State v. DeArman
| Decision Date | 26 June 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 21697-0-I,21697-0-I |
| Citation | 774 P.2d 1247,54 Wn.App. 621 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Washington Respondent, v. Ivan Brent DeARMAN, Appellant. |
John Christiansen and Dawn K. Monroe, Washington Appellate Defender, Seattle, for Appellant, Ivan DeArman.
Al Gehri and Kevin Korsmo, King County Deputy Pros. Atty., Seattle, for Respondent, State.
Ivan DeArman appeals from an order of the Superior Court denying his motion to suppress evidence. He contends that the evidence was the fruit of an automobile stop made in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
At about 2 a.m. on May 20, 1987 at the intersection of Admiralty Way and Gibson Road in South Snohomish County, Deputy Gerald Ross observed an automobile motionless at a stop sign for 45-60 seconds. The automobile's brake lights were on, but Ross could not tell if the headlights were on or if the engine was running. There was no other traffic on the roadway, and Ross thought the automobile might be disabled.
Ross approached the automobile and activated his emergency lights. The automobile then moved through the intersection and pulled over to the side of the road about 50 feet past the intersection. Ross realized the automobile was not disabled, but became "a little suspicious."
Ross asked the driver, Ivan DeArman, for identification. DeArman told him that he had no identification and that his driver's license was expired. Ross then asked him to step out of the automobile. Seeing what appeared to be a wallet in DeArman's hip pocket, Ross again asked that DeArman show him some identification. When DeArman took out his wallet, Ross saw a Washington identification card which he asked DeArman to show him. As DeArman handed the card to Ross, he told Ross there were outstanding warrants for his arrest. Ross confirmed this and arrested DeArman.
During an inventory search at the Snohomish County Jail, cocaine was found in DeArman's wallet and he was charged with possession of a controlled substance. DeArman moved to suppress the cocaine at trial, but the trial court denied the motion. The court concluded that Ross's initial contact of DeArman was a valid Terry 1 stop because DeArman may have needed help. The court also concluded that DeArman's response to the stop sign and Ross's emergency equipment gave rise to an articulable suspicion of criminal activity which justified the request for identification. DeArman was then convicted at a trial on stipulated facts.
DeArman contends that the cocaine was the fruit of an unreasonable seizure. In order to address this contention, we must first determine at what point a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurred. State v. Stroud, 30 Wash.App. 392, 394, 634 P.2d 316 (1981), review denied, 96 Wash. 1025 (1982).
A seizure occurs if " 'in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.' " State v. Aranguren, 42 Wash.App. 452, 455, 711 P.2d 1096 (1985), (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)). Here, DeArman contends that he was seized when Deputy Ross activated his emergency lights. This court has held that a seizure occurs when police officers pull up behind a parked vehicle and activate their emergency lights and high beam headlights. State v. Stroud, 30 Wash.App. 392, 634 P.2d 316. In that case, under similar circumstances, we stated that
the officers' attempt to summon the occupants of the parked car with both their emergency lights and high beam headlights constituted a show of authority sufficient to convey to any reasonable person that voluntary departure from the scene was not a realistic alternative.
Stroud, 30 Wash.App. at 396, 634 P.2d 316. Thus, it is clear that DeArman was seized when Ross pulled up behind him and activated his emergency lights.
We next address the issue of whether the seizure was reasonable. See Stroud, 30 Wash.App. at 396, 634 P.2d 316. A seizure is reasonable only if an officer has "a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity." State v. Larson, 93 Wash.2d 638, 644, 611 P.2d 771 (1980), (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979)); see also State v. Kennedy, 107 Wash.2d 1, 5, 726 P.2d 445 (1986).
Two cases, State v. Stroud and State v. Larson, are factually similar to the case before us and control its outcome. In Stroud, officers signalled a parked automobile because it was unusual for an automobile to be parked in a high crime area late at night. The court in that case held that the seizure was unreasonable because the officers were unable to articulate specific, objective facts upon which to base a reasonable suspicion that the person stopped was engaged in criminal activity. Stroud, 30 Wash.App. at 399, 634 P.2d 316.
In Larson, officers stopped an automobile and questioned a passenger, initially because the automobile was illegally parked and was in a high crime area near a closed park late at night, and then because it began to pull away as the patrol car approached. Larson, 93 Wash.2d at 642-43, 611 P.2d 771. The court concluded that stopping the automobile and questioning the passenger was not reasonable under these facts. Larson, 93 Wash.2d at 643, 611 P.2d 771.
Larson's holding is not limited to a determination of the passenger's rights. The court also held that neither the fact that the automobile was stopped late at night in a high crime area nor the fact that it pulled away when approached provided a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the occupants of the automobile were engaged in criminal conduct. Larson, 93 Wash.2d at 643, 611 P.2d 771. There was no evidence that the car had stopped more than momentarily, and, as far as the officers knew, it could have stopped for any of many legitimate reasons. Larson, 93 Wash.2d at 643, 611 P.2d 771. The court also expressly concluded that the fact that the driver began to pull away when the police approached could not be a basis for the decision to stop because the police had already made that decision before they even approached the automobile. Larson, 93 Wash.2d at 643, 611 P.2d 771.
Larson, and Stroud support the appellant's position. First, the simple fact that...
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