State v. Deas
| Decision Date | 11 January 1943 |
| Docket Number | 15486. |
| Citation | 23 S.E.2d 820,202 S.C. 9 |
| Parties | STATE v. DEAS et al. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
McEachin & Townsend, of Florence, for appellants.
J Reuben Long, Solicitor, of Conway, and George W. Keels, of Florence, for respondent.
Appellants were tried in the Court of General Sessions for Florence County at the June, 1941, term upon an indictment for murder and were convicted of manslaughter. The homicide occurred at about four o'clock in the morning at a "juke joint" on the Darlington highway near the City of Florence in March of that year. No detailed statement of the facts is necessary for consideration of the exceptions, but they will be referred to as may be thought necessary in the discussion of the latter.
Able counsel for the appellants have in their brief conveniently grouped the allegations of error under three questions, the first of which complains of the admission in evidence over objection of testimony of the proprietor of the roadhouse concerning a conversation between him and the male appellant at the place, the locus of the crime, about a half-hour after its commission when this appellant returned to the scene and the witness threatened him with a shotgun and told him that he had already done enough damage there. In the light of retrospect it is difficult to see the relevancy of this conversation but a consideration of all of the evidence particularly that given by this witness, makes impossible the conclusion that any prejudice resulted to the appellants from it. As has been many times said, the admission of evidence is largely within the discretion of the trial judge and erroneous exercise of it must be accompanied by probable prejudice to a party in order to entitle him to a new trial for admission or rejection of questioned evidence. State v. Gregory, 198 S.C. 98, 16 S.E.2d 532.
The second exception is included under this general head and it is contended by it that appellants were prejudiced by the admission of questions by the Solicitor of the appellant Deas on cross-examination as to whether he had shot a hole in the floor of the home of the other appellant on the night before the tragedy, which the witness denied, but the implication in the questions tended to rebut the contention of the witness that his first possession of the pistol was on the night of the killing and that he had then taken it from the home of his co-defendant, at her request, for the purpose of cleaning it, so that evidence of his using it before would have been admissible, within the discretion of the trial judge, to rebut his former testimony. It cannot be overlooked that this was cross-examination, the range of which is ordinarily peculiarly within the sound discretion of the trial court.
However it is contended that the case falls within the rule illustrated by State v. Gilstrap, 149 S.C. 445, 147 S.E. 600; State v. Peden, 157 S.C. 459, 154 S.E 658, and State v. Gregory, 191 S.C. 212, 4 S.E.2d 1. Undoubtedly, as said in these and other decisions, one on trial may not be subjected to proof or evidence of other crimes than that involved in the instant charge, with certain now irrelevant exceptions, but the challenged questions did not go to the length of imputing any other crime to either of the defendants. Indeed, affirmative answers to the questions objected to would not have established any crime.
For the reasons assigned, we think that the exceptions charging error in the admission of testimony must be overruled.
The next question for consideration arises out of the following isolated portions of the court's charge to the jury:
These portions of the charge are criticized for their allegedly erroneous references to the proof of malice. But they related to the crime of murder and the jury were instructed that a finding of malice was necessary for a conviction of such and not present in manslaughter, so the effect of the verdict was an acquittal of the defendants of the charge of murder and therefore an acquittal of malice. Thus whether the charge of the court was correct in that respect is now an academic question and there could have been no prejudicial error, if error at all, on that account. State v. Chambers, 194 S.C. 197, 9 S.E.2d 549.
The third and final question made by appellants, including their remaining exceptions, alleges error arising out of the following circumstances. At the outset of his charge the court, evidently anticipating the...
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State v. Simmons
...to direct a verdict, do not fall within the inhibition of the constitution against charging the jury as to matters of fact. State v. Deas, 202 S.C. 9, 23 S.E.2d 820, and earlier cases cited therein. And we have held that remarks made by the trial judge in the course of a trial need not be c......
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State v. Coggins
... ... But ... even in that aspect it did not constitute objectionable ... expression of the opinion of the judge anent the testimony, ... as earnestly contended by appellant's long-experienced ... counsel. State v. Mishoe, 198 S.C. 215, 17 S.E.2d ... 142. State v. Deas, 202 S.C. 9, 23 [210 S.C. 246] ... S.E.2d 820. This conclusion is not in conflict with the ... decision in State v. Simmons, S.C., 41 S.E.2d 217 ... The ... basis of the last exception is a reprimand of defendant's ... counsel by the Court. There had been repeated ... ...