State v. Delonde Nathanal Pleasant, No. 21922-4-III (Wash. App. 7/31/2007)
| Decision Date | 31 July 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 21922-4-III.,21922-4-III. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Washington |
| Parties | STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. DELONDE NATHANAL PLEASANT, Appellant. |
Appeal from Franklin Superior Court. Docket No: 02-1-50091-8. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 03/21/2003. Judge signing: Honorable Carolyn A Brown.
Counsel for Appellant(s), James Edward Egan, James E Egan PS, 315 W Kennewick Ave, Kennewick, WA, 99336-3827.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Steven Mark Lowe, Attorney at Law, 1016 N 4th Ave, Pasco, WA, 99301-3706.
Frank William Jenny II, Attorney at Law, 1016 N 4th Ave, Pasco, WA, 99301-3706.
Delonde Pleasant pleaded guilty to first degree manslaughter pursuant to an Alford1 plea. He challenges the trial court's imposition of an exceptional sentence based on the trial court's own findings of fact in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004). This court stayed this case pending the Washington Supreme Court's decision in State v. Pillatos, 159 Wn.2d 459, 150 P.3d 1130 (2007).
We hold that the trial court violated Mr. Pleasant's constitutional rights when it based its imposition of an exceptional sentence on findings of fact that were not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. But, because this constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm the exceptional sentence in this case.
Delonde Pleasant was arrested on March 3, 2002, and charged with first degree murder. Mr. Pleasant pleaded guilty pursuant to an Alford plea to first degree manslaughter. In his statement on the plea of guilty, Mr. Pleasant indicated that he knew the State planned to seek an exceptional sentence of three times the standard range. However, Mr. Pleasant also reserved the right, in his statement, to argue at the sentencing hearing for a standard range sentence and to appeal any exceptional sentence that was imposed.
During his allocution at the sentencing hearing, Mr. Pleasant apologized to the court and to SanJuanita Montelongo's family members. He did not, however, admit to any of the specific facts that the trial court relied upon in imposing an exceptional sentence. In fact, Mr. Pleasant went on to dispute each of the facts presented by the State in support of finding the aggravating factor of deliberate cruelty.
Mr. Pleasant did not dispute that Ms. Montelongo's infant child was present when she was killed. But he did claim that the child was asleep the entire time. Mr. Pleasant argued that the fact that Ms. Montelongo's child was asleep meant that the State could not establish the aggravating factor that this crime of domestic violence occurred within the sight or sound of Ms. Montelongo's child. According to Mr. Pleasant's argument, the infant would have had to have been awake to have seen or heard the assault. The trial court rejected this argument.
The trial court imposed an exceptional sentence of 306 months. The standard range sentence for Mr. Pleasant was 78 to 102 months. Among the findings of fact that the trial court cited in support of the exceptional sentence was that Mr. Pleasant inflicted injuries on Ms. Montelongo that were far greater than needed to accomplish her death; that Mr. Pleasant's and Ms. Montelongo's child was present in the home at the time of the homicide; and that the gratuitous violence of the crime constituted deliberate cruelty.
The central issue for this court is whether the trial court erred in imposing an exceptional sentence in this case.2
The court imposed an exceptional sentence of 306 months. The standard sentencing range for Mr. Pleasant was 78 to 102 months. The trial court imposed an exceptional sentence in part because of testimony presented at the sentencing hearing, a presentence report submitted by the State, and the State's memorandum in support of an exceptional sentence. The facts alleged at the sentencing hearing, in the presentence report, and in the State's memorandum in support of the exceptional sentence were not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Mr. Pleasant challenges this sentence in light of Blakely and State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118, 110 P.3d 192 (2005), abrogated by Washington v. Recuenco, 126 S. Ct. 2546, 165 L. Ed. 2d 466 (2006).
In Blakely, the Supreme Court held that a defendant has a constitutional right to have a jury determine whether the factors permitting an exceptional sentence have been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301-03.
The State contends that Blakely does not apply here because Mr. Pleasant pleaded guilty to the crime of first degree manslaughter with the knowledge that the State would request an exceptional sentence from the court. In support of its position, the State cites State v. Hagar, 126 Wn. App. 320, 105 P.3d 65 (2005), rev'd, 158 Wn.2d 369, 144 P.3d 298 (2006). The State asserts that Hagar stands for the proposition that any case involving a plea agreement renders the protections of Blakely inapplicable, so long as the State performs its portion of the plea agreement.
But the holding in Hagar rests on grounds other than the fact the defendant entered into a plea agreement. In Hagar, the defendant could not challenge the judicial fact finding because he had stipulated, in his allocution, to all of the facts that supported the exceptional sentence; not because he had entered into a plea bargain. Hagar, 126 Wn. App. at 322.
Moreover, the Washington Supreme Court has since reversed the holding in Hagar. The court found that the defendant had "stipulated certain facts but did not stipulate that the crimes constituted a `major economic offense,'" which was the fact relied upon by the trial court when imposing an exceptional sentence. Hagar, 158 Wn.2d at 374.
Under Blakely, a defendant may waive his rights to fact finding by a jury so long as the defendant either consents to judicial fact finding or stipulates to the relevant facts that support the sentencing enhancements. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 310. The relevant facts that supported Mr. Pleasant's exceptional sentence included the presence of Ms. Montelongo's child during the beating, the severity of Ms. Montelongo's multiple injuries, and Mr. Pleasant's deliberate cruelty manifested during the commission of the crime. Mr. Pleasant did not stipulate to any of these facts, and went so far as to deny that he had any recollection at all of what had occurred on the day that he killed Ms. Montelongo.
There is also no evidence that Mr. Pleasant waived his right to dispute the imposition of an exceptional sentence or otherwise consented to judicial fact finding. While Mr. Pleasant was aware that the State would seek an exceptional sentence, he reserved the right to challenge such a sentence being imposed.
Mr. Pleasant did not stipulate to the specific facts that supported the trial court's imposition of an exceptional sentence in this case. He did not waive his right to challenge the judicial fact finding and imposition of an exceptional sentence. The trial court violated Mr. Pleasant's constitutional rights when it based its exceptional sentence on findings of fact that were not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Although Mr. Pleasant has demonstrated that his constitutional right to a jury determination has been violated, this court applies a harmless error standard to such violations. See Recuenco, 126 S. Ct. at 2553. The State argues that, had the State presented evidence supporting the aggravating factors to a properly-instructed jury, the jury would necessarily have found all of these factors beyond any reasonable doubt.
The majority of jurisdictions review for harmless error within the framework of Neder v. United States.3 Under this version of the harmless error test, an error is harmless if overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence supports the element. See United States v. Zepeda-Martinez, 470 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2006); Smart v. State, 146 P.3d 15, 39 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006); Galindez v. State, 955 So. 2d 517, 521, 32 Fla. L. Weekly 89 (2007); ...
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