State v. Delbosque
| Decision Date | 30 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 96709-1,96709-1 |
| Citation | 195 Wash.2d 106,456 P.3d 806 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Cristian DELBOSQUE Respondent. |
Timothy J. Higgs, Mason County Prosecuting, Attorney Office, P.O. Box 639, Shelton, WA 98584-0639, for Petitioner.
Gregory Charles Link, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Avenue, Suite 610, Seattle, WA 98101-1683, for Respondent.
Nancy Lynn Talner, ACLU-WA, P.O. Box 2728, Seattle, WA 98111-2728, for Amicus Curiae (American Civil Liberties Union of Washington).
David A. Perez, Thomas W. Hillier, II, Sopen Shah, Perkins Coie LLP 1201 3rd Avenue, Suite 4900, Seattle, WA 98101-3099, Robert S. Chang, Melissa R. Lee, Jessica Levin, Seattle University School of Law, 901 12th Avenue, Seattle, WA 98122-4411, for Amicus Curiae (Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality).
Rita Joan Griffith, Attorney at Law, 4616 25th Avenue NE, PMB 453, Seattle, WA 98105-4523, for Amicus Curiae (Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers).
James Morrissey Whisman, King County Prosecutor's Office, 516 3rd Avenue, W554 King County Courthouse, Seattle, WA 98104-2385, for Amicus Curiae (Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys).
Hillary Ann Behrman, The Washington Defender Association, 110 Prefontaine Place South, #610 Seattle, WA 98104-2626, for Amicus Curiae (Washington Defenders Association).
¶ 1 We have continually recognized that children are different from adults for the purpose of sentencing. We also recognize that trial judges face an extraordinarily difficult task when determining whether a child’s crime is a reflection of transient immaturity or permanent incorrigibility. This case requires us to elaborate on how that determination is made in the context of Miller - fix1 resentencing.
¶ 2 In 1994, 17-year-old Cristian J. Delbosque was convicted of aggravated first degree murder and received a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of release. Because he was a juvenile at the time of his offense, Delbosque was resentenced in 2016 in accordance with the Miller -fix statute and received a minimum term of 48 years without the possibility of parole. The Court of Appeals concluded that Delbosque could seek review of his sentence only through a personal restraint petition (PRP), rather than direct appeal, but nevertheless reversed his sentence, holding that the trial court’s factual findings were not supported by substantial evidence.
¶ 3 We affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding that the sentencing court’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence, thus remanding for resentencing was proper. However, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ holding that Delbosque was not entitled to a direct appeal. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for resentencing.
¶ 4 On October 18, 1993, after a period of heavy drinking, 17-year-old Delbosque brutally murdered Filiberto Sandoval and Kristina Berg. When questioned by police, Delbosque waived his rights and confessed to the murders, although he testified at trial that his girlfriend was the one responsible.
¶ 5 A jury found Delbosque guilty of aggravated first degree murder for the death of Berg and second degree felony murder for the death of Sandoval. Delbosque was sentenced to mandatory life without the possibility of parole for Berg’s murder.2
¶ 6 The Washington Legislature enacted the Miller -fix statute in response to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455. Miller held the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment prohibits mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles and requires sentencing judges to consider "how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." Id. at 480, 132 S. Ct. 2455 ; U.S. CONST . amend. VIII. The Miller -fix amended several RCW chapters relating to juvenile sentencing; however, this case involves only provisions concerning unlawful mandatory life without parole sentences for aggravated first degree murder. RCW 10.95.035(1) provides that juveniles who received such sentences prior to June 1, 2014 "shall be returned to the sentencing court or the sentencing court’s successor for sentencing consistent with RCW 10.95.030." Delbosque was a juvenile eligible to be resentenced.
