public welfare. These constitutional concepts are as abstract as the concept of the highway itself. Not surprisingly, therefore, this doctrine of reconciliation is in perpetual evolution. Netherton, Control of Highway Access at 10 (University of Wisconsin Press 1963).
The first law authorizing limited-access facilities in this state was enacted in 1947. Rem.Rev.Stat. (1947 Supp.) §§ 6402--60 to 6402--70. When the statute was amended in 1951 the legislature made the following declaration of policy:
Unrestricted access to and from public highways has resulted in congestion and peril for the traveler. It has caused undue slowing of all traffic in many areas. The investment of the public in highway facilities has been impaired and highway...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hallauer v. Spectrum Properties, Inc.
... ... The authority to condemn a right of way to transport water has long existed in this state, both by constitutional and statutory provisions. The chief question posed by this case is whether the showing of necessity to condemn a right of way ... See State v. Belmont Improvement Co., 80 Wash.2d 438, 442-43, 495 P.2d 635 (1972) ; State v. Dawes, 66 Wash.2d 578, 583, 404 P.2d 20 (1965) ... Also, the public interest condition and the necessity condition "are generally subsumed under the ... ...
-
King County v. Farr
... Page 600 ... 7 Wn.App. 600 ... 501 P.2d 612 ... KING COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of ... Washington, Respondent, ... Sheldon G. FARR et al., Petitioners ... No. 1316--I ... Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1, Panel ... City of Des Moines v. Hemenway, 73 Wash.2d 130, 437 P.2d 171 (1968); State v ... Page 603 ... Dawes, 66 Wash.2d 578, 404 P.2d 20 (1965); State ex rel. Sternoff v. Superior Court, 52 Wash.2d 282, 325 P.2d 300 (1958). A determination that an ... ...
-
Cowlitz County v. Martin, 34943-4-II.
...165 P.3d 51 ... 140 Wn. App. 170 ... COWLITZ COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Washington, Respondent, ... L. Carlyle MARTIN and Linda C. Martin, husband and wife; Lawrence Olstad and Roberta Kelly, husband and wife; ... Hemenway, 73 Wash.2d at 138-39, 437 P.2d 171; State v. Dawes, 66 Wash.2d 578, 404 P.2d 20 (1965); State ex rel. Sternoff v. Superior Court of King County, 52 Wash.2d 282, 325 P.2d 300 (1958).6 ... ...
-
State v. Brannan
... ... State v. Burdulis, 70 Wash.2d 24, 421 P.2d 1019 (1966); State v. Dawes, 66 Wash.2d 578, 404 P.2d 20 (1965); Tacoma v. Welcker,65 Wash.2d 677, 399 P.2d 330 (1965); Medical Lake v. Brown, 63 Wash.2d 41, 385 P.2d 387 (1963); King County v. Theilman, 59 Wash.2d 586, 369 P.2d 503 (1962), and State ex rel. Sternoff v. Superior Court, Supra. Accord: State v. Burch, 7 ... ...