State v. Dell'Orfano
| Citation | 651 So.2d 1213 |
| Decision Date | 01 February 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-3247,93-3247 |
| Parties | 20 Fla. L. Weekly D293 STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. David DELL'ORFANO, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Sarah B. Mayer, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Joseph L. DeGance, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
David Dell'Orfano was charged with one count of sexual battery upon a child and three counts of indecent assault. The victim was his thirteen-year-old daughter. The counts in the original information alleged that the offenses took place over a three-year period. The state later reduced the time frame from three to two and one-half years. The record reflects that there were approximately ten incidents of this conduct alleged.
The trial court early on dismissed the charges, applying a per se rule that the period of time utilized to frame the allegations unfairly hampered appellee, the accused, in preparing his defense and that double jeopardy considerations also required dismissal.
On appeal from this earlier ruling we reversed, rejecting the application of a per se rule. State v. Dell'Orfano, 592 So.2d 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). The Florida Supreme Court agreed that a per se rule was inappropriate in a criminal case involving child abuse. Dell'Orfano v. State, 616 So.2d 33 (Fla.1993). In its opinion, the supreme court articulated the test for trial courts to apply in such cases when assessing a time period alleged in an information.
On remand, the trial court again granted appellee's motion to dismiss, but from a The Court's position is this: The information that I have available to me right now is that we are dealing--The time frames have been narrowed down originally from a thirty-five month period of time to twenty-seven month period. Within that twenty-seven months, the child is indicating--and I'll use Count I as my example right now--that there are ten separate instances of sexual battery occurring upon her during that twenty-seven month period of time. Any one of those ten separate instances could support a finding of guilt on Count I.
slightly different perspective. Describing its perceived dilemma, the court explained:
In my view, to span a twenty-seven month period of time with ten completely separate distinct crimes within that twenty-seven month period of time, and require the Defendant to defend against--without knowing specifically which one to defend against--all ten in a single count, I don't think is fair.
The difficulty is--I don't see that there is a surmountable problem by special verdict forms. And one of the difficulties that I see is that let's assume for the moment those ten counts, and we have six jurors. And of those ten counts, juror number one finds that the first time was proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but juror number two doesn't find that. Juror number two thinks the second time was proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but juror number one doesn't think that, and so forth down the line.
There is no unanimity as to a particular crime. And without unanimity as to a particular crime, all agree that a sexual battery occurred at some point during the twenty-seven month period of time, but no one can agree when, and there is no unanimity as to the time.
I don't think that would support a finding of guilt. And if the State can't narrow the time frames down, I don't see how it's possible, with ten separate offenses, for the Court to have a special verdict form that would permit an unanimous verdict in the case.
What it places the Defendant as regarding against is a totally non-unanimous verdict as to the offense, with no way of knowing that it's non-unanimous, with no way of establishing that. To me that is an extreme danger of putting ten crimes from a single Information, particularly if the State has the inability within those ten crimes to be able to say--to distinguish it any better than that either, or if special verdict forms would be workable in the case.
It is well settled that separate and distinct offenses may not generally be alleged in a single count of an indictment or information. McGahagin v. State, 17 Fla. 665, 668 (Fla.1880). To be legally sufficient, an information can neither be so vague or indefinite as to mislead or embarrass the accused, or subject him or her to multiple prosecution. Fla.R.Crim.Pro. 3.140(o). See also e.g., Martinez v. State, 368 So.2d 338, 339-40 (Fla.1978). The Florida Supreme Court wrote the following when this case was before it in 1993:
The present case poses two conflicting public policy concerns that the Court must reconcile. First is the strong interest in eliminating the sexual abuse of children through vigorous enforcement of child-abuse laws. We recognize that young children often are unable to remember the specific dates on which they were abused. Second is the strong interest of defendants in being apprised of the charges against them such that they can prepare an adequate defense. The latter concern has been codified to some extent in Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.140(d)(3) and 3.140(o), although there is also a due-process basis for it. Art. I, Sec. 9, Fla. Const.
Dell'Orfano v. State, 616 So.2d 33, 34 (Fla.1993). The supreme court articulated this position with respect to the issue of the time period utilized to frame the allegations. We think the same policy concerns apply when approaching the question of duplicity.
Though Florida courts have apparently not yet addressed the precise issue of charging multiple occurrences in sexual abuse cases, other states have recognized the need for The Washington Supreme Court, which reversed a conviction in a sexual abuse of a child case based on the fact that the jury was allowed to find guilt on a multiple-offenses count with evidence of many incidents, still offered to leave the matter of charging in these highly sensitive, difficult to pin down sexual abuse crimes to the discretion of the prosecutor:
prosecutorial discretion in such cases. See e.g., State v. Petrich, 101 Wash.2d 566, 683 P.2d 173 (1984) (En Banc); State v. Altgilbers, 109 N.M. 453, 786 P.2d 680 (App.1989), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 419, 785 P.2d 1038 (1990).
Multiple instances of criminal conduct with the same child victim is a frequent, if not the usual, pattern. Note, The Crime of Incest Against the Minor Child and the States' Statutory Responses, 17 J.Fam.Law 93, 99 (1978-79). Whether the incidents are to be charged separately or brought as one charge is a decision within prosecutorial discretion. Many factors are weighed in making that decision, including the victim's ability to testify to specific times and places.... The criteria used to determine that only a single charge should be brought, may indicate that the election of one particular act for conviction is impractical.
State v. Petrich, 683 P.2d at 178.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals which quoted the Petrich language also confronted the issue at bar. State v. Altgilbers, 786 P.2d 680. In Altgilbers, two of the defendant's children allegedly had been sexually abused repeatedly over a five year period. The court specifically addressed the dilemma of charging a count in the information for each incident (one child was allegedly abused every other day, while the other was allegedly abused once a week) which is burdensome or logistically overwhelming, or charging all the incidents in one count which can lead to substantial unfairness to the defendant (because one act of misconduct can be proved by any one of a multitude of separate acts committed over a long period). Id. 109 N.M. at 464-65, 786 P.2d at 691-92. Again, in this instance, the court determined that the prosecutor should be afforded discretion in choosing his or her charging pattern. Id. 109 N.M. at 465, 786 P.2d at 692.
In the instant case, the information lists four counts. Each count includes only one specific criminal act, but charges that such act occurred on one or more occasions over a two and one-half year time period. It...
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