¶ 7 Between June and November 2016, the superior court held a four-day evidentiary hearing pursuant to the Miller -fix statute. Both sides presented several witnesses who testified about the crime, about Delbosque’s life experience leading up to the murders, and about his behavior as an adult. In its oral ruling, the trial sentenced Delbosque to a minimum term of 48 years without the possibility of release.
¶ 8 The State presented testimony from the officer who investigated the crime, the juvenile court officer who interviewed Delbosque for his decline determination, and the unit supervisor of the prison where Delbosque was incarcerated at the time of his resentencing. While incarcerated, Delbosque received prison infractions for fighting without a weapon; for extortion; and for possession of a weapon, tattoo paraphernalia, and another inmate’s property. Between the ages of 29 and 32, he was repeatedly investigated for gang-related violence. His last infraction occurred in 2010, alleging that Delbosque used his position in a gang to arrange an assault on another inmate. None of the infractions were referred for prosecution. The corrections officer also testified that but for Delbosque’s life sentence and immigration detainer, he would be classified as a minimum security prisoner. Six victim impact statements were offered by Berg’s family members.
¶ 9 Delbosque’s siblings testified about his childhood experiences of growing up in extreme poverty and losing his mother as a young child. In addition, Delbosque confided during his psychiatric evaluations that he was physically and sexually abused by multiple family members.
¶ 10 Two experts testified in support of Delbosque. Dr. Manuel Saint Martin testified about Delbosque’s current psychological state and low propensity for future dangerousness. He also concluded that Delbosque was likely experiencing alcohol-induced psychosis
at the time of the crime. Dr. Sarah Heavin opined that Delbosque’s executive functioning deficits were likely greater than the average 17-year-old because of his early childhood traumas. This in turn would have negatively impacted his development and ability to regulate his behavior.
4 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (Nov. 23, 2016) at 662.
¶ 12 The court then entered an order incorporating a supplemental written memorandum opinion that set forth the court’s findings and conclusions.
¶ 13 Delbosque directly appealed, and the Court of Appeals unanimously reversed in a published opinion. State v. Delbosque , 6 Wash. App. 2d 407, 430 P.3d 1153 (2018). The court held that "the proper method for Delbosque to seek review of the superior court’s order is a PRP," but it decided to "disregard this procedural defect and review Delbosque’s appeal as a PRP." Id. at 413-14, 430 P.3d 1153.
¶ 14 On the merits, the court held that "(1) the superior court’s findings regarding Delbosque having an attitude toward others reflective of the underlying crime and of Delbosque’s permanent incorrigibility and irretrievable depravity are not supported by substantial evidence and (2) the superior court failed to comply with the Miller -fix statute when setting the minimum term." Id. at 414, 430 P.3d 1153. The court therefore determined that Delbosque’s restraint is unlawful, granted his PRP, and remanded for resentencing. Id. at 421, 430 P.3d 1153.
¶ 15 The State filed a petition for review challenging the Court of Appeals’ decision on the merits. Delbosque sought review of the Court of Appeals’ decision to treat his appeal as a PRP. We granted review of both issues.
¶ 16 A. Were the superior court’s findings supported by substantial evidence in the record?
¶ 17 B. If the findings were not supported by substantial evidence, is the appropriate remedy to remand for resentencing to give the trial court the benefit of our subsequent decisions?
¶ 18 C. Does RCW 10.95.035(3), which requires parties seeking review of a minimum term sentence imposed pursuant to the Miller -fix statute to file a PRP, violate the right to appeal in criminal cases guaranteed by article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution ?
¶ 19 Three provisions of the Miller -fix statute govern Delbosque’s resentencing. First, RCW 10.95.035(1) provides that juveniles who received such sentences prior to June 1, 2014 "shall be returned to the sentencing court or the sentencing court’s successor for sentencing consistent with RCW 10.95.030." Second, RCW 10.95.030(3)(a)(ii) gives 16- to 18-year-old juvenile homicide offenders a chance to become eligible for parole by requiring that they receive "a maximum term of life imprisonment and a minimum term of total...
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