State v. Delbert O. Vest
| Decision Date | 29 May 2001 |
| Docket Number | 00CA2576,01-LW-2006 |
| Citation | 2001 Ohio 2394 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee v. DELBERT O. VEST, Defendant-Appellant Case |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Paige J. McMahon, 42 East Fifth Street Chillicothe, Ohio 45601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Edward R. Bunstine and Robert C. Hess, 32 South Paint Street, Chillicothe, Ohio 45601
This is an appeal from a Chillicothe Municipal Court judgment of conviction and sentence. The trial court found Delbert O Vest, defendant below and appellee herein, guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(3).
Appellant assigns the following error for review:
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS."
Our review of the record reveals the following pertinent facts. On August 6, 2000, at approximately 1:54 a.m., Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Timothy Karwatske drove his patrol cruiser on State Route 23, a four-lane divided highway with two lanes of opposite travel. Trooper Karwatske then observed a vehicle traveling in front of him.
Trooper Karwatske testified that when he first saw the vehicle, his cruiser was in the left lane and the other vehicle was in the right lane. He stated that he observed the vehicle cross over the line which divided the two lanes of travel. Trooper Karwatske stated that the vehicle crossed the dividing line by approximately six inches to one foot. The trooper further observed the vehicle cross the dividing line by six inches to one foot two additional times before he decided to stop the vehicle.
Upon stopping appellant, Trooper Karwatske discovered that appellant had been operating his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.[1] The officer subsequently charged appellant with: (1) operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(3); (2) operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1); and (3) driving outside the marked lanes, in violation of R.C. 4511.33.
On August 22, 2000, appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence. Appellant argued, inter alia, that Trooper Karwatske lacked a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the traffic stop. Specifically, appellant contended that the trooper lacked a reasonable suspicion that appellant had committed any traffic violation.
On October 25, 2000, the trial court held a hearing to consider appellant's motion to suppress evidence. At the hearing appellant testified that the trooper, by quickly pulling up behind appellant's vehicle, caused appellant to "flinch" and to swerve the vehicle. The trial court, however, rejected appellant's assertion that the trooper caused appellant to drive outside the marked lane. The court noted that Trooper Karwatske stated that when he first observed appellant's vehicle drive outside the marked lane, the trooper was in the left lane and appellant was in the right lane. Thus, the court found specious appellant's testimony that the trooper pulling directly behind appellant caused appellant to swerve.
The court further found that appellant's vehicle crossed the dividing line between the two lanes of travel by six inches to one foot three times within a quarter of a mile. The court concluded that appellant's driving outside the marked lanes provided Trooper Karwatske with a reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop.
Following the trial court's denial of appellant's motion to suppress evidence, appellant withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a no contest plea to violating R.C. 4511.19(A)(3). The state dismissed the remaining two charges. The trial court sentenced appellant to forty-five days in jail. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
In his sole assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred by overruling his motion to suppress. Appellant argues that the trial court should have suppressed the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop because the traffic stop violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. In particular, appellant argues that Trooper Karwatske failed to articulate specific facts to demonstrate that he possessed a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop of appellant's vehicle. Appellant asserts that Trooper Karwatske did not observe appellant commit any traffic violations or any erratic driving that would justify a traffic stop.
The state asserts that the trial court correctly determined that appellant's conduct in driving his vehicle outside the marked lane by six inches to one foot three times within a quarter to one-half mile provided the trooper with a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify a stop of appellant's vehicle. We agree with the state.
We initially note that appellate review of a trial court's decision regarding a motion to suppress evidence involves mixed questions of law and fact. See State v. Long (1998), 127 Ohio App.3d 328, 332, 713 N.E.2d 1, 3. When ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. See State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583, 584; State v. Dunlap (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 314, 652 N.E.2d 988, 995. Accordingly, a reviewing court must defer to the trial court's findings of fact if competent, credible evidence exists to support the trial court's findings. See Long, supra; State v. Medcalf (1996), 111 Ohio App.3d 142, 675 N.E.2d 1268; Dunlap, supra. The reviewing court then must independently determine, without deference to the trial court, whether the trial court properly applied the substantive law to the facts of the case. See Long; State v. Williams (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 37, 619 N.E.2d 1141; State v. Fields (Nov. 29, 1999), Hocking App. No. 99 CA 11, unreported. See, generally, Ornelas v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911.
The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,[2] as well as Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution,[3] protect individuals against unreasonable governmental searches and seizures. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 662, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1400, 59 L.Ed.2d 660; State v. Gullett (1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 138, 143, 604 N.E.2d 176, 179. In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court held that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment--subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Id., (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576; see, also, State v. Sneed (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 3, 6-7, 584 N.E.2d 1160, 1165; State v. Braxton (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 28, 36, 656 N.E.2d 970, 975.
One exception to the general prohibition against warrantless seizures exists when an officer possesses probable cause to believe that an individual has committed a traffic violation. See Whren v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 806, 809, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89. In Whren, the Supreme Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment's reasonable requirement is fulfilled and a law enforcement officer may constitutionally stop the driver of a vehicle when the officer possesses probable cause to believe that the driver of the vehicle has committed a traffic violation. Id. The court stated that "the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." Id., 517 U.S. at 809-10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89; see, also Dayton v. Erickson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12, 665 N.E.2d 1091, 1097-1098.
In the absence of probable cause to believe that the driver of a vehicle has committed a traffic violation, a law enforcement officer generally may not stop the vehicle unless the officer observes facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See, generally, Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889; State v. Andrews (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 565 N.E.2d 1271; State v. Venham (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 654, 645 N.E.2d 831, 833. To justify a traffic stop based upon less than probable cause, the officer must be able to articulate specific facts which would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person stopped has committed or is committing a crime, including a minor traffic violation.[4] See Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12, 665 N.E.2d 1091, 1097-1098; Prouse, supra; Terry, supra.
Based upon the foregoing well-established principles of law, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that Trooper Karwatske's initial stop of appellant complied with the Fourth Amendment. Trooper Karwatske stated that he observed appellant drive outside the marked lane of travel three times within a short distance (one-quarter to one-half mile) and that appellant's vehicle crossed the dividing line by six inches to one foot. Appellant's driving provided the officer with probable cause to believe that appellant violated R.C. 4511.33(A).[5] Because the trooper possessed probable cause to believe that appellant had committed a traffic violation, the trooper's conduct in stopping appellant did not violate appellant's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures. See Whren; Erickson; see, also, State v Bolding (May 28, 1999), Erie App. No. E-97-115, unreported (concluding that driving outside the marked lane by one-half of a foot sufficient to justify traffic stop); State v. Myers (Jan. 7, 1998), Summit App. No. 18292, unreported ( that driving outside...
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