State v. Demas

• Decision Date: 23 February 1921
• Docket Number: 15792.
• Citation: 114 Wash. 596,195 P. 1001
• Parties: STATE v. DEMAS.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

195 P. 1001

114 Wash. 596

STATE v. DEMAS.

No. 15792.

Supreme Court of Washington

February 23, 1921

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, Snohomish County; Guy C. Alston, Judge.

H Demas was convicted of sodomy, and he appeals. Affirmed.

C. D Liliopoulas, of Seattle, and William Sheller, of Everett, for appellant.

Thos A. Stiger, of Everett, for the State.

BRIDGES J.

The defendant was convicted of a certain crime which the state charged he had committed. From judgment of sentence he has appealed. By independent testimony, he sought to impeach the testimony of the complaining witness for the state, by showing that he had been guilty of immoral acts and conduct and the court sustained the state's objections to that character of testimony. In its ruling it said:

'There is only one thing I will permit you to show with reference to the witness [complaining witness], and that is his reputation for truth and veracity. Whether he was immoral or moral was not a matter upon which he can be impeached, but you may simply show his reputation for truth and veracity as affecting his credibility as a witness. * * * Now, it is wholly immaterial to this case whether this boy is immoral or very moral except in so far as it may bear upon his testimony--his credibility as a witness. Now, you cannot bring witnesses to prove he is immoral, * * * but whether or not this boy has been guilty of things which made it necessary for the school authorities to chastise him or reprimand him is not an issue in this case, and you cannot show those things even for the purpose of affecting his credibility as a witness, but, if you want to impeach his testimony, you may show whether or not he is a boy whose word is considered good or bad in the community in which he lives, whether or not he is a truthful or untruthful boy.'

The appellant argues that he was entitled to show the immoral character of the state's witness, and cites several cases in support of this contention. Among those cited are State v. Jackson, 83 Wash. 514, 145 P. 470, and State v. Gaul, 88 Wash. 302, 152 P. 1029. This court in those two cases held that independent and separate testimony might be received to show the general moral reputation of a witness, for the purpose of affecting his credibility, but we have never gone so far as to hold that occasional or isolated instances of immoral acts might be proven for that purpose. In the case of State v. Jackson, supra, we said:

'We nevertheless believe that the reputation of a witness for immorality may be inquired into, either upon cross-examination or by a resort to general reputation. It is not the manner of proof that concerns the law so much as the object sought to be attained, for, as said by this court in the Coella Case, a woman cannot ruthlessly destroy that quality upon which most other good qualities are dependent and for which, above all others, a woman is reverenced and respected, and retain her reputation for truthfulness unsmirched. We can mark no distinction between receiving evidence as to the reputation of a witness for truth and veracity and receiving evidence of reputation as to moral character, when this court has said that a reputation for immorality is a thing to be considered when passing upon the credibility of a witness.'

It will be observed that the court in that case limited the proof to reputation for morality or immorality. We have no disposition to enlarge upon the doctrine of that case. But it is stated that we have already broadened the doctrine of the Jackson Case, because, speaking of that case in State v. Gaul, supra, we said:

'That case and the cases followed passed upon the question of the admissibility of evidence to show immoral habits or conduct of witnesses, either upon cross-examination or by the direct testimony of other witnesses to affect the credibility of the witnesses assailed, and whether that method of impeachment was as permissible as any other.'

When we used the words 'immoral habits or conduct of witnesses,' we were using them in the sense of the reputation of the witness concerning his morality or immorality, and there was no intention of holding or intimating that individual acts of immorality might be shown.

It is said, however, that the ruling of the trial court upon the objections made was broad enough to deny the appellant the right to introduce independent testimony showing, if he could, the reputation of the state's witness for immorality. The result of the court's ruling was...